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THESIS SUMMARY 
As outsourcing continues to grow in large global organisations, governance and risk management of 
the related outsourcing ecosystem is evolving as a strategic Board-level activity, driving competitive 
advantage and value-creation, in addition to value-protection. Amidst this growth and evolution, the 
outsourcing of Information Technology (IT) and IT-enabled Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) 
continues to mature into a broader category referred to by contemporary researchers as “business 
services” including almost every service that can be delivered by third parties, often enabled by 
digitisation and technology.  
Through such strategic initiatives, focused on creating inimitable competitive advantage and 
organisational value, organisations have increased their levels of dependence on outsourcing, 
exposing themselves to newer risks amid shifting business environments. But despite these 
developments, there has been limited research on the ability of organisations to manage risks around 
outsourcing with a dynamic mind-set to create and protect value for organisations. Instead, most 
research continues to focus exclusively on preventing “bad things happening”.  
The first part of the research establishes the context by providing a forward-looking multi-
disciplinary view on strategic risk and governance related to outsourcing. This is followed by gaining 
an understanding of how and why large global organisations are broadening their perspective and 
enhancing maturity over governance and risk-management around their outsourcing ecosystem, 
including capabilities that they must develop to emerge as astute decision-makers, using industry-
specific case studies. The second part of the research uses primary data to capture the overall 
progress made in achieving this transformation and implementation challenges.  
This thesis contributes to the growing body of outsourcing literature by focusing on governance from 
a novel “outsourcing ecosystem” perspective. It also makes practical contributions by identifying and 
addressing implementation challenges relevant to this transformational thinking, together with a 2x2 
framework, which hold relevance for organisations operating with a significant outsourcing 
ecosystem and their leadership.  
 
Keywords: Outsourcing Ecosystem, Strategic Governance, Risk Management. Dynamic Capability, 
Third-party Risk. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Section Summary: This section provides an introduction to the subject and motivation for the 
research. It sets out an overview of the research problem and the change drivers in the macro-
economic and business environment of large global organisations that are propelling these 
organisations to transform themselves to adopt a more strategic approach to the governance and risk 
management of an ever-increasing number of third parties forming their outsourcing ecosystem. 
Having thus set the context, it seeks to identify and address the research gaps in this area by aligning 
them to the research steps and highlighting the proposed contribution from a theoretical and 
practical perspective. Following on from this introduction, the subsequent section will describe the 
philosophy of the research and its phased design, together with empirical data collection and related 
safeguards for ethical conduct of research.  A brief description of the key constructs and terms used in 
this thesis is set out in Appendix – E. 
1.1 Introduction and overview of the research problem 
This thesis explores the emerging change in mind-set (and related organisational transformation) 
around risk management and governance in large global organisations that are outsourcing IT and 
business processes to a progressively larger number of vendors (including some positioned as 
strategic business partners) forming their “outsourcing ecosystem” or “extended enterprise”. These 
organisations consider this change to be highly strategic in nature, i.e. where specific responsibilities 
and behaviours lead to the successful implementation of the organisational strategy. In addition to 
cost-reduction, organisations are increasingly striving to achieve strategic benefits such as more 
flexible IT, access to global markets and talent, etc. making it important to understand sourcing 
projects and their governance within a more strategic context (Lacity, Khan, & Yan, 2016). 
Throughout this thesis, the phrase “third party” is used consistently to refer to providers/suppliers of 
IT and business processes and services, collectively also referred to as the third-party ecosystem 
(discussed in detail in section 3.2 of this thesis), embodying the cumulative impact of these individual 
outsourcing relationships. Accordingly, “outsourcing risk management” refers to the process of 
managing risks related to the third-party ecosystem. 
In support of the growing third-party ecosystem in organisations, recent data published by Deloitte 
(2018) in their publication entitled “Extended Enterprise Risk Management (EERM) – Focusing on 
the Climb Ahead” indicated that more than 56% of large global organisations had more than 1000 
third parties comprising their ecosystem or extended enterprise. Within this group, 27% managed 
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anything between 10,000 and 50,000 third parties as part of their ecosystem while another 19% had 
more than 50,000 third parties forming their extended enterprise. This number is only expected to 
grow in the years ahead.  
This thesis is organised by sections and sub-sections rather than chapters and sub-chapters. The first 
part of the research (section 3) establishes the context by providing a forward-looking multi-
disciplinary view of the emerging concept of strategic governance and risk management. Having set 
the context, it then attempts to gain an understanding of how and why such large global organisations 
are broadening their perspective and maturity over governance and risk-management around their 
outsourcing ecosystem, together with the organisational capabilities that they must develop to emerge 
as astute decision-makers in this regard, using primary research-based industry-specific case studies.  
The second part of the thesis (sections 4 and 5) also uses further primary data, but this time to capture 
the overall progress made in achieving this organisational transformation, identifying the related 
implementation challenges, and evolving good-practice (to address these challenges), to exploit the 
full spectrum of opportunity that the outsourcing ecosystem presents.  
This research recognizes the role of the Board of Directors in large publicly-listed global 
organisations to be in keeping with fiduciary duties to shareholders. This includes providing strategic 
direction and monitoring organisational goals, together with related strategies and policies. The role of 
executive leadership, led by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), is to run the organisation in line with 
the Board’s direction by making operational decisions, keeping the Board informed, and providing 
information and recommendations to support the Board in policy-making, decision-making, and 
oversight. Accordingly, the term “Board-level activity” in this thesis refers to an activity of a strategic 
nature that is directed and monitored by the Board, while being implemented by the executive 
leadership including the CEO and other members of top management (referred to as the C-suite), 
under direct Board oversight. 
Over the last few years, the potential for enhancing organisational value through the outsourcing 
ecosystem, enabled by such strategic governance and risk management, has made it a Board- and top 
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leadership (C-suite)-led imperative and has led researchers to study this phenomenon with a value-
creation and competitive advantage lens. Earlier researchers mainly focused on value after it was 
created, rather than the proactive identification of the antecedents of such value creation (Chebiyyam, 
Sidhartha, Narain, & Kanwal, 2016), in this case through a strategic approach to governance of the 
outsourcing ecosystem. At the same time, related organisations have also gradually increased their 
levels of dependence on outsourcing to unprecedented levels (Forrester Research, 2013; Gartner, 
2014; Deloitte, 2015), exposing themselves to newer risks and hazards amid shifting business 
environments (Starbuck, 2014; Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 2015; Deloitte, 2016; Lacity, Khan, & 
Yan, 2016). Despite this development, over the last decade or so there has been limited research on 
the ability of organisations to manage risks around outsourcing with a strategic and dynamic mind-set 
to create value for organisations. Instead, most researchers have largely examined risk management 
around outsourcing with the goal of preventing “bad things happening” and avoiding the related risks, 
where possible. Further, their research has focused primarily at the level of contract managers and 
other members of middle/lower (i.e. operations-focused) management rather than at strategic 
management or top leadership levels (e.g., Zhang, Liu, Tan, Jiang, & Zhu, 2018; Gupta, 2018; Suveiu, 
2015; Lintukangas, Kahkonen, & Ritala, 2016; Tsan-Ming, Yulan, & Wallace, 2016; Christ, 
Mintchik, Chen, & Bierstaker, 2015; Słoniec, Kaczorowska, & Motyka, 2016; Alexander, & Stefan, 
2016; Jarvenpaa & Keating, 2011; Handley & Benton Jr., 2012; Mason, Oshri, & Leek, 2012), 
although combined vendor-provider operational perspectives have more recently started to emerge 
(e.g. Yu-Chih Liu, & Asri Rizki, 2016; Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2017) and the focus on a broader range 
of third parties beyond just IT or BPO outsourced service providers is starting to develop for the 
benefit of independent reviewers within an organisation such as internal audit functions (Rose & Frio, 
2017). This missing evidence has obscured the full spectrum of potential opportunity that outsourcing 
could create for organisations, particularly those that are more radical or transformational in nature. 
This thesis aims to address the gap and broaden this perspective by gaining a better understanding of 
this strategic transformation, relating it to the development of newer organisational capabilities and 
identifying/addressing the challenges with implementing this new approach. 
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Apart from the growing level of dependence on this outsourcing ecosystem, the uncertain, volatile and 
complex macro-economic and business environment since the last global financial crisis has only 
made the case for such an enquiry more pressing. Starbuck (2014) argues that risk management as 
part of corporate governance should continually consider technological and social changes such as 
networking and alliances, which are propelling corporations toward entirely new organisational forms. 
Further, he stresses that businesses will continue to face growing economic uncertainty and 
turbulence, requiring them to develop new capabilities to increase their maturity in risk management 
in this environment. This call for a refocus on governance and risk management is further supported 
by researchers such as Lehn (2018), who argues that in this rapidly changing environment, 
governance plays a prominent role in ensuring corporate agility, i.e., the ease with which firms adapt 
to changes in their respective environments, particularly in the more decentralised environments. This, 
in turn, is directly related to corporate performance and survival during such periods of environmental 
volatility. Individuals charged with governance, including members of Boards of Directors and Audit 
Committees, as well as C-suite executives are now facing much greater accountability with greater 
consequences for not appropriately discharging governance-related responsibilities, particularly in the 
more regulated industry segments (Keay, 2017; Brinkley, 2016). Researchers believe that increased 
accountability will help drive greater prudence and better conduct in governance (e.g. Korner, 2017). 
As outsourcing evolves, including variants like nearshoring, offshore outsourcing and on-shoring 
(Oshri, Kotlarsky & Willcocks, 2015), the various risks involved and management mechanisms also 
continue to mature and evolve (Carmel & Agarwal 2002; Hahn et al., 2009). The first few waves of 
experimenting with outsourcing have now moved this up the value chain, calling for enhanced and 
evolved strategic mechanisms for governance/risk management.  
1.2 What is changing in the internal and external environment? 
This sub-section highlights the change drivers in the macro-economic and business environment of 
large global organisations that are compelling them to transform their approach to governance and 
risk management of their outsourcing ecosystem and to reposition the same to more strategic levels as 
 10 
explained earlier. Throughout this thesis, the term “strategic governance and risk management” is 
used to denote its close linkage with the successful implementation of the strategy of large global 
organisations in this thesis that operate with a significant outsourcing ecosystem (after establishing its 
implications through literature review in section 3.1), although a number of similar terms such as “the 
adoption of a strategic mind-set”, “strategic transformation”, “strategic repositioning”, and “strategic 
management” are used in prior literature. Therefore at the very outset of the thesis, it is worth gaining 
an understanding of what such strategic responsibilities and behaviours entail. Najmaei (2014) argues 
that strategic management, in both theory and practice, tries to understand how organisations aspire to 
improve their performance in competitive interactions with other firms.  
Given this description, strategic management can be described as “developing an explanation of firm 
performance by understanding the roles of external and internal environments, positioning and 
managing within these environments, and relating competencies and advantages to opportunities 
within external environments, or the processes of building capabilities that allow a firm to create 
value for customers, shareholders, and society while operating in competitive markets” (Nag, 
Hambrick, & Chen, 2007, p.946.). This view of strategic management points to three essential 
constructs of strategic management (all of which have been considered in this thesis, including 
specifically Table-1 in sub-section 1.3.2 which discusses the rationale for the research questions, 
aligned to the various layers of internal and external environments of large global organisations):  
 The careful analysis of internal and external environments.  
 
 The development of value-creating strategic initiatives for stakeholders.  
 
 The exploitation and development of organisational capabilities and competencies better than 
competitors.  
To set the stage, Figure-1 below demonstrates the key layers in the internal and external environments 
of the research firms.  
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Source: Researcher’s own analysis based on literature review cited below. 
For simplicity, let us consider three key components of the external environment: 
 The outsourcing ecosystem or extended enterprise consists of various outsourcing providers, as 
indicated above, some of whom are more critical in importance than others and are positioned as 
strategic partners to the focal organisation. 
 The business and industry environment includes various business stakeholders including industry 
regulators as well as organisational peers and competitors. 
 The wider macro-economic environment that represents the various economic and other external 
forces that impact organisational behaviour and performance. 
Similarly, within the organisation: 
 The corporate centre is the logical owner of a company’s resource allocation process and needs to 
have the appropriate structure, organisation and capabilities to play this role fully and effectively. 
Strategic leadership and governance functions form the core responsibilities of the corporate 
centre (Hall, Huyett, & Koller, 2012). 
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 The operating units of the organisation, together with the corporate centre, set the external 
frontline or legal boundaries of the business as a result of their interactions with the external 
environment. However, as the research findings set out in section 3 indicate, adverse risk events 
originating outside of the legal boundaries of the organisation can have a significant impact on 
shareholder value, brand and reputation, profit and loss, employee engagement, and operations. 
As organisations continue to evolve toward more complex ecosystems, these risks are likely to 
grow. Yet all too often traditional governance and risk management processes do not adequately 
consider these extended enterprise risks. Beyond financial and reputation losses, these risk events 
can demand a significant amount of time and focus on the part of organisational leadership to 
navigate and remediate the events, and sometimes even rebuild the organisation and its reputation. 
To protect and create value in the modern enterprise, management and boards need to reset the 
“front line of risk management” to include and focus on the extended enterprise.  
The outlines of this transformation of governance and risk management are already evident at 
many of the organisations covered by this research although few have completed the journey to 
create a coherent system with clear accountability for its execution. At the same time, this thesis 
outlines many of the innovative approaches that were observed during this research. Collectively, 
they point to this “resetting of the front line” of governance and risk management and new 
opportunities to drive value from emerging risk management practices and technology. 
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Source: Researcher’s own analysis based on literature review cited below. 
Figure-2 sets out a summary of the key changes taking place in the internal and external environment 
of the research organisations: 
 Macro-economic environment: The unprecedented pace of disruptive change, volatility and 
uncertainty has created the need to continually rethink the role of governance/risk management 
as a strategic enabler for leadership while preventing “bad things happening” as well as a 
strategic enabler for leadership. Recognizing the difference between risk and uncertainty is 
critical for business success. Risk can be quantified using probabilities, including conditional 
probabilities but uncertainty cannot be quantified that way at all. With uncertainty, the 
“unknowns are unknown”, requiring very different management responses and coping 
mechanisms and entrepreneurial proclivities (Teece & Leih, 2016). This argument is used in 
this thesis to reinforce the understanding of the emerging view of risks in section 3.1.1 as well 
as to establish the linkage with dynamic capabilities-based thinking in response to the research 
findings in section 3.3. The dynamic capabilities framework highlights interrelationships that 
need to be understood if managers are to build and maintain competitive advantage. It helps set 
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priorities and enables coherence between strategy, structure, and the business environment 
(Teece, Peteraf, & Leih, 2016).  
 Business and industry environment: Organisations across industry segments are broadening 
their risk perception while enhancing the maturity of governance/risk management processes to 
emerge as astute decision-makers, reinforced by regulators in the highly regulated industries. At 
the same time, organisations are seeking to develop inimitable competitive advantage by 
leveraging the skills and competencies available to them through their outsourcing ecosystem in 
an innovative manner. This phenomenon is investigated empirically through the industry case 
studies in section 3.4.1 and the articulation of a 2x2 decision-making framework across the 
more regulated and relatively unregulated industry sectors in section 3.4.2. Regulatory concern 
now embraces third-party risk. For instance, with the inexorable trend in the financial services 
sector to digitisation, the adoption of other new technologies and new business models (e.g. Fin 
Tech), third-party service provision and collaboration, outsourcing and third-party risk has 
understandably become a more pronounced regulatory concern in the financial services sector 
(Lewis, 2018). 
 Outsourcing ecosystem: Exponential growth of outsourcing is increasingly being driven by 
longer-term strategic factors (beyond cost-savings) to achieve inimitable competitive advantage 
across an ecosystem of multiple third-party vendors. This also creates new risks, requiring a 
strategic rethinking in the approach to governance/risk management of the outsourcing 
ecosystem. The global survey in section 4 highlights these changes and their impact on 
implementing an integrated and holistic framework for strategic governance of the outsourcing 
ecosystem. 
 Operating units: The global survey in sections 4 and 5 of this thesis also identifies the impact of 
the contemporary trend of increasing decentralisation in large global organisations to promote 
greater responsiveness and agility. Such increasing decentralisation presents a potential 
challenge to implementing a strategic and unified approach to governance/risk management of 
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the outsourcing ecosystem, creating an “execution gap” between strategic intent and 
organisational capabilities.  
 Corporate centre: Bridging the execution gap in governance/risk management of the 
outsourcing ecosystem and developing dynamic capabilities for strategic governance and risk 
management are emerging as key focus areas for the corporate centre/organisational leadership 
as discussed in section 4.7, together with emerging best-practices. As revealed in the literature 
review (section 3.1) and mirrored subsequently in the industry case studies in section 3.4.1, 
boards and organisational leadership (C-suite) are increasingly being expected to lead this 
transformational opportunity to extend the frontline of governance/risk management beyond 
traditional organisational boundaries by adopting an extended enterprise perspective. 
1.3 Aims, objectives and contributions of the study  
The motivation for this research was founded on the researcher’s involvement with one of the largest 
global accounting and consulting firms, which was in the process of starting a new practice area in 
their Risk Advisory business called “Third Party Governance and Risk Management”. In one of his 
early interactions with one of the global leaders of this new practice area in December 2014, he was 
invited to participate in a client roundtable event where senior executives from FTSE 500 
organisations in the UK expressed their concerns around the growth and complexity of their 
outsourcing ecosystem, given that many of these organisations were managing anything between 
20,000–50,000 outsourcing contracts ranging from providers of IT and business process outsourcing 
services that included operating their core and support functions, sales and distribution functions etc. 
to their core supply chain (for manufacturing and trading companies). Many of these FTSE 500 
organisations had also established their own subsidiary companies in lower-cost locations such as 
India and the Philippines to offshore their IT and business processes, which were also considered to 
be an extension of “outsourcing” in the eyes of the industry regulator, given that these subsidiaries 
were managed by their own local management teams. During this roundtable discussion, it emerged 
that IT and business process outsourcing represented their key area of concern, given the rapid 
changes in technology and the criticality of the business processes involved – as well as representing a 
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relatively recent development when compared to traditional supply-chain management, where 
organisational expertise had been developed over the years. Having said that, these executives wanted 
to eventually extend their third-party governance and risk management framework to cover all third 
parties, including their supply chain, subsidiary companies and even joint venture partners and 
affiliate organisations to common standards as required by industry regulators. To establish a business 
case for investment in third-party governance and risk management, these organisations were keen to 
demonstrate a realisation of benefits from their investment by exploiting the upside of such risk 
management in addition to “preventing bad things happening”. At the same time, they had realised 
that this would not be possible unless significant transformational changes were implemented within 
their organisations and relevant capability had been developed. Some of the participants in this 
roundtable discussion expressed a need to obtain professional assistance to guide them through this 
process of transformational change, share evolving good practices as well as assist in addressing 
implementation issues.  
Following this roundtable meeting, the researcher was offered an initial one-year contract-based 
opportunity (during 2015-16) to develop research-based thought-ware (based on his research for this 
DBA degree that included any relevant ongoing guidance from his supervisors to drive the knowledge 
agenda). The plan was to publish this research globally via the consulting firm (subject to meeting its 
global quality and brand standards), primarily as downloadable educational content to enlighten and 
coach their clients in this area, supported by a global survey of C-suite executives. Given the 
increasing proportion of work in a global organisation that was being handled by third parties with 
high to critical level of dependency on them (even up to 85-90% in some instances where, according 
to participants of the above roundtable, these organisations had chosen outsourcing as a core strategic 
choice to remain agile and responsive to market needs in a cost-effective way), it was evident to the 
researcher that this would hold significant implications for the way in which organisational 
leadership, procurement and vendor management teams, finance teams, risk management and internal 
audit groups and even industry regulators contributed to governing and risk-managing these third-
party relationships.  
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Encouraged by the initial response from their clients, the contractual arrangement between the 
researcher and the global consulting firm has since been continually extended up to December 2018 to 
continue educating and guiding their clients, using the findings from this research in progress. The 
researcher has since been recognised as their global head of research for this new practice area, now 
known as Extended Enterprise Risk Management. 
Aligned to the above contractual agreement with the sponsoring firm, the research embodied in this 
thesis thus aims to contribute towards the development of contemporary business practices related to 
implementing successful strategic governance mechanisms around outsourcing business or IT 
processes in the larger global organisations, particularly those with a turnover exceeding US$ 1 billion 
and typically those listed on a stock exchange (listed companies). Past research in this area has largely 
had an operational or a “contract manager” perspective (at the micro or meso level), rather than a 
strategic, top-down, Board and C-suite (macro level) wider corporate governance perspective. As will 
be evident from the detailed literature review in section 3.1, the dominant focus of past risk-
management research has been on day-to-day operational issues around “preventing bad things 
happening” around outsourcing (aligned to the traditional view of risk), resulting in a lack of focus on 
strategic issues that impact organisational positioning, competitive advantage and value through 
governance and risk management. This is particularly true in an increasingly uncertain and volatile 
business environment which now creates the need for developing dynamic risk management 
capabilities aligned to the changing mantra that risk management and governance should be a matter 
of choice rather than a matter of chance to achieve strategic goals. 
To summarise, the aims and objectives of this research are four-fold: 
 Establish the context by providing a forward-looking multi-disciplinary view on strategic 
governance and risk management of the outsourcing ecosystem. 
 In this context, gain an understanding of how and why large global organisations are 
broadening their perspective and enhancing maturity over such governance and risk 
management, together with the organisational capabilities they must develop to emerge as 
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Astute Entrepreneurs. This is proposed to be done through primary research-based industry-
specific case studies. 
 Assess the overall progress made by global organisations in achieving this transformation, 
identifying the implementation challenges. 
 Addressing these implementation challenges through emerging good practices. 
1.3.1  Identifying and addressing the research gaps  
The detailed literature review in section 3.1 indicates how organisations are repositioning governance 
to the board level focused on maximizing organisational value and mitigating the negative impact of 
risks smartly and strategically. Further, these organisations are doing so with an ecosystem 
perspective (section 3.2) rather than just an individual “contract-based” perspective to outsourcing 
relationships. In this process of evolution and maturity, these organisations continue to develop 
dynamic (risk-management) capabilities that this transformational change entails (section 3.3). 
Despite all these changes happening in organisations and their business environments, there exists a 
gap in the literature that this thesis seeks to address. This gap is the result of the difference between 
typical prior research focus and the scope of the current research as indicated in Figure-3 below.  
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Source: Researcher’s own analysis based on literature review referred to below. 
Figure-3 above summarises the result of the literature review in section 3.1.4 of this thesis. It reveals 
that prior research on outsourcing risk has primarily focused on a contract-based view (appropriate for 
the contract managers in the middle level of management). There is thus an organisational as well as a 
research need, not only to transition to the ecosystem view of outsourcing, but to also concurrently 
evolve and mature from the traditional perspective of governance and risk management to the 
emerging concept of strategic governance. This, in turn, justifies the first research question (RQ1): 
Why and how are large global organisations (that operate with a significant level of dependence on 
their outsourcing ecosystem) broadening their perspective and increasing the maturity of risk-
management to reposition their governance and risk-management processes around their outsourcing 
ecosystem (comprising multiple vendors and providers) to more strategic levels (for competitive 
advantage and value-creation)? 
Secondly, the literature review confirms the existence of a knowledge gap around new organisational 
capabilities required to exploit the full spectrum of opportunities (conventional to radical) to create 
value and competitive advantage by outsourcing in an uncertain and volatile business. This is 
addressed in the second research question (RQ2): How can insights from the dynamic capabilities 
(DC) theory be used to describe two new sets of dynamic capabilities required to strategically 
transform organisations: (a) having a broader perception of risk in outsourcing that recognizes 
opportunities in addition to the threats and hazards; and (b) developing more mature risk 
management mechanisms that enable organisations to maximize the business opportunity from 
outsourcing while mitigating risk in an uncertain and complex environment? Based on these two new 
capabilities, a 2x2 framework is presented to assist organisations in understanding their current 
positioning and to motivate them to determine a possible trajectory going forward that not only 
manages risks but also fully exploits the opportunities that outsourcing can create for them. Using 
primary data collected through a survey and interviews of senior executives, exemplar case studies are 
used to illustrate this framework and the different paths that organisations can pursue (horizontal, 
vertical or diagonal) in their attempt to develop into astute decision-makers.  
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A third research gap relates to the implementation issues faced while making the transition to strategic 
governance and risk management with a holistic ecosystem perspective. Having addressed the need 
and manner of transformational change in organisations to establish strategic governance and risk 
management mechanisms over their outsourcing ecosystems, supported by utilising the DC theory to 
focus on relevant capability-development, RQ3 relates to implementation issues of this relatively new 
corporate thinking: How are organisations making progress in implementing this repositioning and 
what key challenge(s) are they facing? As discussed subsequently, the findings in response to this RQ 
indicate a widening “execution gap” caused by leadership intent failing to achieve intended 
consequences arising from people, processes and technologies underpinning the transition to strategic 
governance. 
The fourth and final research question, RQ4, relates to how these organisations are overcoming the 
implementation challenges, particularly the execution gap between strategy and execution identified 
above, together with capturing and summarizing the related good practices evolving.  
This work is exploratory in nature, seeking to capture both breadth (through global survey) and depth 
(through a smaller number of detailed semi-structured interviews) to fulfil the research questions. The 
breadth refers to the many factors that impact strategic governance and risk management in large 
global organisations, whereas the depth can be found in understanding the specific aspirations, 
challenges and emerging practices in a global organisation that could be positioned as the “role 
model”. In this way, the research endeavours to draw together a number of important themes, through 
exploratory enquiry, using an “outside-in” approach across disciplines to make sense of a ‘messy’ 
business context (Parkhe, 1993). Sections 2.1 and 2.2 explain this research rationale in greater detail. 
1.3.2 Aligning research gaps to research steps and proposed contributions 
Table-1 below aligns these research questions (RQ1 – RQ4) to the changes taking place in the various 
layers of the external and internal environments of large global organisations (see Figure-2 on page 
12).  
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Table-1: The Research Questions in Context  
Research Questions Rationale for Research Questions in the 
Organisational/Environmental Context 
RQ1: Why and how are large global 
organisations (which operate with a significant 
level of dependence on their outsourcing 
ecosystem) broadening their perspective and 
increasing the maturity of risk-management to 
reposition their governance and risk-
management processes around their outsourcing 
ecosystem to more strategic levels? 
 Examine the impact of change drivers in the 
macro-economic environment as well as in 
the organisational business and industry 
environment in driving transformational 
change in large global organisations in 
strategically governing their third-party 
ecosystem to create and protect 
organisational value. 
 Review prior literature supported by 
empirical evidence to identify organisational 
attributes indicating higher/lower breadth of 
risk perception and risk-management 
maturity level compared to peers on a cross-
industry basis. 
 Use the above attributes to propose a 2x2 
framework for astute organisational 
decision-making for outsourcing based on an 
“aspirational path to excellence”.  
RQ2: How can a classical management theory 
like Dynamic Capabilities theory be extended to 
aid in understanding the development of the 
related capabilities for such repositioning of 
governance and risk management around the 
outsourcing ecosystem? 
 Uncertainty in the wider external 
environment requires non-traditional 
management responses, coping mechanisms 
and entrepreneurial proclivities for creating 
and protecting organisational value (Teece 
& Leih, 2016).  
 The dynamic capabilities framework 
highlights interrelationships to be 
understood and managed to build and 
maintain competitive advantage amid 
uncertainty. It helps set priorities and 
enables coherence between strategy, 
structure, and the business environment 
(Teece, Peteraf, & Leih, 2016) which need 
to be considered for organisations to develop 
forward-looking governance and risk 
management capabilities related to the 
outsourcing ecosystem. 
RQ3: How are organisations making progress 
in implementing this repositioning and what key 
challenge(s) are they facing? 
Review implementation progress and identify 
implementation challenges in large global 
organisations in the various organisational 
layers (e.g. the execution gap between 
leadership intent and capability of operational 
units, challenges related to decentralisation in 
the corporate centre etc.). 
RQ4: How are these organisations addressing 
these challenges? 
Summarise action points and capture good 
practices evolving in organisations (across all 
organisational layers) that can serve as role-
models to develop successful value-creating 
initiatives for stakeholders and develop relevant 
capabilities better than competitors. 
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Table-2 follows on from Table-1 to align the research questions to the research steps and proposed 
contributions from this thesis within the overall research philosophy (discussed in section 2.1) and the 
three phases envisaged as part of the overall research design (section 2.2). 
Table-2: Research Questions, Research Objectives and Proposed Contribution 
RQ1: Why and how are large global organisations (which operate with a significant level of 
dependence on their outsourcing ecosystem) broadening their perspective and maturity of risk-
management and repositioning their governance and risk-management processes around this 
outsourcing ecosystem to more strategic levels? 
 
Research Objectives Proposed Contribution 
 Review available literature to gain an 
understanding of existing knowledge 
on governance and risk management, 
both generally as well as specifically to 
outsourcing and the third-party 
ecosystem.  
 Identify the key drivers of strategic 
change in the internal and external 
environment that are challenging 
traditional thinking and approaches to 
the above.  
 Investigate the key reasons for 
increased risk and uncertainty in the 
outsourcing ecosystem and its impact 
on governance-related activities.  
 Based on the above, develop a model 
or framework to assess organisational 
positioning and progress made in 
implementing strategic governance 
mechanisms related to their 
outsourcing ecosystem based on two 
considerations identified by the 
literature review: (a) the breadth of 
their risk perception and (b) the 
maturity of governance and risk 
management mechanisms related to 
their outsourcing ecosystem, with a 
specific reference to outsourcing of IT 
and business processes.  
 Illustrate the above framework using 
industry case studies based on 
empirical data collected through 
primary research to demonstrate the 
“aspirational path to excellence” being 
followed across industry segments to 
 On the academic side, this research 
contributes to the growing body of 
outsourcing literature by focusing on 
strategic governance and risk management 
from a novel and emerging “outsourcing 
ecosystem” perspective. To that end, it has 
integrated and extended the multi-
disciplinary perspective on risk and 
governance across diverse disciplines such 
as strategy, operations, finance, risk, 
insurance, legal and compliance, macro-
economics etc. supported by empirical 
evidence and case exemplars to propose a 
forward-looking framework. This 
framework depicts a unique trajectory to 
enable companies to foreground capacities 
for strategic advantage through outsourcing 
that challenges traditional thinking in this 
area.  
 From a practical perspective, the framework 
that is proposed in this thesis is intended to 
assist organisations to align risk 
management with strategic governance and 
develop governance mechanisms that allow 
them to benefit from outsourcing 
opportunities. Specifically, the framework 
motivates organisations to answer two key 
questions. First, “Where are you today?” to 
assess where they are currently positioned 
in terms of maturity of strategic governance 
over outsourcing vis-à-vis their breadth of 
risk perception which drives their appetite 
to take higher risks. Second, “Which way 
should you be going next?” to determine a 
possible trajectory going forward to be able 
not just to manage risks but also fully 
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emerge as astute decision makers 
related to outsourcing. 
exploit the opportunities that outsourcing 
can create.  
 Methodologically speaking, the work 
highlights the value of a flexible 
problematisation approach (Locke and 
Golden-Biddle, 1997; Alvesson and 
Sandberg, 2011) in investigating “messy” 
contemporary issues, characterised by 
multiple layers of change and related 
uncertainties in the external and internal 
environment of large global organisations. 
This perspective allowed the researcher a 
degree of freedom and subsequently led to 
the unexpected discovery of the aspirational 
path to excellence in the 2x2 framework 
presented in this thesis through a multi-
stage approach involving exploratory 
interviews, qualitative and quantitative data 
collection in a range of organisational and 
industry contexts. This approach within this 
exploratory investigation provided both 
breadth (by studying responses to a diverse 
range of questions in a large-scale global 
survey spanning three continents) and a 
depth of focus (a small number of in-depth 
qualitative semi-structured interviews) to 
fully capture a range of issues and themes in 
a relatively under-studied field. 
RQ2: How can a classical management theory like Dynamic Capabilities theory be extended to aid 
in understanding the development of the related capabilities for such repositioning of governance 
and risk management around the outsourcing ecosystem? 
Research Objectives Proposed Contribution 
 Investigate the relevance of the DC 
Theory in developing governance and 
risk management capabilities related to 
the above framework in the 
contemporary context. 
 In addition to making an academic 
contribution by providing a multi-
disciplinary perspective indicated under 
RQ1 above, this thesis proposes to relate 
and extend DC theory to the need for a more 
dynamic approach to the governance and 
risk management of the outsourcing 
ecosystem. To do so, the thesis builds upon 
earlier studies that have long recognised 
overall vendor relationship management 
ability of organisations as a DC. It now 
focuses specifically on two new capabilities 
(identified by empirical research) forming 
an integral part of such overarching vendor 
relationship management activities: (a) the 
capability to have a broader perception of 
risk in outsourcing that recognizes 
opportunities that these risks present in 
addition to the threats and hazards; and (b) 
the “asset orchestration” capability to 
develop more mature risk management 
mechanisms that enable organisations to 
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maximize the opportunity while addressing 
the risk. 
 
RQ3: How are organisations making progress in implementing this repositioning and what key 
challenge(s) are they facing?  
RQ4: How are these organisations addressing these challenges? 
Research Objectives Proposed Contribution 
 Review implementation experience by 
large global organisations in achieveing 
the transition to strategic governance 
and risk management related to the 
outsourcing ecosystem, identifying 
implementation challenges and good 
practices/strategic processes that are 
being adopted by the more successful 
organisations. 
 Examine how organisational design 
(appropriate balance of centralisation 
and decentralisation) together with the 
judicious use of technology, people and 
processes can cost-effectively be 
leveraged to address the 
implementation challenges. 
 The thesis extends past experience on 
managing the strategy execution gap and 
relates the same to the context of the 
outsourcing ecosystem with a Strategic 
Management focus as well as Information 
Management focus. From a practitioner 
perspective, members of the Board and C-
suite as well as senior management in large 
global outsourcing (client) organisations can 
use this thesis to help them address the 
potential for emerging practices and 
mechanisms to avoid or address the 
execution gap to maximize the opportunities 
that the outsourcing ecosystem can create 
for them going forward.  
 The current trend of increasing 
decentralisation in large global 
organisations presents a new set of 
challenges to achieving the transformational 
repositioning in the strategic governance 
and risk management of large global 
organisations. In response to this trend, this 
thesis highlights a three-pronged approach 
being used by large decentralised global 
organisations to address this challenge by 
revisiting the role of the corporate centre 
with regard to its strategy and governance 
functions; aligning outsourcing governance 
practices to the nature and extent of 
decentralisation and ensuring better 
coordination between those who perform 
governance and control functions across the 
business. 
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1.4  Outline and structure of the thesis  
As is evident from the above discussion, this thesis examines the following three related topics within 
the over-arching theme of strategic governance and risk-management of the outsourcing ecosystem, 
under a common philosophical stance and integrated research design over three phases, further 
explained in section 2.2 (see Figures-4, 5 and 6). 
 How and why are large global organisations adopting a more strategic approach in this regard 
(RQ1), and developing dynamic risk management capabilities (RQ2) to achieve this 
organisational transformation? However, to examine these questions, a forward-looking 
emerging view of strategic governance and risk management in the outsourcing context is 
presented at the outset through a multi-disciplinary literature review to initially establish the 
context and a shared understanding with the user of this thesis (section 3). 
 Organisational progress in making this transition, together with implementation challenges 
(with a specific focus on the execution gap) and how these are being overcome through 
evolving good practices (section 4). 
 Understanding decentralisation as the root cause of the above execution gap and evolving 
organisational good practices to address the impact of decentralisation (section 5).   
The remainder of this thesis is thus organised as follows. 
Section 2 (research methodology and design) explains the exploratory nature of the research which 
was justified by the novelty of the research area combined with the unprecedented pace of change 
across the external and internal environment of large global organisations discussed in the preceding 
section supported by emerging professional literature. As such the work employed a large-scale global 
survey with 113 responses, supported by a much smaller number (28) of in-depth follow-on 
interviews, which, in turn, were informed by themes from the literature and underlying social 
constructivist ontology. Section 2.1 clarifies the rationale surrounding the philosophical stance of the 
work, followed by the three-phased research design/process (section 2.2), detailed steps for empirical 
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data collection and analysis (section 2.3), concluding with ethical issues and limitations concerned 
with these (section 2.4).  
Section 3 reviews the first of the three topics indicated above by revisiting, in depth, the complex 
context of the research to discuss the problem statement, on the basis of which the research questions 
have been articulated and address RQ1 and RQ2. To set the context, sections 3.1.1 to 3.1.4 examine 
the following in detail: the traditional views of risk and risk-management and the changing 
perceptions in this regard; uncertainty and its impact on risk-thinking; following on to discuss the 
upside or opportunity in risk/risk-management and the rise of such risk-based governance, resulting in 
a summarised description of key terms including “strategic governance” which forms the key 
construct undergoing a transformational change in perception and interpretation in this thesis. In 
doing so, some of the other enablers for this transformational change such as the changing role of the 
industry regulators (in the external environment) and the Board of Directors (in the internal 
environment) are also discussed in the context of large global organisations. Establishing the problem 
statement also requires an understanding of the “outsourcing ecosystem” in relation to recent studies 
on organisational ecosystems. Having gained this understanding, the changing perceptions of strategic 
governance and risk management in general are specifically related to the outsourcing ecosystem in 
section 3.2. Section 3.3, in turn, discusses the key principles from the DC theory to provide the 
theoretical underpinning in interpreting this changing perception of governance and risk-management 
as a dynamic mechanism for enhancing competitive advantage and shareholder value. As 
organisations face significant changes in the environment in which they operate, these changes 
necessitate significant shifts in strategy in order to ensure survival and growth (Burgelman & Grove, 
1996; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). In rapidly-changing times, there is a growing recognition that the 
organisation’s ability to survive, grow and retain its competitive advantage depends more on its 
capacity to renew itself in line with environmental changes, rather than on the industry structure and 
positioning or its specific resources (Teece, Pisano et al., 1997, Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). 
Competences or capabilities, leading to competitive advantage, rest fundamentally in organisational 
processes, which are moulded by its evolutionary and co-evolutionary paths (Teece & Pisano, 2004). 
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In this section, the DC theory is specifically related to developing the two specific capabilities around 
risk management that subsequently define the two axes of the 2x2 framework: (a) a broader 
perception of risk in outsourcing that continually recognizes the opportunities that these risks present 
in addition to the threats and hazards; and (b) mature risk-management mechanisms that enable 
organisations to mitigate the risks while maximizing the business opportunity from outsourcing. Both 
these new capabilities require the organisation to act strategically and with flexibility and adaptability 
in order to innovatively embrace the new opportunities by graduating from an ordinary capabilities 
mind-set to a DC mind-set. Having thus set the context, section 3.4 presents the findings of the pilot 
survey in the form of a 2x2 framework to assess organisational positioning with regard to strategic 
governance of their outsourcing ecosystem and explains the “Aspirational Path to Excellence” 
(section 3.4.2) for organisations to emerge as astute decision-makers in this area, illustrated by 
industry perspectives/case studies in section 3.4.1. Following the case studies and the discussion on 
the ‘aspirational path to excellence’, in section 3.4.1, the rest of this section discusses how the DC 
theory can be extended to assist in the development of the new dynamic capabilities framework 
relating to strategic governance and risk management in these organisations.  
Section 5 then focuses specifically on decentralisation as the root cause of this emerging gap in 
organisations and how it can be addressed by achieving the optimal balance between centralisation 
and decentralisation, together with other evolving good practices (RQ4). 
Section 6 presents a reflection on the outcomes of the study by setting out a holistic summary across 
all the above research phases/questions as one integrated item or entity. Findings are discussed in the 
context of both:  
 theoretical framework i.e., how do these findings contribute to the existing body of knowledge 
e.g. extending DC theory or reconfirming principles and practices identified as a result of prior 
research? For instance, how are they contrasting/confirming/extending what was expected from 
theory?  
 managerial context i.e., how do these findings alter organisational leadership’s perceptions and 
actions with regard to developing dynamic risk management capabilities for innovative or 
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entrepreneurial outsourcing; understanding what the peer group is doing with regard to addressing 
execution gaps in strategic governance and risk management of outsourcing etc.). In other words, 
how do the findings contribute to current professional practice?  
 
Section 7 concludes the thesis, revisiting the contributions once again, acknowledging the weaknesses 
and limitations of the study and providing input for making recommendations for further research.  
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2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
Section Summary: This section describes the philosophy of the research and its phased design, 
together with the detailed steps for empirical data collection and related safeguards for the ethical 
conduct of this research.  The research is largely founded on the interpretivist paradigm and draws 
on a problematisation perspective with research questions emerging from gap-analysis in past 
research and existing literature as discussed in the previous section. It uses qualitative as well as 
quantitative data gathered through a large-scale survey supported by detailed follow-on interviews to 
bring in depth as well as breadth to this study, in addition to enabling triangulation of research data 
for a more robust analysis. The subsequent section will describe the first of the three phases of the 
research and address the first two research questions.   
2.1 Research philosophy 
As indicated in the introductory section, the nature of this work is explorative and multidisciplinary. 
The knowledge proposed to be researched is bound by individual experience (Berger & Luckmann, 
1991) (in this case, the experience of transitioning to strategic governance and risk management of the 
outsourcing ecosystem) and the current research aims to learn about these experiences as against 
empirically testing them. The researcher is motivated by a desire to reflect the complexity of the 
constructs outlined in the literature review and how these interact with each other to establish this 
constructed reality of strategic governance, together with an understanding of the related processes 
and good practices it entails. It is therefore clear that there are a number of influences on this work 
(presented in the literature review) which are reflective of ‘messy’ (Parkhe, 1993), complex and real 
life research.  
The research draws on a problematisation perspective (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997; Alvesson & 
Sandberg, 2011) with the research questions emerging from gap-analysis in past research and existing 
literature. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no prevalent academic literature 
surrounding similar research topics related to strategic governance of the outsourcing ecosystem; 
accordingly, this opens up the opportunity to contribute new knowledge to the research field in light 
of the emergent issues and gaps identified in the literature review.  
It is believed that such problematisation of reality (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997; Alvesson & 
Sandberg, 2011) also enables flexibility of research in examining phenomena. This, in turn, often 
leads to the discovery of problems or findings that the researcher may not have initially considered. 
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The epistemological stance adopted should therefore promote both an inductive and deductive 
approach to answering research questions, which this research pursues by using qualitative and 
quantitative data in order to provide a full and rigorous exploration of the issues defined in the 
literature review, with the required depth (e.g. smaller number of semi-structured interviews) and 
breadth (e.g. large-scale survey to inform and support the semi-structured interviews and the resulting 
in-depth findings and analysis).  
Having said that, this research is largely founded in an interpretivist paradigm and in keeping with 
Bryman & Bell’s explanation that interpretivism is “taken to denote an alternative to the positivist 
orthodox” (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This then means that the goal of research becomes focused on 
investigating the roles and behaviour of actors in specific situations rather than the recording and 
analysis of objective measurements (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The nature of interpretivism has been 
discussed by several authors, such as Burrel & Morgan (1979; p. 28), Bryman & Bell (2015), 
Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2012; p. 140) and Robson & McCartan (2016). Burrel & Morgan 
explain that “the interpretive paradigm is informed by a concern to understand the world as it is, to 
understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience. It seeks 
explanation within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, as well as within the frame 
of reference of the participant as opposed to the observer of action” (Burrel & Morgan, 1979; p. 28). 
Interpretivism is thus characterized by its focus on looking at the world from a subjective viewpoint in 
contrast to an objective viewpoint and “sees the social world as an emergent process which is created 
by the individuals concerned” (Burrel & Morgan, 1979; p. 28). The result is that rather than seeking to 
explain observations on the basis of objective observations, explanation is sought in understanding the 
subjective interpretation of events by the relevant participants and the interaction of actors in real 
situations to understand observed phenomena (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Robson (2011) outlines that 
interpretivism assumes “that social properties are created by human beings and social interaction” 
(Robson, 2011; p. 24). The underlying epistemology of this thesis is thus social constructionism which 
is based on the understanding that reality (and therefore the knowledge of reality) is shaped by the 
individual and therefore predominantly subjective.  
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The specific approach used for the empirical research in this thesis can perhaps be described as 
pragmatic interpretivism. Researchers such as Goldkuhl (2012) reaffirm that such an interpretivist 
approach can co-exist with methodological pragmatism providing flexibility around the role of the 
researcher in creating knowledge and permitting a pluralist attitude (Goles & Hirschheim, 2000) 
rather than a more rigid “methods follow process” to ensure “everything relevant is interpreted”, as in 
this case through a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collected through the interviews 
and the survey. Appropriate for complex real world situations such as the subject of this thesis, 
Goldkuhl (2012) describes such a pragmatic methodological approach to research in the 
interpretivist/constructionist paradigm as “meaningful action based in evolutionary social 
interaction”. This is in contrast, for instance, to an approach focusing solely on the measurement of 
objective metrics and performance indicators. One of the limitations of an interpretivist approach 
however is that the subjective nature of the behavioural interplay between actors which underpins it 
may be highly contextually dependent. Thus results and explanations derived in a particular situation 
cannot always be readily translated to other contexts. This research takes that into account by seeking 
to identify various emerging processes and good practices based on this ontological model. From an 
epistemological viewpoint, this means that it is important to understand these behaviours by the 
application of qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews with small samples and in-depth 
analysis (as in the follow-on interviews) as outlined by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2012; p. 140), 
in this case to discuss organisational transformation in context of adopting a strategic approach to the 
governance of the outsourcing ecosystem. However, in addition, informing and supporting the results 
of the semi-structured interviews using the results of the large-scale survey, in the view of the 
researcher, has brought in the much-needed methodological pragmatism to support the interpretive 
analysis.  
This research reflects both emic and etic approaches to constructs in its design and addressing the 
research questions (Morris et al., 1999). The emic approach, whereby constructs are described on the 
participant’s terms (e.g. definition of strategic governance) and drawn from self-understanding (Pike, 
1954; 1967), is particularly true to the qualitative side of the work which endeavours to draw 
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subjective, rich data from interviews. Whilst predominantly emic, this research also employs an etic 
approach through the investigation of strategic governance and risk-management capability by 
applying an outside view (in this case the DC theory). Etic approaches are able to provide a holistic 
view of constructs through taking into account external factors (such as the multiple drivers of change 
in the various elements of the external and internal environment described in section 2) and can often 
be explored in terms of objective measures (Pike, 1967). The objective measure in this research, 
however, is used for the purpose of exploration (to augment larger volumes of qualitative data 
collected) rather than testing, comparing populations or more sophisticated quantitative analysis.  
Additionally, this work also moves back and forth between both the different data sets and theory 
which is reflective of other approaches that support an iterative research process such as the 
Hermeneutic Cycle referred to earlier. For instance, the concept of abduction (as established by 
Blaikie, 1993) is whereby researchers generate social scientific accounts from social actors’ accounts. 
In this way, abductive research follows social constructive ontological assumptions whereby there is 
no single reality but multiple and changing realities (Ong, 2012) from “socially constructed mutual 
knowledge” (Blaikie, 2000; p.116).  
Abductive research is not simply a mixture of deductive and inductive approaches (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002). It often begins with a general idea of an area to explore which is then refined in collaboration 
with the social actors being studied (Ong, 2012). This is similar to the flexible research strategy 
behind progressive focusing (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012) which allows the researcher to move 
between theory and fieldwork, making modifications in between, in order to generate theory. 
Although there appear to be synergies with this work and its analytical approach, it should be made 
clear that abductive research strategies are different from methods of grounded theory (Ong, 2012). 
Grounded theory emphasises the accounts of the reality of the social actors being studied but also 
acknowledges the account of the researcher in creating knowledge, whereas abductive research 
theories are more insular, emic and sympathetic towards lay terms (Ong, 2012). Although aspects of 
abductive research have had a strong influence on research design, this work has not adopted a purely 
abductive approach because its strategy is predominantly emic. This research also has an outside 
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perspective (etic) approach as the researcher was using established theories to guide this work. 
Themes for analysis were developed through the interviews and words of the participants (emic) but 
also guided by academic and practical theory (etic) (Douglas & Craig, 2006).  
Whilst abductive and progressive focusing theories acknowledge the ‘messy’ (Parkhe, 1993) nature of 
real-word research (especially those involving qualitative elements), this does not mean an ‘anything 
goes’ approach (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012); researchers should employ tools to manage and 
document the research method.  
To summarise, it is clear that there are a number of influences on this work in terms of ontological, 
epistemological and research design approaches. It is reflective of flexible and explorative work that 
attempts to provide a holistic and honest view of a ‘messy’ world (Parke, 1993). In terms of ontology, 
the researcher believes the form of nature and reality to be both subjective and objective; 
epistemologically the researcher has adopted a social constructivist view of knowledge based on this 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1991). The methods are founded on these views, especially in terms of one of 
the offshoots of grounded theory in analysis of the qualitative part of this work, as discussed in a 
subsequent section below. The influence from abductive (Blaikie, 1993) and progressive focussing 
(Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012) has encouraged the researcher to employ an iterative approach to clarify 
knowledge using qualitative and quantitative data (large-scale survey plus a smaller number of 
detailed qualitative follow-on interviews that underpin the industry case studies), as well as going 
back and forth between data sets. 
Researcher bias, one of the key challenges of interpretivist research, is addressed by testing the 
interview protocols and reviewing whether the planned procedures are performing as envisioned by 
the researcher (Chenail, 2011). The use of contact sheets and research memos, amongst other steps 
described under data collection and analysis, have enabled the meaningful interpretation of actual and 
latent meanings to reconstruct the reality.  
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2.2 Research phases and design  
The sequencing of this thesis over three phases as indicated in the outline and structure (section 1.4) 
reflects how the researcher has investigated three related topics within the over-arching theme of 
strategic governance and risk-management of the outsourcing ecosystem, under a common 
philosophical stance and integrated research design (see Figures 4 to 6 below). 
   
As a result, an iterative approach to establishing the theoretical foundations through literature review 
has been adopted as relevant to each specific topic within each of the three phases/research topics. 
Further literature reviews have been conducted in subsequent phases as and when new areas have 
emerged during this exploratory research, requiring an iterative approach between such literature and 
the related data being analysed (see Figure - 6 below).  
Aligned to the three phases of the research illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 below, the subsequent Table-
3 on page 36 sets out a consolidated summary of research objectives, methodology and contribution 
by research question. 
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RQ1: Why and how are large global organisations (which operate with a significant level of dependence on their outsourcing ecosystem) broadening their 
perspective and increasing the maturity of risk-management to reposition their governance and risk-management processes around their outsourcing 
ecosystem to more strategic levels? 
Summarised Research Objectives Research Methodology and Steps Contribution 
 Gain an understanding of existing 
knowledge on governance and risk 
management (both generally as well 
as specifically to outsourcing and 
the third-party ecosystem) to 
summarise the state of the literature 
and identify knowledge gaps to be 
addressed by empirical research in 
this thesis, including 
o key change drivers for 
organisational 
transformation;  
o impact of increasing risk 
and uncertainty in the 
outsourcing ecosystem on 
governance-related 
activities.  
 Review available academic literature, prior 
research and practitioner-based publications to 
gain an understanding of existing knowledge on 
governance and risk management across multiple 
disciples such as strategy, operations, finance, 
risk, insurance, legal and compliance, macro-
economics etc. (see section 3.1 of this thesis for 
this literature review).  
 Having defined the state of the literature, 
compare this with the research objective across 
the four steps followed for literature review to 
identify detailed gaps to be addressed by 
empirical research (see Appendix A for this 
analysis).  
 On the academic side, this research contributes 
to the growing body of outsourcing literature by 
focusing on strategic governance and risk 
management from a novel and emerging 
“outsourcing ecosystem” perspective. To that 
end, it has integrated and extended the multi-
disciplinary perspective on risk and governance 
across diverse disciplines indicated in the 
middle column of this table. This multi-
disciplinary literature review is supported by 
empirical evidence and case exemplars to 
propose a forward-looking framework, which in 
turn depicts a unique trajectory to enable 
companies to foreground capacities for strategic 
advantage through outsourcing that challenges 
traditional thinking in this area.  
 Develop a framework to assess 
organisational positioning and 
progress made in implementing 
strategic governance mechanisms 
related to the outsourcing 
ecosystem. Illustrate this framework 
using industry case studies based on 
empirical data collected through 
primary research to demonstrate the 
“aspirational path to excellence” 
being followed across industry 
segments. 
 Develop survey questionnaire (Appendix C) and 
semi-structured interview prompts (Appendix D) 
aligned to the analysis in Appendix A described 
above. 
 Develop and execute survey – further details in 
section 2.3 of this thesis. 
 Conduct semi-structured interviews to gain a 
deeper understanding – see section 2.3 sub-
headings semi-structured interviews and data 
analysis for further details of data collection and 
analysis.  
 Define the two axes of the proposed framework 
based on literature review supported by above 
data analysis – see figures 8 and 9 in section 
3.4.1. 
 From a practical perspective, the framework 
that is proposed in this thesis is intended to 
assist organisations to align risk management 
with strategic governance and develop 
governance mechanisms that allow them to 
benefit from outsourcing opportunities. 
Specifically, the framework motivates 
organisations to answer two key questions. 
First, “Where are you today?” to assess where 
they are currently positioned in terms of 
maturity of strategic governance over 
outsourcing vis-à-vis their breadth of risk 
perception which drives their appetite to take 
higher risks. Second, “Which way should you 
be going next?” to determine a possible 
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 Interpret implications of framework (figure 10), 
illustrated by industry case studies based on 
survey and interview data (figure 11) in section 
3.4.3. 
  
trajectory going forward to be able not just to 
manage risks but also fully exploit the 
opportunities that outsourcing can create.  
 Methodologically, the work highlights the value 
of a flexible problematisation approach (Locke 
and Golden-Biddle, 1997; Alvesson and 
Sandberg, 2011) in investigating “messy” 
contemporary issues, characterised by multiple 
layers of change and related uncertainties in the 
external and internal environment of large 
global organisations. This perspective allowed 
the researcher a degree of freedom and 
subsequently led to the unexpected discovery of 
the aspirational path to excellence in the 2x2 
framework (section 7). 
RQ2: How can a classical management theory like Dynamic Capabilities (DC) theory utilised to aid in understanding the development of the related 
capabilities for such repositioning of governance and risk management around the outsourcing ecosystem? 
 Investigate the relevance of the DC 
Theory in understanding and 
developing governance and risk 
management capabilities in the 
contemporary context. 
 
 Using fundamental principles of the Hermeneutic 
Circle, carry out multiple iterations of abstraction 
and generalisation of the survey/interview data 
through theoretical framing of the findings using 
the relevant insights from the DC theory (see 
section 3.4.3 – Table 6 for this analysis).  
 
The fundamental principles of the Hermeneutic 
Circle inter-alia involve revisiting prior ideas and 
pre-conceived notions by distanced re-
interpretation of the empirical data by revisiting 
the theoretical framework as many times as 
required to bring together the parts of the picture 
as one whole – see Gadamer, 1977).  This has 
enabled establishing the linkage between the key 
criteria for DCs proposed by Teece (2014) to the 
two axes of the framework to develop specific 
risk-management capabilities for strategic 
governance and risk-management. 
 In addition to providing a multi-disciplinary 
perspective (RQ1 above), this thesis utilises DC 
theory to establish the need for a more dynamic 
approach to the governance and risk 
management of the outsourcing ecosystem and 
specifies how exactly this can be achieved. It 
does so by focusing specifically on the two new 
capabilities identified in this thesis: (a) the 
capability to have a broader perception of risk in 
outsourcing that recognises ongoing 
opportunities that these risks present in addition 
to the threats and hazards; and (b) the “asset 
orchestration” capability to develop more 
mature risk management mechanisms that 
enable organisations to maximize the 
opportunity while addressing the risk amid 
changes in the macro-economic and business 
environment. 
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RQ3: How are organisations making progress in implementing this repositioning and what key challenge(s) are they facing?  
RQ4: How are these organisations addressing these challenges? 
 Gain an understanding of 
implementation experience in 
implementing a transformational 
approach to reposition governance 
and risk management of the 
outsourcing ecosystem to more 
strategic levels  by large global 
organisations. This specifically 
includes identifying implementation 
challenges and good practices that 
are being adopted by the more 
successful organisations. 
 
 Examine how organisational design 
(appropriate balance of 
centralisation and decentralisation) 
together with the judicious use of 
technology, people and processes 
can cost-effectively be leveraged to 
address the implementation 
challenges. 
 Use survey results in the form of basic 
descriptive statistics, supported by data analysis 
from semi-structured interviews (as described 
against RQ1 above) to explore the emergence of 
a value-focused ecosystem in large global 
organisations with increasing dependence on the 
provider with regard to critical organisational 
processes and the related risks and challenges this 
is creating (sections 4.1 to 4.3). 
 Determine the extent of progress made by large 
global organisations in increasing the maturity of 
governance and risk management processes 
relating to its outsourcing ecosystem to address 
these risks and whether strategic intent matches 
organisational abilities to ensure an integrated 
and holistic approach to the management of third 
parties forming its outsourcing ecosystem 
(execution gap) (section 4.4). 
 Investigate the cause of this execution gap and 
align prior research to survey/interview findings 
to propose the way forward to address this gap 
(section 4.5 to 4.7). 
 Investigate decentralisation in large global 
organisations as a root cause of this execution 
gap and align prior research to survey/interview 
findings to address the impact of decentralisation 
(sections 5.1 to 5,3). 
 The thesis extends past experience on 
managing the strategy execution gap and 
relates the same to the context of the 
outsourcing ecosystem with a Strategic 
Management focus as well as Information 
Management focus. From a practitioner 
perspective, members of the Board and C-
suite as well as senior management in large 
global outsourcing (client) organisations 
can use this analysis to help them address 
the potential for emerging practices and 
mechanisms to avoid or address the 
execution gap, thus maximising the 
opportunities that the outsourcing 
ecosystem can create for them going 
forward.  
 Decentralisation in large global 
organisations presents a new set of 
challenges to achieving the 
transformational repositioning in the 
strategic governance and risk management 
of large global organisations. In response 
to this trend, this thesis highlights a three-
pronged approach (being used by large 
decentralised global organisations) by 
revisiting the role of the corporate centre 
with regard to its strategy and governance 
functions; aligning outsourcing governance 
practices to the nature and extent of 
decentralisation and ensuring better 
coordination between those who perform 
governance and control functions across 
the business. 
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Qualitative and quantitative data to address the research questions 
To effectively address the research questions, this researcher thus employed an approach to gather 
detailed qualitative data through a smaller number of detailed semi-structured interviews supported by 
more generic quantitative indicators captured through a broader survey to address the research 
questions (see Table-4). 
Table-4: Data Collection 
 
The long-standing debate between purist quantitative and qualitative researchers on using both these 
types of data together within the same research design has become somewhat redundant in the 
literature as the combination of the two has become recognised as an independent and established 
third research paradigm (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Johnson et al. (2007) understand the 
paradigm as:  
Data type Method Relevant Research Question 
Qualitative 
 
 
 
Quantitative 
Semi-structured interviews 
grouped into industry-specific 
case studies. 
 
Populating the industry 
positioning on the 2x2 
framework to support the 
qualitative analysis above. 
RQ1: Why and how are outsourcing organisations (client 
view) broadening their perspective and maturity of 
governance/risk management mechanisms around their 
outsourcing ecosystem and repositioning them to more 
strategic levels in the organisation for competitive advantage 
and value creation. 
Qualitative Semi-structured interviews RQ2: How can a classical management theory like Dynamic 
Capabilities (DC) Theory be extended to aid the 
development of the related capabilities for such repositioning 
of governance/risk management of the outsourcing 
ecosystem. 
Quantitative 
indicators/ 
benchmarks 
to support 
qualitative 
data 
 
 
Qualitative 
Large-scale survey to 
provide snapshots of  
implementation progress and  
other basic data supporting the 
qualitative analysis below. 
 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews. 
RQ3: What are the organisational experiences of trying to 
reposition their governance/risk management of their 
outsourcing ecosystem to more strategic levels enabled 
through a renewed set of holistic and consistent mechanisms, 
including the key challenges so far?  
Qualitative 
 
Quantitative 
indicators/ 
benchmarks 
Semi-structured interviews. 
 
Basic quantitative data to 
support or dispel qualitative 
understanding or reasoning. 
RQ4: How are these organisations overcoming these 
challenges? 
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“…combining elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches…for the broad 
purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration.” (p.123)  
As explained earlier, the current research calls for this notion of breadth and depth. This study uses a 
‘between methods’ (Denzin, 1978) approach involving the use of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods to satisfy the research questions. It demonstrates pluralism to reflect the interdisciplinary, 
complex and dynamic phenomena being explored; the remainder of this section seeks to justify this 
choice further.  
An earlier generation of researchers claimed that quantitative and qualitative methods should not be 
combined and that they are incompatible (Howe, 1988). However the long-term (and dated) debate 
over keeping quantitative and qualitative paradigms separate is becoming less relevant with the 
growing number of studies now following a combined approach. This is increasingly being perceived 
by contemporary researchers as appealing to a pragmatic philosophic perspective as no 
incompatibility between quantitative and qualitative methods is now believed to exist at either the 
level of practice or that of epistemology. 
One of the articulated justifications for employing a combination of qualitative and quantitative data 
is to gain the best of both worlds by drawing from the strengths and minimising the weaknesses of 
each approach (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Integration in this way ensures triangulation of 
research data by viewing quantitative and qualitative methods as complementary practices rather than 
competing paradigms (Jick, 1979).  
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2.3 Detailed steps for empirical data collection and analysis 
The survey indicated above was designed to investigate the current and emerging risk management 
and governance practices in outsourcing amongst large global organisations. These senior members of 
management were responsible for governance and risk management around the outsourcing of IT and 
business processes in their organisations, and included Chief Finance Officers, Heads of 
Procurement/Vendor Management, Chief Risk Officers, Heads of Internal Audit and those leading the 
Compliance and IT Risk function. Potential respondents were screened through discussions with the 
lead relationship manager (relationship-owner) in the consulting firm to reconfirm that in each case 
these individuals represented senior leadership charged with the governance of outsourcing 
relationships in these organisations with appropriate responsibility and authority. Additional insight 
was also obtained from respondents from subsidiaries of these organisations, which independently 
managed outsourcing and third-party relationships with some degree of decentralisation but with 
lower annual revenues relevant to the specific subsidiary.  
The respondents represented industries across all the major industry segments. However, a substantial 
proportion of responses were obtained from organisations in Financial Services (FS) (34%), followed 
by Healthcare & Life Sciences (HLS) (26%), and Business and Professional Services (BAPS) (17%). 
Analysis of the survey results revealed clusters emerging around these three key industry segments, 
thus providing us with the confidence to set out the case studies on organisational positioning around 
risk perception and governance maturity by these industry segments. This seems to be representative 
of the diverse state of play that was typical of a large global organisation in that segment. A potential 
fourth cluster was seen to emerge around Public Sector organisations together with some other 
organisations from Consumer Business (CB), Energy and Resources (E&R) and Technology, Media 
and Telecom (TMT) representing, in total, around 9% of respondents). These organisations typically 
had a high public exposure and therefore were inherently risk averse, like their Public Sector 
counterparts. This risk-averse mind-set was reflected in the organisations’ reluctance to adopt more 
entrepreneurial approaches to outsourcing due to their increased public accountability. Many of these 
organisations had their roots in the public sector and had been subsequently privatised without any 
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significant behavioural changes with regard to risk-taking and entrepreneurship. For simplicity, these 
have been grouped under “Public Sector” in the subsequent analysis. 
More than 70% of the organisations represented in the survey had annual revenues in excess of US$1 
billion. The majority of these organisations were headquartered in Western Europe and in Northern 
America, although the survey did not reveal any significant changes to their behaviour as global 
organisations based on the location of the corporate headquarters. The questionnaire was designed 
through collaborative efforts between representatives of the consulting firm that enabled the survey 
and academic input from the authors. It was split into the following four sections with an initial 
filtering question to identify and select those respondent organisations that were outsourcing IT and 
business processes for consideration in this report: 
 Background and context of the respondent’s third-party or outsourcing ecosystem.  
 Mechanisms for managing risk. 
 Governance frameworks. 
 Technology, delivery models and other evolving issues and good practices.  
In order to capture the evolution in risk management and governance process over time and to identify 
future trends, the survey was designed to include questions that are related to the organisations’ 
current position and also their past status (referred to as “a year or more earlier”), as well as the 
position to which they aspired in the near future (referred to as “a year or more ahead”). The survey 
was followed by one-on-one detailed interviews with 36 of these respondents (including 8 initial pilot 
interviews), selected on the basis of their availability and willingness to participate in these 
interviews. These semi-structured interviews were intended to obtain a better qualitative 
understanding of their organisations’ specific circumstances and challenges vis-à-vis their peers, 
supported by illustrative examples and their proposed way forward, augmented by additional 
quantitative indicators revealed by the survey.  
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To be able to report these findings by industry segment and also illustrate the 2x2 framework through 
these industry perspectives (exemplifying all aspects of change across the external and internal 
organisational environment), a case-study based approach was adopted for the follow-on interviews.  
Case study is a research strategy for examining a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 
2008).  In this research, the behavioural phenomenon in terms of the changing approach to strategic or 
corporate governance at leadership levels is very closely interwoven with the organisational context 
and cannot be separated. Therefore the context is deliberately part of the design. Hartley (2004) 
describes the aim of doing this as being able to provide an analysis of the context and processes which 
illuminate the theoretical issues being studied.  
A common feature of case studies is their holistic approach. Since the case study seeks to capture 
people as they experience their natural, everyday circumstances, it can offer the researcher empirical 
and theoretical gains in understanding larger social complexes of actors, actions and motives (Feagin 
et al., 1991). This enabled the semi-structured interviews to identify good practices/strategies 
(covering people, process and technology domains) that were being adopted by the more successful 
organisations to address enhanced risk and uncertainty holistically and cost-effectively.   
Case study research, like other qualitative research, is amenable to the theoretical generalisation of the 
learnings from my proposed research, although broader generalisation to the extent possible under 
positivist research may be a challenge (Lee, 2008). Theoretical generalisation involves suggesting 
new interpretations and concepts or re-examining earlier concepts and interpretations in major and 
innovative ways (Yin, 2008). This would be key to understanding strategic or corporate governance in 
its repositioned status at a significantly higher level of the corporate hierarchy. 
Case study approaches can be based on a single case or multiple cases. Multiple case designs facilitate 
comparative analysis where the aims of the research include the need to find the replication of results 
under different circumstances. In the context of this research, a multiple rather than a single case 
study approach was selected, covering around 5-6 organisations in each industry segment. Each such 
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industry segment constituted a case and a group of similar organisations in any of the four industry 
segments presented made up an embedded case, thereby facilitating cross-case analysis between these 
four embedded cases (industry segments).  
As there was a significant amount of learning in carrying out each of these four embedded case 
studies, a sequential rather than a parallel approach was considered appropriate in the context of the 
research. A sequential approach to case analysis helped refine the approach in studying subsequent 
industry segments. This replication logic is supported by Yin (2008), as set out below.  The case 
study organisations would be selected based on the “typical instance” logic, where each of the case 
study organisations within the embedded cases are similar in crucial respects to the others that might 
have been chosen, and that the findings from the case study are therefore likely to apply elsewhere. As 
the case study organisation is like most of the rest, the findings can be generalised to theory applicable 
to the entire class of organisations comprising each of the embedded cases.  
Semi-structured interviews: Data collection was largely qualitative in nature through these semi-
structured interviews, using open-ended questions, which had been informed by the preceding survey.  
This provided respondents with room for flexibility and variation to reinforce the understanding, 
unlike a structured interview where the questions and response categories are predetermined, 
inflexible and invariable and may fail to address all the facets or dimensions of this complex 
phenomenon. On the other hand, there is a risk that a fully unstructured interview may lose the focus 
of addressing the specific research areas set out in the research questions (Silverman, 2005). Fontana 
& Frey (2003) emphasize that it is critical to ask not just the right questions but also in the manner 
most appropriate to the research setting, the culture and the language of the respondents, deciding how 
the questions are delivered, including the wording and the sequence, as well as building rapport/trust 
with the research settings and participants. As the rapport, context and storyline evolves, different 
respondents can be asked the broader questions in a different way or in a different order, thus 
enhancing the quality of data gathered.  
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Many of the principles of Interpretive Field Research applied specifically to the IS research field as 
articulated by Klein & Myers (1999) were used in the current research, such as: the fundamental 
principle of the Hermeneutic Circle to iterate between information provided by the key informants 
and wider organisational data; the need for contextualisation of interviews and social construction of 
data; abstraction and generalisation through theoretical framing of the findings; the need for 
sensitivity to biases, systematic distortions, multiple interpretations and consideration of potential 
revisions to research design based on dialogical reasoning.  
The process and situation for the interviews was trialled, as feasible, within the case study 
environments, to address researcher bias. The more unstructured the interview, the more 
communication skills in general and listening in particular are important (Silverman 2005).  
Data analysis 
Data collected from the above interviews was primarily in the form of transcripts and notes. To 
substantiate some of the discussions during the interviews, any other documentary evidence gathered 
from the interviewees, such as policies, procedures, communication, minutes of Board and Audit 
Committee meetings, regulatory directives, design documents relating to technology-driven risk 
management mechanisms etc. directly relevant to the agenda of strategic and corporate governance in 
organisations, was also captured.  
The fundamental principles of data analysis set out by Miles & Huberman (1994) were followed, 
tailored to the specific research circumstances, to reduce the vast amount of data collected to the 
underlying themes, ideas and concepts, without losing the richness of the data. This enabled the 
presentation of the case study data in various forms and perspectives (quotes, diagrams, cross-case 
and within-case data discussion) to enrich the analysis and enable conclusions to be drawn. These 
conclusions were then verified and validated to ensure high quality reliable research.  
Application of Grounded Theory: With regard to interpretation and analysis of the follow-on 
interviews, the grounded theory approach, in its “pragmatic form” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), was 
followed, which encourages the researcher not just to generate the theory from the data as in the 
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“purist form” (Glaser & Strauss 1967), but also to blend the process with existing insights obtained 
from existing theory, literature and practice. The search for meaning thus starts evolving at the early 
stages of data collection through a continuous interplay of data collected and analysed, in this case, 
both quantitative and qualitative. (Stern, 1994). Grounded theory as a tool for analysis arguably has 
some conflicts with understanding the world as subjective or objective from a philosophical point of 
view (Annells, 1996) and therefore this will be clarified in this section. The view of the researcher and 
this subsequent work is that of social constructionism: society is both subjective and objective in that 
society and individuals assign objective meaning to constructs (Andrews, 2012). Annells states that 
the philosophical view of grounded theory is whereby:  
“…social and natural worlds have differing realities but that both forms of reality are 
probabilistically apprehensible, albeit imperfectly” (Annells, 1996; p.385).  
This work employs grounded theory in two ways. Firstly, it assumes a similar perspective to Glaser 
(2001) in that the theory should emerge from the data through induction. It should however be 
understood that there is a level of deduction occurring. This is due to the background of the researcher 
as an individual who has been immersed in this subject of research and therefore is unable to 
withdraw completely from personal subjective views (Thomas & James, 2006). Secondly, this 
research deliberately draws on grounded theory in order to logically make sense of a large amount of 
qualitative data and to ensure that meaningful knowledge is drawn from it. This, of course, requires a 
level of objectivity. Objective meanings and codes are assigned to the subjective views of the 
participants with the purpose of drawing meaningful results that represent the samples in this research 
(see detailed steps in operationalizing analytical techniques below).  
Grounded theory arose from philosophies of symbolic interaction which have been traditionally 
employed by psychologists and sociologists enquiring about human and group behaviours (Chenitz & 
Swanson, 1986). The view here is that individuals will enter into their own experiences as an object 
and not a subject defining themselves through social roles, expectations and perspectives of 
themselves and others (Mead, 1962). Individuals derive meaning from social interaction and interpret 
this (thus modifying meaning) to determine their actions (Blumer, 1969). This corresponds with a 
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constructivist paradigm of enquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) whereby the nature of reality (in terms of 
objectivity) is formed subjectively by a person or collective mental constructions.  
When talking about objectivity and subjectivity, it is useful to understand the differing backgrounds of 
grounded theory’s founding academics, Glaser and Strauss. Glaser had training in positivistic 
approaches and therefore coded qualitative responses into something objective (Annells, 1996). This 
portrays more of an etic approach whereby constructs are described externally in terms of concepts 
that are equally understandable to other cultures (Pike, 1967). It is in this way that grounded theory 
has been criticised for its formulaic nature (Robrecht, 1995; Thomas & James, 2006) and has been 
accused of oversimplifying complex meanings and interrelationships because of its reliance on a naïve 
model of scientific induction towards “inference to the best explanation” (Miller & Fredericks, 1999). 
Nonetheless, in terms of the current research it is this systematic approach and analysis strategy that 
has enabled the researcher to clearly make sense of a large amount of qualitative data.  
Strauss’s training encouraged him to understand the active role of individuals in research and the 
subjective nature of interpretation (Strauss, 1987; Thomas & James, 2006). It is acknowledged that 
preconceptions cannot be wholly abandoned, which contrasts with Glaser’s (1978) motivation to 
“come closer to objectivity” (p.8). The view of social constructionism appreciates that while 
knowledge is subjective, the value that we can assign to it is objective (Andrews, 2012); grounded 
theory shares this view (Annells, 1996) and encourages “concepts of reality” (Glaser, 1992; p.14), 
however, it is Strauss (1987) who more clearly acknowledges the subjective role of the researcher.  
Since the original work on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) different versions and forms of 
grounded theory have arisen, each with similarities but serving different purposes and reflecting 
different backgrounds (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007):  
 Strauss & Corbin’s (1998) approach finds the researcher knowing where to start; they approach 
data from a top down view, deriving and proving theory from the data.  
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 The Glaserian perspective (2001) stresses the importance of letting a theory emerge from the data 
rather than using specific, present categories; the theory emerges from the data. The researcher 
approaches a phenomenon with a completely ‘empty mind’.  
 The Constructivist approach (Charmaz, 2003; Charmaz, 2006; Charmaz, 2014) emphasizes the 
importance of meanings individuals attribute to the phenomena under study. The researcher will 
apply active codes to look at the feelings and values participants assign to concepts rather than 
solely focusing on facts and description. It accepts the researcher as an active participant in 
shaping the conclusions. 
The current study does not aim to tell an individual story surrounding each participant; rather it seeks 
to identify behaviours to do with strategic governance and risk-management in the context of the 
outsourcing ecosystem to resolve a concern (Breckenridge et al., 2012). The outcome seeks to explore 
behaviour rather than describe how individuals construct their own independent reality (which is more 
aligned with Glaser’s (2001) view).  
Before a divergence in views occurred between Glaser and Strauss, the intention of grounded theory 
stressed the prescription of data analysis steps to develop and contribute to a logic paradigm or model 
of the theory generated (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) through both inductive and deductive enquiry. The 
current work is reflective of this original approach. The researcher has some preconceptions of themes 
that he wished to explore and which have been guided by the literature and theory presented in this 
thesis, although the specific details surrounding the outputs from the data are unknown, reflecting 
both inductive and deductive approaches (Polsa, 2013).  
Detailed steps in operationalising analytical techniques 
1. Open coding and concept development (enabled by NVivo): To start, the interview 
transcriptions were analysed and open-coded into distinct units of meaning by identifying key 
words or phrases which connect the informant’s account to the subject of my research, for 
instance the concept of the “execution gap”, albeit expressed by using different words by 
different interviewees . Concept development then involved identification of a chunk of data 
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as “belonging to, representing, or being an example of some more general phenomenon” 
(Spiggle, 1994; p.493).  For instance, the informants from the outsourcing organisations talk 
about what enhances risk to their organisation and then relate that to various elements or 
situations of risk that they are describing.  
2. Contact summaries/research memos: Immediately following each interview, a Contact 
Summary sheet was created with a research memo for each interview, highlighting the main 
themes and any thoughts or perceptions (e.g. anxiety expressed over regulatory non-
compliance and enforcement action related to the actions of third parties in the outsourcing 
ecosystem) that could be subsequently revisited to enrich the emerging theory.  
3. Axial coding and category development: Involving grouping of emerging concepts, for 
instance, elements or situations of risk and related challenges, into those arising from 
regulatory, people/cultural, technology or process issues, based on the relationship between 
these concepts. This involved the process of abstraction (refer also to the discussion on 
abstraction in section 5.1 above) onto a theoretical level to create the basis for theory-
construction (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) which can be traced back to the data.  
4. Theoretical sampling: As concepts/categories were identified and the alignment to DC theory 
started to develop, the need to include additional informants and incorporate new scenarios 
not covered earlier was considered, in order to strengthen the research findings and propose 
an alignment to DC theory based on risk management capabilities arising from the interviews. 
Thus, at this stage, the process of data collection started to get ‘controlled’ by the emerging 
theory” (Glaser, 1978; p.36). In this case, the agenda for subsequent interviews was refreshed 
to include the list of relevant insights arising from the DC theory to ensure these insights were 
comprehensively covered in the discussions. Another example related to the identification of 
the “execution gap”. When the initial interviews identified that one of the potential causes of 
this gap was the delegation of key risk management functions to junior managerial staff 
without relevant skills or training, a small number of such junior staff from the same 
organisations were also included as additional informants.  
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5. Constant comparison and triangulation: As the name implies, this involves comparing like to 
like in looking for emerging patterns and themes. These comparisons were initially done 
within each embedded case and then across the embedded cases. Similarly, literature being 
reviewed and emerging theory were continually compared as was the relationship between the 
data and emerging theory. As discussed earlier, the use of a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative data significantly enhanced the opportunities for triangulation. 
6. Treatment of any emerging disagreement between the data, the emerging theory and the 
literature: The principle applied here was that rather than assuming that the emerging theory 
was incorrect, plausible explanations to the divergence would be sought that reconciled and 
made sense of both the research data including specific explanations provided by 
interviewees, as well as the literature. For instance, in the industry case studies, the macro 
economic and business environment impacting the specific industry (e.g. regulatory pressures 
in Financial Services or the inherent changes that the Healthcare and Life Sciences industry 
was going through) provided many of these explanations to determine the trajectory or 
aspirational path to excellence in RQ1. 
7. Reaching the point of saturation: The researcher “stayed in the field” until the point of 
saturation was reached and no new evidence emerged from subsequent data.  
8. Obtaining feedback as a quality and sense check: This was done at the broader thematic level, 
to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of respondents, and served as a quality and sense 
check on the conclusions (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
A structured and robust approach, enabled by the use of NVivo, to manage the high volume of data, 
enabled the researcher to address the limitations of the grounded theory approach which often relates 
to the “data overload and information blackout” (Drucker, 1988). It also enabled the researcher to 
ensure that early impressions (or data collected) did not make a deeper mark, which in turn, has the 
risk of subsequent data that is inconsistent, difficult to get or missing to be ignored.  
This proposed design was refined and adjusted as the research progressed, to better align with the 
research problem, particularly based on the experience of the trialling and sequential studies. 
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2.4 Safeguards to ensure ethical conduct of research 
Appendix B sets out a sample consent form used to tell potential research informants about the 
research, enabling them to make an educated choice about participating in the research by clearly 
setting out upfront what the research is about and what it entails from their perspective. Apart from 
explaining the objective and scope of the study; the consent form also clearly indicated the manner in 
which data would be collected and how this data would be used. It emphasised that participation in 
this research was voluntary and the participants could potentially withdraw their consent at any later 
time, without providing any specific reason for such withdrawal.  
The participants were further assured that commercial confidentiality related to their organisation as 
well as individual sensitivities in matters relating to Board or leadership-level strategic activities 
would be protected.  Further, some personally identifiable information (PII) or personally sensitive 
information (PSI) may have been captured during the interviews with the key informants. There was 
thus a need to have a continuous focus on preventing any misuse of such information beyond original 
intent. The legal obligation under the Data Protection Act, 1988 required the researcher to store any 
personal information in password protected data files, lock physical copies and not retain them longer 
than necessary (normally 5-7 years). Any confidential corporate information obtained during my 
research would also need to be similarly safeguarded. As the data collection for this research was 
completed prior to the European Global Data Privacy Regulations (GDPR) came into effect on 25 
May 2018, this aspect of compliance was not required to be considered by the researcher. Finally, all 
uses of other researchers’ work and publications have been duly acknowledged to avoid plagiarism as 
I am responsible for the integrity, impartiality and independence of my research. 
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3 EXTENDING ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES THROUGH OUTSOURCING: 
TOWARDS A DYNAMIC RISK MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY FRAMEWORK 
Section Summary: This section focuses on addressing RQ1 and RQ2, i.e. the how and why of adopting 
a more strategic approach to the governance and risk management of the outsourcing ecosystem by 
developing dynamic risk management capabilities underpinned by the dynamic capabilities (DC) 
theory. The first part of this section (3.1 to 3.3) sets the context of this organisational transformation 
discussed in the introductory section of this thesis by providing a forward-looking multi-disciplinary 
view of the emerging concept of strategic governance and risk management in the context of the 
outsourcing ecosystem, integrating key principles from the DC theory. Having set the context, it then 
attempts to gain an understanding of how and why such large global organisations are broadening 
their perspective and maturity over governance and risk-management around their outsourcing 
ecosystem to emerge as astute decision-makers (3.4.2), together with the organisational capabilities 
that they must develop to emerge as the astute decision-makers in this regard, using primary 
research-based industry case studies (3.4.1) and concludes by relating these emerging organisational 
risk management capabilities to key principles of the DC theory (3.4.3). The next section will focus on 
addressing RQ3, i.e. gaining an understanding of the organisational experience in implementing this 
transformational change and related challenges faced. 
3.1 Strategic governance and risk management in the outsourcing context  
Sub-sections 3.1 to 3.4 establish the context for the organisational transformation by critically 
reviewing existing literature to gain an understanding of the changing perception of risk and 
governance that is currently taking place in the business environment and relate it to the outsourcing 
context. By doing so, these sub-sections further explain the knowledge gaps that establish the 
foundations for the research covered in this thesis, setting the stage for the subsequent industry case 
studies, the 2x2 framework and alignment with the DC theory. 
Existing literature, relevant to proposed research, can be grouped into four broad themes: 
 Risk and risk-management: Explaining and recognizing the strategic nature of risk as an 
enabler for value-creation. 
 Risk-based governance: Strategic repositioning of governance as a risk-based top-down 
Board-driven activity.  
 Enablers for strategic governance: Contemporary rethinking on the role of Board and 
regulation. 
 Strategic governance and risk-management (in the outsourcing context): Studies on risk and 
governance in the context of outsourcing and relating the above themes to the 
outsourcing/offshoring context. Figure 7 below summarises this framework for the literature 
review.  
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Based on the review of existing literature in this way, the evolving approach to capture the strategic 
nature of risk and governance in outsourcing is depicted across these four key themes.  
 Risk and risk-management: First, the changing perceptions of risk over time towards recognizing 
the strategic nature of risk as an enabler for value-creation, not just “bad things happening” 
(Funston & Wagner, 2010; Slywotzky & Drzik, 2005), and dealing with uncertainty (Samson, 
Reneke, & Wiecek, 2009; Carbonara & Caiazza, 2010; Marczyk, 2009; Elahi, 2013). This also 
includes recognition of the more strategic types of risk, in addition to traditional financial or 
compliance-related risks (McConnell, 2013; Weitzner & Peridis, 2011). 
 Risk-based governance: Second, strategic repositioning of risk-based governance, which views 
governance as driven by strategic risks, and integrated as a top-down Board-driven activity.  
 Enablers for strategic governance: Third, emerging enablers for strategic governance that involve 
recognizing the increasing role of the Board in governance (McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas, 2013) 
and regulation as strategic enablers in this evolution.  
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 Strategic governance and risk management (in the outsourcing context): Lastly, strategic 
governance and risk management mechanisms relevant to the outsourcing context. 
 
Each of these four areas is elaborated below:  
3.1.1 Risk and Risk-management   
Changing Perceptions: Risk is typically defined as a probability or threat of damage, injury, liability, 
loss, or any other negative occurrence, caused by external or internal vulnerabilities, which may be 
avoided through pre-emptive action (Law, 2006). Therefore, risk represents a potential for failure in 
terms of loss, harm or missed opportunity. In line with this view, risk management has typically been 
associated with mitigating adverse financial consequences of “bad things happening”, including the use 
of market insurance mechanisms (Harrington & Niehaus, 2003). Dionne (2013) explains that after the 
Second World War, the inability to comprehensively insure business risks led to the emergence of newer 
mechanisms for risk management such as contingent planning and risk prevention activities. This was 
followed by the international regulation of risk (1980s), starting with financial institutions developing 
internal risk management models and capital calculation algorithms to optimize regulatory capital. As 
Figure-7: Approach to Literature Review 
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wider governance mechanisms started evolving, integrated risk management was introduced and Chief 
Risk Officer (CRO) roles emerged. Sarbanes-Oxley regulation, stipulating governance rules for 
companies, was introduced in the United States in 2002, following various scandals and bankruptcies 
resulting from poor risk management, and the key stock exchanges added similar rules for listed 
companies (Blanchard & Dionne, 2004). However, despite these developments, traditional risk 
management with its focus on avoiding financial risks and protecting existing assets clearly did not 
prove sufficient to prevent the housing bubble, subprime crisis and credit crisis of the 2000s in the USA, 
leading on thereafter to a much wider global financial and economic crisis. These challenging times 
triggered the need to rethink risk and risk management. It was realised that risk management, as 
practised, rarely involved business leaders and was rarely used to identify and exploit the most 
promising value-creation opportunities. By not doing so, most directors and executives were left with a 
skewed view of risk and with only one set of tools (i.e., asset preservation tools) when they also needed 
another set to deal with the risks that accompany their efforts to create new value for their organisations 
(Funston & Wagner, 2010). Further, the key focus on “preventing bad things happening” or the 
downside led many organisations to treat their enterprise risk management function merely as 
extensions of their audit or regulatory compliance processes (Slywotzky & Drzik, 2005).  
Uncertainty and its impact on risk thinking: “Risk” is generally linked with uncertainty (Samson, 
Reneke, & Wiecek, 2009). Indeed, leadership often has to make decisions without complete information 
and with the inability to specifically describe future outcomes (Carbonara & Caiazza, 2010; Krickx, 
2000). Knight (1971) describes two types of uncertainty: first where probabilities are known or 
knowable, which he calls risk; and second, where probabilities are not known or knowable. This 
classification established the probability theory based foundation of conventional risk management, 
involving probabilities based on normal distributions, ignoring the outliers. This approach has failed, 
as improbable and extreme events have occurred instead of the probable. Thus risk management needs 
to be flexible and dynamic, rather than static and bound by a set of statistical rules.  
Several definitions of risk consider the extent of uncertainty and the magnitude of potential loss, as the 
two essential elements of risk (e.g., Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). Regda (2007) defines risk as uncertainty, 
concerning the occurrence of a loss, emanating from lack of complete information about the future. 
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Luhmann (2005) argues that risk, unlike danger and uncertainty, implies a domain for decision-making 
about the future. Therefore, risk management creates an expectation of decidability and management of 
uncertainty and opportunity (Power, 2007). 
On a related note, Marczyk (2009) points out the fundamental yet intuitive Principle of Incompatibility 
between high complexity and high precision (Zadeh, 1975), by which high complexity reduces the 
accuracy of future predictions, thus increasing risk. Horton (2012) explains how a complex system 
cannot be explained by breaking it down into its component parts because the key element is the 
interaction between parts. As a result of these interactions, complex systems exhibit emergent 
behaviour, making probabilistic risk assessment techniques, based on linear relationships, difficult to 
apply. Bonabeau (2007) in his paper on understanding and managing complexity risk, gives examples 
of how such complexities in business processes, legal contracts, software, networks, etc, in a hyper-
connected world have led to business failures or major disruptions in different industries. 
The extent and impact of uncertainty thus enhances the need to rethink risk management at operational, 
planning and strategic levels. Researchers agree that the rapid pace of change significantly increases 
uncertainty and accordingly the risks (both in number and strategic impact), making predictions less 
reliable and impairing organisational ability to sustain competitive advantage (Dess & Beard, 1984; 
Wholey & Brittain, 1989; Pearson, 2004; D’Aveni, Gagnino, & Smith, 2010). Risk management would 
be redundant in a perfectly predictable world (Elahi, 2013).   
The upside or opportunity in risk: Research on exploiting the upside or opportunity in risk is emerging 
as the world continues to realize that risks must be taken to seize opportunities, managed and not simply 
avoided for an enterprise optimizing its value and success, particularly in uncertainty and turbulence 
(Funston & Wagner, 2010). Traditional approaches for managing risk tend to focus on monitoring key 
financial indicators (often driven by financial statements) and regulatory compliance. Resulting risk 
strategies are thus largely driven by prior performance and past negative events; these are often 
inappropriate for detecting future strategic risks, managing future performance or focusing beyond 
value preservation to value-creation (Deloitte, 2013). In line with this view, risk can be defined as the 
potential for failure in terms of loss or harm or missed opportunity.  
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Risk management is the discipline of improving one’s chances of survival and success, particularly in 
uncertainty and turbulence. It is driven by the philosophy that risks must be taken to seize opportunities, 
and they must be managed not simply avoided. Therefore, by considering and managing risk, an 
enterprise can succeed in optimizing its value and success (Dictionary of Business and Management; 
Law, 2006). Risk management can significantly enhance competitive advantage, as advocated by Porter 
(1985) through cost advantage as well as differentiation. This is showcased by Elahi (2013) who 
explains how this can be achieved by being stronger in dealing with disruption when it hits everyone, 
seeking riskier businesses with higher potential profits, creating a resilient image and dealing more 
effectively with day-to-day fluctuations. On similar lines, Kaplan & Mikes (2012) reiterate the need for 
managing strategic and external risks, but emphasize that this needs to be accomplished in addition to 
managing the downside and preventing “bad things happening”. Preventable risks, arising from within 
an organisation, can be monitored and controlled through rule-based standardised compliance tools, 
while strategic risks and external risks require dynamic approaches, enabled by iterative discussion. 
Therefore, establishing Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Systems can create long-term competitive 
advantage (Nocco & Stulz, 2006).  
Aven (2016) summarises the emerging changes in risk and risk-management by concluding through 
literature review that the scientific foundation of risk assessment and risk management is still somewhat 
shaky on some issues, in the sense that both theoretical work and practice rely on perspectives and 
principles that could seriously misguide decision-makers. Examples include the general conception of 
risk as an expected value or a probability distribution. In recent years several attempts at integrative 
research have been conducted, establishing broader perspectives on the conceptualisation, assessment 
and management of risk, which Aven (2016) considers as essential for developing the risk field and 
obtaining a strong unifying scientific platform for this field. This current thesis addresses this call, 
specifically the acknowledgement of managerial review and judgement in risk management. 
3.1.2  Risk-based governance  
Having reviewed how the existing literature recognizes the broadening of risks beyond avoiding or 
mitigating the negative effects of (primarily) financial risks, this sub-section now examines the related 
theme of realignment of governance mechanisms to match this reincarnated risk thinking.  
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Governance is concerned with directing and managing activities to maximize performance that meets 
the expectations of internal and external stakeholders, while managing risks and complying with 
applicable laws, regulations and obligations (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 
2004). Researchers acknowledge risk-based approaches to governance as universally applicable 
foundations for improving quality, efficiency and rationality of governance (e.g., Rothstein, Borraz, & 
Huber, 2013). The alignment of governance mechanisms to risk perceptions provides an objective 
method for establishing governance priorities, allocating resources and rationalizing the practical limits 
of what governance interventions can and should achieve (Graham, 2010). Further, risk-based 
approaches create a potential convergence of the ways in which governance problems are framed and 
solutions sought across diverse domains and organisations (Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001). Power 
(2007) argues how risk-based governance practices offer bureaucracies defensive decision-making 
rationales that carry the “veneer of technocratic legitimacy” in the face of increasing scrutiny and 
legitimacy pressures. In line with this compelling justification that risk is driving governance, it is 
natural to expect that the increasing strategic nature of risk drives risk management activity and 
governance to more strategic levels, to be discussed and debated amongst the highest levels of 
management in the organisation, such as the Board of Directors and the CEO. Saltaji (2013) reiterates 
how this also enhances the ongoing relationship between corporate governance and strategic 
management in the pursuit of shareholder value, in keeping with the Anglo-American conception of a 
company as a device to further the wellbeing of shareholders. These emerging perspectives reconcile 
the need to protect the downside risk to shareholders (managerial accountability), as well as to 
encourage managers to take risks to increase shareholders’ value (Keasey & Wright, 1993). 
The recognition of strategic risks as an emerging and rapidly developing form of risk, beyond traditional 
financial risks, is just the first step in strategically repositioning governance mechanisms. This explicit 
linkage of risk and strategy, through repositioned governance mechanisms to start at the very top of the 
organisation, should become an integral part of an organisation’s strategy-setting process (Beasley & 
Frigo, 2007). To address risk issues that have a strategic impact, some organisations have developed 
initiatives, referred to as Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC), which look holistically across their 
risk and control functions and seek to enhance their efficiency by identifying and integrating common 
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processes and activities, such as risk assessments, typically performed by each of these functions (Frigo 
& Anderson, 2009). 
A recent global survey of top management by Marsh corroborates that risk management functions have 
indeed started taking a more strategic role leading to mature practices such as: stronger interaction 
between risk functions and Boards; use of analytics for evolving strategic purposes; development of 
cross-functional collaboration through such means as risk committees; financial and operational skill-
development in risk management personnel; and the evolution of organisational risk knowledge centres 
(Marsh, 2014). In the fast-paced and highly dynamic global business and political environment when 
risk can instantaneously become reality, companies should now consider a much broader set of risks 
and strategic assets which are more difficult to leverage, manage and protect, including people, 
intellectual property, customers, marketing efforts, and even, for example, “the crowd” in emerging 
phenomena like crowdsourcing (Nevo & Kotlarsky, 2014). Additionally, companies should adopt more 
of an outside-in perspective by gathering data and appreciating external perspectives from external 
sources, including, for instance, customers, bloggers, information trendsetters, and marketplace and 
security analysts (Deloitte, 2013).  
3.1.3  Enablers of strategic governance  
Following the last global financial crisis, both management practitioners and researchers are reviewing 
corporate practices and assumptions that may have contributed to this economic disaster. This 
specifically includes the effectiveness of current models of corporate governance (Acharya & 
Richardson, 2009). On similar lines McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas (2013) demonstrate how the growing 
number of academic studies on corporate governance tend to explore Boards of Directors more than 
other governance-related actors or mechanisms. 
Key regulators and governance bodies now agree on the Board’s central role in approving and 
monitoring strategy, in keeping with fiduciary duties to shareholders. Boards are required to “set 
strategy” (CEBS, 2010), to “guide” strategy (OECD, 2004; NACD, 2008), to “approve” strategy 
(BCBIS, 2010), and “review” and “monitor” strategy (IOD, 2009). The Board has to understand the 
inherent strategic risks and ensure appropriate strategic risk management. Strategic risk is different from 
other risks as the Board itself is the risk-taker (McConnell, 2013). Weitzner & Peridis (2011) argue 
  
60 
accordingly that the Board’s traditional role of financial oversight needs to extend to strategic 
oversight/control. Fully understanding the strategic activities of the organisation enables a more 
accurate assessment of the risks involved and ethical oversight. This further enables the Board to strike 
a better balance between risk oversight, growth, performance and strategy.  
Changes in the regulatory environment are significantly impacting the Board’s area of focus in several 
countries around the world and are likely to continue to do so (McConnell, 2013). For example, in the 
financial services sector in the UK, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) of the Bank of England 
announced, in May 2011, a new approach to banking regulation, stating that, in future, prudential 
regulation would be forward-looking, “seeking to assess whether, on the balance of risks, there are 
vulnerabilities in firms’ business models, capital and liquidity positions, governance, risk management 
and controls that cast into doubt their future financial soundness” (Bank of England, 2011). This directly 
supports the changing roles discussed above. 
Following the financial crisis, the ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been integrated 
into the strategic governance responsibilities of the Board. There has also been a surge in research on 
the strategic and moral benefits of having a strong reputation (Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009; 
Davies, Chun, & Kamins, 2010; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Supporting this notion, the concept of CSR, 
with its focus on externally-oriented discretionary moral behaviour, has also found its way into strategy 
research (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008).  
3.1.4  Strategic governance (in the context of outsourcing)  
Towards an emerging definition of strategic governance: The emerging thinking on risks and 
governance emanating from the above discussion can thus be synthesised to articulate the evolving 
definition of strategic governance (see Table 5), aligned to the emerging focus on strategic risks. The 
emphasis is clearly on value-creation and the approach is distinctly transformational in its impact on 
the way organisations operate. 
  
  
61 
Table 5: Strategic Risk and Proposed Definition of Strategic Governance 
 Strategic Risk  Strategic Governance 
Definition Potential high-impact loss, harm 
or missed opportunity arising from 
or challenging the achievement of 
business strategy decisions. 
A value-creation-based transformational 
approach to governance where governance 
mechanisms are driven top-down by 
recognizing strategic and other risks. 
Relevance 
to the 
Board 
Having articulated a strategy, a 
Board must identify the highest-
level risks that may affect 
achieving business objectives, to 
be defined as strategic risks 
(McConnell, 2013). 
According to the Institute of Directors (2009), 
a strategic governance framework formally 
establishes the Board’s specific 
responsibilities to shareholders and other 
stakeholders which include establishing the 
company’s structure, strategy and risk profile 
and monitoring and evaluating its 
implementation. 
 
Over the years, researchers have examined the constructs of risk and risk management around 
outsourcing. Several researchers have tested various hypotheses around managing risks to ensure 
success in outsourcing initiatives. These hypotheses have ranged from measures of ITO risk (Bahli & 
Rivard, 2005); investor responses to outsourcing transaction risk (Oh, Gallivan, & Kim, 2006); specific 
aspects, such as the role of business familiarity in managing outsourcing risks and the resultant impact 
on pricing decisions (Gefen, Wyss, & Lichtenstein, 2008); and/or service provider opportunism as a 
key strategic outsourcing risk (Handley & Benton Jr., 2012). There have also been several examples of 
case-study-based research on aspects such as trust-building as a risk-mitigating factor in outsourcing 
(Sabherwal, 1999); agility as an essential element underlying the effectiveness of globally-distributed 
information; systems development teams (Sarker & Sarker, 2009), and successful communication and 
inter-networking to manage risks in offshore teams (Oshri, Kotlarsky & Willcocks, 2007).  
Similarly, in the area of supply chain risk management, the key area of focus appears to have been on 
preventing supply chain disruptions as the ongoing trend of using module-based and systems-based 
suppliers has led to greater dependency (Trkman & McCormack, 2009) and inherently increased the 
vulnerability of the supply chain (Christine, 2013). The companies become inextricably linked and are 
no longer able to withdraw from the respective supplier networks. Although extensive literature is 
available on this focus area, several authors point out the need for a more holistic approach on 
monitoring supply chain risks in greater detail (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Narasimhan & Talluri, 2009; 
Ho et al., 2015). Wu & Knott (2006) also identified a gap between the proactive role of SRM in a 
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complex and multilayer supply network and the current view on how to deal with the more 
contemporary supply chain risks, covering both strategic as well as operational risks and the need for 
further research to close this gap by providing criteria and classifications for a best practice model for 
SRM, proposed by Choi et al., (2001). It is believed that such literature will not just create a more 
integrated and strategic framework for action but also be proactive in nature, for instance contributing 
to the future avoidance of supply disruptions by formulating early and sustainable warning indicators, 
as recommended by Christoper & Mangan (2005). Unfortunately, a more recent review of supply chain 
risk management literature by Ho, Zheng, Yildiz, & Talluri (2015) indicates that this gap is yet to be 
fully addressed.  
In case of ITO, BPO and Supply Chain Management, most of this risk-related research has been carried 
out largely from the perspective of operational-level risks and the findings/recommendations primarily 
addressed at the level of contract managers or junior levels of staff from procurement and vendor 
management teams, outsourcing team leaders and other members of middle management. Strategic 
risks, where researched, have focused, for example, on choice of locations, structuring of relationships, 
joint ventures and contracts. Research has primarily been on initial structuring and decision-making 
around an outsourcing mechanism, rather than investigating ongoing activities around managing and 
reviewing strategic risk as part of the enhanced accountability of the Board of Directors as discussed 
above.  
As outsourcing (as well as supply-chain management in general) is moving up the value chain, the 
various risks involved, as well as the approaches for managing them, continue to mature and evolve 
(Carmel & Agarwal, 2002; Hahn, Doh, & Bunyaratavej, 2009), requiring enhanced strategic 
governance mechanisms. Such mechanisms should help outsourcing organisations to exploit the upside 
of risk and leverage risk for strategic advantage on an agile and dynamic basis, in addition to managing 
the downside of risk by preventing “bad things happening”. Both relational and contractual governance 
have been dominant themes in outsourcing research (Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Gerbasi, 2015; Lacity, Khan, 
& Yan, 2016). In particular, as BPO evolved beyond routine transaction processing, the concept of 
relational governance, in addition to or instead of the more rigid, parameter-based contractual 
governance, has gained importance in academic research (Huber, Fischer, Dibbern, & Hirschheim, 
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2013). Vivek, Richey & Dalela (2009), for instance, find that offshoring relationships begin with 
calculative trust and opportunism, which later gives way to building dynamic capabilities to increase 
process value through a trust-based relationship. Accordingly, the governance processes evolve from 
transactional to resource complementarity to a phase where trust and long-term orientation governs the 
outsourced and/or offshored processes. In a later study Huber, Fischer, Dibbern, & Hirschheim (2013) 
refine this broader theme and develop a process model of how and why complementarity and 
substitution form dynamically over time between contractual and relational governance, in response to 
trigger events (such as significant changes in the macro-economic environment impacting 
organisations, increasing regulatory focus on outsourcing in certain industries such as Financial 
Services, business disruption, etc.). Continuing with a similar theme Cao, Mohan, Ramesh, & Sarkar 
(2013) reveal how a balance between contractual and relational governance can be achieved through a 
process the researchers describe as the “ambidexterity pendulum”. Relational factors, however, 
dominate where BPO is focused on higher value processes (Rai, Keil, Hornyak, & Wullenweber, 2012), 
process improvement (Jayaraman, Narayanan, Luo, & Swaminathan, 2013) or strategic innovations 
(Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Gerbasi, 2015) to maximize the strategic benefits of the outsourcing organisation, 
co-existing with other contractual and administrative mechanisms. Abulokwe and Lupson (2013) 
specifically relate this to governance processes in captive offshore delivery centres and demonstrate 
how organisations engaged in captive offshoring are faced with two apparently contradictory sets of 
issues: a set of highly desirable and interrelated strategic benefits and a variety of operational challenges 
that arise from the imposed nature of the governance processes, thus advocating the need for co-
developed governance processes. Similarly, collaboration in supply-chain management as well as the 
need for developing environment-friendly and sustainable processes and those that address corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) objectives are rapidly evolving as contemporary issues that need to be 
addressed by ongoing research in governance and risk management of the outsourcing ecosystem. 
Lacity et al. (2016) in their comparative review of empirical business services literature (vis-à-vis prior 
research) highlight a deeper exploration of the direct effects of transaction attributes, sourcing 
motivations, client and provider capabilities, and governance on sourcing decisions and outcomes. They 
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report that researchers have also studied a broader variety of sourcing decisions, including shared 
services, captive centres, rural sourcing and back-sourcing.  
3.2  Towards an ecosystem view of outsourcing 
As indicated earlier, analysts continue to predict exponential growth in outsourcing, which echoes 
their perceived potential for enhancing organisational value in the current economic scenario 
characterised by volatility and uncertainty in the recovery following the recent global financial crisis. 
In addition, the definitions of ITO and BPO are continuously evolving, as a result of which 
contemporary researchers such as Lacity, Khan & Yan (2016) have grouped such sourcing into a 
broader category called “business services” that transcend the traditional classification into ITO and 
BPO. Such business services include, but are not limited to, financial and accounting, human 
resources, procurement, R&D, call centres/customer service, software development, software support, 
infrastructure management services, systems integration services, legal services and any other services 
that can be delivered by third parties, typically enabled by technology (Lacity et al., 2016). 
Specifically, the scope of such business services are constantly broadening to include newer and more 
evolutionary forms, such as the more recent logistics outsourcing and converging with supply chain 
management more generally (Accenture, 2017). This report recognizes, for instance, how new 
outsourcing-based opportunities are emerging in areas such as planning, direct procurement, order 
management and reverse logistics, blurring the traditional distinction between outsourced business 
services and physical movement of goods in the supply chain. Similarly, businesses are also seeing a 
change in how supply chain outsourcing services are provided and who delivers them (third-party 
logistics companies who have traditionally delivered goods physically at various locations as against 
professional services firms specializing in BPO service delivery in the areas of demand planning and 
forecasting, sourcing and procurement, warranty management and customer services). The potential 
result is a broader range of integrated outsourcing opportunities (both physical goods as well as 
services) that is likely to come under the aegis of a single provider in future. Similarly, the rules of the 
game are being re-written for “make or buy decisions” around outsourcing of manufacturing 
processes in the current uncertain and disruptive environment to be able to continue to create and 
retain organisational value (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017). This analysis helps them identify critical 
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products that enable the organisation to maintain a competitive and innovative edge (and require a 
more strategic focus on governance) versus those that can be outsourced more readily without 
harming growth prospects.  
Researchers Song, Xue, Rai, & Zhang (2018) provide another example of an emerging ecosystem 
relevant to technology companies operating through software platform-based collaboration. They cite 
the instance of software platforms, such as Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android, which are emerging as 
dominant models for software-based services (Tiwana et al., 2010). Based on their technological 
architectures, these platforms extend their product boundaries by attracting large numbers of third-
party applications that create complementary value (Boudreau, 2012; Ceccagnoli et al., 2012). In this 
way, software platforms inherently operate as a two-sided third-party phenomenon, represented by 
users on one side and the applications (offered by outsourced third-party developers) on the other side 
which influence the growth of installed bases of each other (e.g., number of applications, application 
variety, and nature of application usage etc.), reflecting their growing complexity in the interest of 
organisational value and sustainable competitive advantage.  
There is no doubt that such pursuits of organisational value and sustainable competitive advantage 
through a longer-term strategic focus on areas such as innovation, growth and scarce skills is 
continually driving organisations to evolve complex outsourcing strategies across their multiple third-
party relationships. These strategies go far beyond merely fulfilling short-term objectives, such as 
immediate cost-savings, which cannot offer sustained competitive advantage or value, given their 
imitability (Porter, 1985; 1990). As a result, organisations are increasingly finding themselves 
operating within an ecosystem of third parties as a fundamental means to transform them in the way 
they organize themselves to compete globally (Lewin & Peeters, 2006). In terms of the increasing size 
of the third-party ecosystem in organisations, recent data published by Deloitte (2018) in their 
publication entitled “Extended Enterprise Risk Management (EERM) – Focusing on the Climb 
Ahead” indicated that more than 56% of large global organisations have more than 1000 third parties 
comprising their ecosystem or extended enterprise. Within this group, 27% managed anything 
between 10,000 and 50,000 third parties as part of their ecosystem while another 19% had more than 
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50,000 third parties forming their extended enterprise. This number is only expected to grow in the 
years ahead.  
While these changes create new opportunities, they also bring in a different set of risks, many of 
which have a strategic impact. Accordingly, risk management and governance over these outsourcing 
relationships or the third-party ecosystem, as it is now being referred to, are starting to transform 
themselves into an integrated set of strategic and proactive Board-led activities, with a dual focus on 
enabling value protection as well as value creation. Being viewed for decades as a set of fragmented 
operational-level activities that address specific threats at the level of individual outsourcing 
engagements, this rethinking and repositioning of these issues holistically for the entire third-party 
ecosystem is yet to be supported by adequate research to identify and analyze current and emerging 
trends and business practices. An opportunity thus exists for management and organisational scholars 
to make a major contribution in understanding this phenomenon better with an ecosystem lens.  
This shift, from a focus on cost to a focus on value, reconfirms the organisational recognition of the 
strategic opportunity that outsourcing can create for them. As a result, organisations are increasingly 
finding themselves as operating within an eco-system of third-party relationships, which embodies the 
cumulative impact of these individual outsourcing relationships.  
Prior research and existing literature on IT outsourcing as well as more broadly on supply chain 
(ecosystem) management presents several debates around whether business organisations should 
consolidate their supplier base to focus on a small number of service providers or whether they should 
enhance their reliance on third parties by outsourcing a larger and possibly more critical processes to a 
larger group of vendors. Typically, such research carried out up to the early 2000s prior to the last global 
financial crisis identified critical trade-offs involved in increasing the number of suppliers and strongly 
recommended focus on a handful of strategic partners to balance these trade-offs (Levina & Su, 2008). 
However, since the turbulence in the business environment leading up to the crisis, there appears to 
have been a significant change in direction of this thinking, with multi-sourcing increasingly being 
viewed as the new emerging trend (Cohen & Young, 2006). Researchers such as Skinner, Ford and 
  
67 
Stamp (2009) as well as Jones (2010) explain how such a business environment drives organisations to 
reduce the traditional contract size into contracts of a smaller scale, distributed across a larger number 
of diverse providers, each of whom bring in niche skills or address specific client requirements. In 
addition to leveraging economies of scale resulting from servicing multiple clients in their focused 
domain, these providers bring in specialist subject matter expertise, domain knowledge, streamlined 
processes and technology that exceed the internal capabilities of the client organisation. As a result, IT 
outsourcing as well as the supply chain more generally is now seen as a key source of differentiation 
and competitive advantage (Millar, 2015). Apart from creating value for organisations by providing a 
cost advantage, a view of sourcing as strategic recognises the further potential to reduce risk, improve 
customer responsiveness, develop innovative products and processes as well as take innovations to the 
market more effectively by collaborating with other providers or supply chain partners (Welch & 
Nayak, 1992; Shook, Adams, Ketchen, & Craighead, 2009) to become a strategic tool for cutting-edge 
innovation (Su, Levina & Ross, 2016). For example, a survey by the Loughborough Centre of 
Excellence for Global Sourcing and Service (2014) highlights that while cost-savings continue to 
remain an important driver for outsourcing, the relative importance of this driver is reducing as 
compared to other more strategic drivers such as access to specialised skills, flexibility in utilisation of 
human resources, access to distinctive business knowledge possessed by the vendor and enabling 
strategic change by helping overcome internal politics and resistance to change (Oshri, Kotlarsky & 
Willcocks, 2015). For instance, many organisations are revising their IT and BPO vendor portfolios to 
include smaller, highly innovative companies in this eco-system of third-party relationships.  
Similarly, Deloitte (2018) reports that it is also heartening to see that the business case for investment 
in risk management of outsourcing ecosystems is increasingly being driven by other factors that exploit 
the upside of risk, such as enhancing organisational responsiveness and flexibility, innovation, brand 
confidence, and increasing revenues. In a 2018 survey, 26% of respondents felt that they could achieve 
greater flexibility to address market uncertainty and 21% considered such investment in governance 
and risk management a revenue-generating opportunity, for instance by identifying under-reported 
revenue streams within the third-party ecosystem. This represents another significant shift from the 
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almost-exclusive earlier focus on managing the downside (such as regulatory exposure or third-party 
related incidents). The majority of respondents (62%) in this survey had some or significant confidence 
in their ability to demonstrate at least some tangible benefits, if not significant returns from such 
investment, supported by the use of performance measures to continually monitor achievement of 
results against stipulated targets. 
The common feature that has enabled organisational researchers to use the analogy of a biological 
ecosystem to better understand how organisations interact is that the environment presents similar 
adaptive challenges to organisms. In this context, a business ecosystem consists of a set of 
organisations that are independent, coordinate activities and share some common adaptive challenges 
(Viswanadham & Kameshwaran, 2013; Ketchen, Crook, & Craighead, 2014). 
Such an ecosystem directly resonates with the centralised network perspective of Lorenzoni & Baden-
Fuller (1995), subsequently described by Koenig (2012) as the Supply Ecosystem where the strategic 
centre of an organisation brings together as a nucleus a small number of strategic partners around it. 
The ecosystem thus acts as a system of diverse resources (e.g. scarce skills and talent, specialised 
knowledge and capabilities, “best-in-class” processes, technology etc.) that this central enterprise can 
mobilize, design, control and animate in order to propose a competitive offer to its clients. As Koenig 
(2012: p. 215.) explained: “the term system is employed to highlight the fact that a part of the 
mobilised resources does not belong to the central enterprise but to the partners that have been 
enlisted”. These resources are being managed as firms’ strategies are changing and evolving over 
time, as highlighted by Iansiti & Levien (2004: 1): “the strategy increasingly becomes the art of 
managing assets that one does not possess”. In a similar vein, Moore (2006; 34) recognizes the need 
to “achieve inter-firm coordination sufficient to justify players aligning their dreams, plans, and 
product road maps”. Recent research by Lappi, Haapasalo & Aaltonon (2015) continues to 
acknowledge the concept of the business ecosystem as a trending model of business collaboration that 
emphasizes organisational diversity, relationship dependency and joint evolution.  
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Contractor et al., (2010) demonstrate how the competitive strength of a 21st century global 
organisation will be driven not just by technological competencies, but equally by its strategic 
management competencies, along multiple dimensions, in a world of outsourcing and offshoring. 
Global organisations will continue to be exploiters, knowledge seekers, and cost reducers (Nicholls-
Nixon & Woo, 2003), while being at the same time arbitrageurs, exploiting cost differentials across 
markets and seeking competitive advantage (Ghemawat, 2007). It will develop alliance negotiation 
and management skills, so as to increase the value of its quasi-externalised relationships globally 
(Contractor & Lorange, 2002) and an innovation network manager (Ernst & Kim, 2002).  
3.3.  Key principles from the dynamic capabilities theory 
Dynamic capabilities enable an organisation to act strategically, embrace newer opportunities under 
uncertainty, and even shape the business environment (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Teece, 2014). In 
this section, key principles from the DC theory are discussed that can be related to developing two 
specific capabilities around strategic governance and risk management and thereafter defining the two 
axes of the 2x2 framework in the earlier section: (a) a broader perception of risk in outsourcing that 
continually recognizes the opportunities that these risks present in addition to the threats and hazards; 
and (b) mature risk-management mechanisms that enable organisations to mitigate the risks while 
maximizing the business opportunity from outsourcing.  
Both these new capabilities require the organisation to act strategically and with flexibility and 
adaptability in order to innovatively embrace the new opportunities by graduating from an ordinary 
capabilities mind-set to a DC mind-set. Accordingly, it is first important to differentiate between 
ordinary and dynamic forms of capabilities from a theoretical perspective. 
Insight A: Difference between ordinary and dynamic capabilities 
The former involves the performance of administrative, operational, and governance-related functions 
that are necessary to the execution of current plans. They are embedded in some combination of (1) 
technical skills; (2) facilities and equipment; (3) processes and routines; and (4) the administrative 
coordination needed to get the job done (Teece, 2016). As a result, much of the knowledge required to 
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acquire ordinary capabilities can be bought in through consultants who can help design processes or 
implement technologies or through investment in training (Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, & 
Roberts, 2013). Although such capabilities are valuable for businesses, in a competitive business 
environment these are typically imitated by competition within relatively shorter periods of time 
(Bloom, Genakos, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2012). 
Dynamic capabilities on the other hand are more innovative in nature and can enable an enterprise to 
re-focus its attention towards pursuing novel opportunities which do not come with guaranteed 
success, develop new capabilities, and effectively coordinate (or “orchestrate”) internal and external 
resources to address and shape shifting business environments (Teece, 2016). Strong DCs can allow 
an enterprise to generate superior profits by developing and producing differentiated products and 
services that address new markets, or existing markets in new ways (Teece & Pisano, 1994). The 
strength of a firm’s dynamic capabilities determines the speed and degree to which the firm’s 
resources can be aligned and realigned. To achieve this, organisations must be able to continuously 
sense and seize opportunities, and to periodically transform (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000).  
To summarise, ordinary capabilities are about being efficient; dynamic capabilities are about learning 
and improving and about being innovative. Strong DCs are vital for firms facing dynamic competition 
and, possibly, significant disruption from competitive behaviour (Sidak & Teece, 2009). According to 
Chatterji & Patro (2014), these broad sets of activities have been called “asset orchestration.” These 
scholars note that very few specific examples are available to demonstrate how this capability 
operates in practice. The literature review leads the researcher to concur with this view. However, this 
limitation of earlier research not providing clear examples of such orchestration is addressed by 
demonstrating how it operates in practice in the context of outsourcing governance and risk 
management and by providing a direct linkage between the related criteria proposed by Teece (2016) 
and the two axes of the 2x2 framework provided in the subsequent section 3.4.3 of this thesis. An 
analysis table is also provided in that section to demonstrate that the development of these new 
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capabilities primarily entails a change in an organisation’s focus from ordinary capabilities to 
dynamic capabilities.  
Insight B: Dual-focus on threats and opportunities  
In line with the proposed 2x2 framework, the DC theory envisages the development of an over-
arching ability to keep a dual focus on recognizing threats along with the opportunities presented by 
its dynamic and competitive business environment (Teece, 2016). This aligns with the emerging 
duality of the risk-management perspective as identified by the literature review in this thesis – 
managing threats as well as creating opportunity. Teece & Leih (2016) explain how the “asset 
orchestration” dimension of dynamic capabilities, together with sensing, seizing and transformational 
capabilities, can be used for maximizing the opportunity from positive events while mitigating the 
downside of negative events. Strong dynamic capabilities enable an organisation to do a better job of 
responding to threats while shaping unknown futures that offer potential opportunities through 
orchestration of its actions and addressing outcomes of strategic choices. Further, if a firm has a good 
early warning system (i.e., can “sense” these developments in the business environment as negative or 
positive at an earlier stage), it can have more time to respond to potentially fortuitous scenarios while 
planning to absorb the negative shocks. Teece & Leih (2016) also underscore the cognitive skills 
associated with sensing and sense-making that can benefit any organisation. Similarly, an organisation 
with strong seizing and transformation capabilities will be more resilient when such negative or 
positive shocks require rapid alignment or expansion. A culture of continuous renewal keeps 
organisations supple and responsive. The unacceptable alternative is to continue pursuing an 
unchanged strategy even in the face of surprising and consequential events when it is a distraction 
from what the organisation should be doing. 
Insight C: Concurrence of routinised and independent innovation  
Prior researchers in DC, such as Teece (2016), define innovation in general terms as creative ideas 
related to the generation and delivery of products or services that are new to the world or just new in a 
given context. These creative ideas can either: 
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 extend existing activities in some way (improved risk management processes, proactively 
“sensing” risks in the business environment, using emerging technologies to process real time 
data such as cloud, predictive analytics, visualisation of risks etc.) i.e. “routinised innovation”; 
and  
 be completely new and create a new market and revenue streams, satisfy a previously 
unrecognised customer need or develop and commercialize a new approach to technology, i.e. 
“independent innovation”) (Baumol, 2002).  
How well a firm fosters both types of innovation (in this paper, through outsourcing) to 
simultaneously seek competitive advance is based on the strength of its dynamic capabilities (Beske, 
Land, & Seuring, 2014; Chen, Paulraj & Lado, 2004; Teece & Pisano, 1994; Teece, 2007). Examples 
of innovative outsourcing identified through this research that are provided in sub-section 3.4 under 
the heading “Value-Creation through Innovative Approaches to Outsourcing and Related 
Governance/Risk Management: Maximizing Opportunities, Mitigating Risks” as well as the multi-
industry perspectives that follow, demonstrate this concurrence in practice. 
Insight D: Ownership and accountability for developing DCs  
Both the literature review and empirical research reflect similar views on ownership and 
accountability for implementing DCs in an organisation compared to establishing risk-management 
mechanisms for outsourcing, which once again establishes a common foundation in relating the two. 
Although led by Boards and organisational leadership, the ownership and accountability for 
developing and leveraging dynamic capabilities in an organisation resides, in part, with individual 
managers and the top management team (Adner & Helfat, 2003). The ability of board members and 
the top management team to have continued macro- and micro-level insight is important to 
reallocating resources to lead the firm forward. Teece (2016) is of the view that this is likely to be the 
most visible feature of the firm’s DCs. At the same time, the dependence of DCs on the knowledge of 
individual managers and in idiosyncratic (“signature”) organisational routines that have developed 
over time makes them hard for rivals to imitate (Gratton & Ghoshal, 2005).  
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To conclude, as organisations face significant changes in the environment in which they operate, these 
changes necessitate significant shifts in strategy in order to ensure survival and growth (Burgelman 
and Grove, 1996; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). In rapidly changing times, there is a growing 
recognition that the organisation’s ability to survive, grow and retain its competitive advantage 
depends more on its capacity to renew itself in line with environmental changes, rather than on its 
specific resources (Teece, Pisano et al., 1997, Hodgkinson & Healey 2011). Competences or 
capabilities, leading to competitive advantage, rest fundamentally in organisational processes, which 
are moulded by its evolutionary and co-evolutionary paths (Teece & Pisano, 2004).  This theory is 
thus leveraged in the subsequent section 4.4 to help understand strategic governance capability in 
organisations as a dynamic capability and outline how it could be built-up and used for strategic 
advantage. 
3.4 Repositioning governance and risk management of the outsourcing ecosystem 
This section follows on from the literature review to discuss the research gaps in further detail as well 
as the gaps in organisational capabilities from a dynamic risk management ability perspective that 
organisations are trying to address in adopting a more strategic perspective of governance and risk 
management of their outsourcing ecosystem. In this way, it proposes two new organisational 
capabilities required to exploit the full spectrum of opportunities from outsourcing in an uncertain and 
volatile environment, using insights from the dynamic capabilities (DC) theory. Having done that, it 
provides empirical evidence of how organisations are starting to gain competitive advantage through 
these new dynamic capabilities, while also maintaining a duality of focus on the downside. 
As outsourcing ecosystems continue to grow in large global organisations around the world, the 
research findings show how risk management is manifesting itself as a strategic Board-level activity, 
driving competitive advantage and value-creation. ITO and IT-enabled BPO continues to mature as a 
major trend. In addition, the definitions of ITO and BPO are continuously evolving, as a result of 
which contemporary researchers such as Lacity, Khan and Yan (2016) have grouped such sourcing 
into a broader category called “business services” which transcend the traditional classification into 
ITO and BPO. Such business services include, but are not limited to, financial and accounting, human 
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resources, procurement, R&D, call centres/customer service, software development, software support, 
infrastructure management services, systems integration services, legal services and any other services 
that can be delivered by third parties, typically enabled by technology (Lacity et al., 2016). 
Specifically, the scope of such “business services” is constantly broadening to include newer and 
more evolutionary forms, such as the more recent logistics outsourcing and converging with supply 
chain management more generally (Accenture, 2017).  
In such strategic pursuits focused on creating inimitable competitive advantage and organisational 
value, organisations have progressively increased their dependence on outsourcing to unprecedented 
levels (Forrester Research, 2013; Gartner, 2014; Deloitte, 2015), exposing themselves to newer risks 
and hazards amid shifting business environments (Starbuck, 2014; Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 
2015; Deloitte, 2016). This phenomenon of increasing dependence is also empirically verified through 
the survey in section 4.2 under contemporary settings. 
Explaining and addressing the knowledge gaps 
Despite the above developments, the literature review in section 3.1 revealed that over the last decade 
or so there has been limited research on the ability of organisations to manage risks around 
outsourcing with a dynamic mind-set to create value. Instead, most researchers have largely examined 
risk management around outsourcing with the goal of preventing “bad things happening”. Further, 
their research has focused primarily at the level of contract managers and other members of 
middle/lower management rather than at strategic management or top leadership levels (e.g., Zhang, 
Liu, Tan, Jiang, & Zhu, 2018; Gupta, 2018; Suveiu, 2015; Lintukangas, Kahkonen, & Ritala, 2016; 
Tsan-Ming, Yulan, & Wallace, 2016; Christ, Mintchik, Chen, & Bierstaker, 2015; Słoniec, 
Kaczorowska, & Motyka, 2016; Alexander, & Stefan, 2016; Handley & Benton Jr., 2012; Mason, 
Oshri, & Leek, 2012) although combined vendor-provider operational perspectives are more recently 
starting to emerge (e.g. Yu-Chih Liu, & Asri Rizki, 2016; Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2017) and the focus 
on a broader range of third parties beyond just IT or BPO outsourced service providers is starting to 
develop for the benefit of independent reviewers within an organisation such as internal audit 
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functions (Rose & Frio, 2017). This missing evidence has obscured the full spectrum of potential 
opportunity that outsourcing could create for organisations, particularly those that are more radical or 
transformational in nature. This part of the thesis aims to address the research gap and broaden this 
perspective by relating it to the development of newer organisational capabilities, in addition to 
providing several examples revealed through the research of how and why this transformational 
change is taking place. 
The increasingly uncertain and complex macro-economic and business environment since the last 
global financial crisis has only made the case for such an analysis more pressing. In his article “Why 
corporate governance deserves serious and creative thought” in the Academy of Management 
Perspectives in 2014, Starbuck makes a strong argument that risk management as part of corporate 
governance should continually consider technological and social changes such as networking and 
alliances, which are propelling corporations toward entirely new organisational forms. Further, citing 
the United Nations Global Outlook (2013), he comments that businesses will continue to face growing 
economic uncertainty and turbulence, requiring them to develop new capabilities to increase their 
maturity in risk management in this environment. It emerges as another important under-studied area, 
seeking researchers’ attention. 
Earlier studies (e.g., Beske, Land, & Seuring, 2014; Vos & Schiele, 2014; McAdam, Humphreys, 
Galbraith, & Miller, 2017) have long recognised the generic vendor relationship management ability 
of organisations as a dynamic capability. This section of the thesis aims to build on such earlier 
studies and address the above-mentioned research gaps using the findings set out below. This is done 
by proposing two new organisational capabilities required to exploit the full spectrum of opportunities 
(conventional to radial) from outsourcing in an uncertain and volatile environment, using insights 
from the dynamic capabilities (DC) theory: 
 First, the capability to have a broader perception of risk in outsourcing that recognizes 
opportunities that these risks present in addition to the threats and hazards.  
  
76 
 Second, the capability to develop more mature risk management mechanisms that enable 
organisations to maximize the business opportunity created from outsourcing while mitigating the 
risk in this uncertain and complex environment.  
This dual focus on exploiting the opportunities while managing the risk is referred to as “astute 
decision-making” in the findings of this research. Insight from the DC theory, which aims to explain 
the organisational competencies required to achieve competitive advantage in global marketplaces 
characterised by change (Beske, Land & Seuring, 2014; Vos & Schiele, 2014), is utilised for 
understanding the risk-taking behaviour of organisational leadership for such astute business decision-
making.  
By integrating theory and research findings around the new capabilities described above, section 
3.4.2 offers a forward-looking framework that can enable organisations to understand their current 
positioning and select a possible trajectory going forward to emerge as astute decision-makers. This 
framework is illustrated by providing a four-pronged perspective, based on exemplar case studies 
from the empirical research, involving high profile industry players across multiple industry segments 
in section 3.4.1. The related methodology has been set out earlier in Table 3 (page 36 of this thesis).   
Value-creation through innovative approaches to outsourcing and related governance/risk 
management: maximizing opportunities, mitigating risks  
The recent change in mind-set around risk-management described above has been mirrored by 
research, which demonstrates enhanced opportunities for innovative thinking in the outsourcing 
context. Murphy, Wu, Welsch, Heiser, Young, & Jiang (2012) define innovative or “entrepreneurial 
outsourcing” as the identification and exploitation of previously unexplored opportunities 
innovatively through outsourcing. Most of the emerging literature on innovation in this context has 
focused on processes, practices, and decisions that have led to the development and delivery of 
innovative and new products/services through outsourcing (Ordóñez de Pablos, 2012). Won (2015), 
who attempts to theorize the influence of innovation and entrepreneurship in the determination of 
insourcing vs. outsourcing decisions, demonstrates how such an innovative mindset in sourcing 
decisions can increase organisational agility and flexibility by outsourcing in an environment of 
uncertainty. Innovative thinking also influences the choice of sourcing mechanisms in favour of those 
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aiming to exploit the newly recognised opportunities to create a sustainable competitive advantage 
that would be challenging for competitors to imitate, as evidenced below.  
Maximizing the opportunities – empirical evidence from this research 
Vagadia (2012) lists the following five pillars of potential competitive advantage through outsourcing 
in the era of globalisation, despite the risks involved and no guarantee of success. To provide a better 
understanding of how the more progressive organisations are starting to innovatively extend their 
boundaries through outsourcing, below are some specific empirical examples provided by respondents 
during follow-up interviews, based along these five pillars.  
Focus: redefining what business you are in, in convergence with business partners/long-term service 
providers that possess complementary skills. 
Example: A European paper manufacturer reported how it reinvented itself as a bio-energy 
producer by implementing bio-refinery units in its existing pulping mills to process biomass 
into energy to generate new revenues. Having operated with in-house IT teams and a strong 
regional culture since inception, the organisation’s Board recognised the risks and debated 
extensively over multi-sourcing IT and business processes for its new energy business to three 
firms operating in India, Poland and the Philippines as their delivery centres. This, in the 
Board’s view, was the only feasible alternative to facilitate a timely transition, expedite 
revenue inflows and secure competitive advantage. 
 
Efficiency: seeking out cost and process efficiencies through lower-cost providers with core 
competencies in outsourced processes. 
Example: Two of the survey respondents (new-generation challenger banks) reported having 
implemented a number of vested outsourcing contracts based on long-term partnering. They 
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shared profits from innovative continuous improvement based on actual benefits-realisation 
with vendors.  
 
Skills and knowledge: seeking global skills and knowledge with a worldwide workforce across 
multiple time-zones to evolve as a 24-hour company. 
Example: An interviewee from the HLS industry reported that they were exploring the concept 
of launching a “Darty button” to provide immediate response to their customers, irrespective 
of geographical location, enabled by a combination of outsourced service providers. The Wifi-
enabled device (costing Euro 25) was pioneered by the French electronics chain Darty, and 
enables its customers get a call back from the nearest customer service representative within 
one minute, including items not covered by warranty or procured outside Darty (The Times, 
2014). The company calls this “prioritised personal support,” developed and operated by 
outsourced providers.  
 
Technology: using global technology capabilities to establish a connected ecosystem for enhancing 
collaboration opportunities across business partners. 
Example: A large global financial services organisation with over 10,000 third parties forming 
its outsourcing ecosystem reported how it had joined a community of large organisations 
working together to reduce duplication of effort in third-party pre-qualification and on-going 
assessment, based on pre-agreed common risk-management standards and performance data 
they had collected collaboratively. This collaboration was facilitated by an outsourced external 
intermediary. Using cloud-based and other agile technologies, this vendor provides access to a 
hub of validated data and analytics, helping organisations in the network manage outsourcing 
risks efficiently and cost-effectively.  
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New products and markets: offering new products and services, innovatively developed or operating 
in new markets through business partners and long-term providers.  
Example: A global provider of IT and BPO services reported that it was partnering with a large 
European bank with operations in more than 20 countries to converge various internal finance 
functions (cost centres) of the bank into shared services utilities and eventually transform them 
into market utilities servicing other banks as revenue-generating profit centres. They aligned 
and simplified standardised risk, regulatory and financial reporting processes and modernised 
technology, reducing total cost of ownership by 32%. 
 
Mitigating the Risks  
The nature of the evolving threats to such innovative outsourcing is also compelling organisations to 
continuously focus on sensing and addressing risks dynamically. Davari & Rezazadeh (2015) 
recognize outsourcing decisions as one of the most complex organisational decisions, requiring a 
thorough evaluation of the benefits on one side and the barriers or challenges on the other from the 
perspective of fostering innovative thinking. Our interviewees, on a similar note, agree that the risks 
associated with outsourcing continue to increase in proportion to the rewards and that recent examples 
of high-profile business failures have demonstrated that third-party risk management has not always 
been given the strategic attention it deserves.  
Inappropriate actions or failures of third parties have impaired the achievement of strategic objectives 
(e.g., a business model failing to achieve growth and profitability targets), compromised 
organisational reputation, impaired business continuity/resilience and attracted regulatory 
enforcement action. An interviewee gave an example of an incident which acted as a change driver to 
stimulate rethinking in their organisation. A major supermarket chain in the USA faced a cyber-attack 
(in November 2013) in which 70 million items of shoppers’ personal data and 40 million credit card 
details were stolen. The initial intrusion was through network credentials stolen from a third-party 
vendor, followed by a malware-laced email phishing attack sent to employees of the vendor 
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organisation. The supermarket faced losses exceeding $400 million including costs of reissuing 
millions of cards by issuers; fines for Payment Card Industry (PCI) non-compliance; and direct 
customer service costs, including legal fees for customers affected by the breach.  
Many of the interviewees from the FS industry referred to recent cases of regulatory enforcement by 
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the United Kingdom that resulted in fines ranging from 
US$67 million to US$500 million on banks for failures caused by their outsourced providers, which 
compromised customer interest or impaired their ability to access banking services.  
A 2016 global survey on outsourcing and third-party risk conducted by Deloitte mirrors the empirical 
evidence that enhanced regulation and concerns about cyber fraud, data security and privacy are 
expected to challenge organisations using outsourcing as part of a business model. Further, the lack of 
appropriate senior-level executives managing outsourcing in the retained organisation may impair 
innovation intended to enhance value to the business (Deloitte, 2015). The phrase retained 
organisation in this context refers to capabilities that the outsourcing firm should retain in-house to 
ensure that it can exploit business advantages of technology over time (including technology-enabled 
services outsourced to third parties) (Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 2015). 
At the same time, empirical evidence from the survey also demonstrates organisations are going 
beyond traditional financial and compliance-related risks (McConnell, 2013; Marsh, 2014) to 
recognize the strategic impact. This supports arguments put forward by researchers that outsourcing 
management and contract design should be recognised as a capability and a source of competitive 
advantage for a client firm (Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Harrison & McMillan, 2006), which in turn can 
enable better product or service innovation or provide access to skills and capabilities not available 
internally. Outsourcing service providers that bring in new knowledge and experience can thus be 
utilised as knowledgeable partners or trusted advisors, able to catalyse organisational innovation, 
provide strategic insights and even feature on organisational Advisory Boards (Deloitte, 2015).  
All of the above evidence demonstrates how organisations now need to refresh their approach to 
emerge more flexible, adaptable and innovative so that they may maximize the strategic opportunities 
  
81 
while mitigating the risks under uncertainty in the business and macro-economic environment. The 
need to develop this organisational ability therefore leads us to examine how newer risk management 
capabilities can be developed across various industries, underpinned by the DC theory. Section 3.4.1 
below sets out four industry case studies that demonstrate how this is taking place in practice, 
followed by section 3.4.2 that provides a 2x2 framework providing an aspirational path to excel in this 
evolution. 
3.4.1 Industry perspectives/case studies 
Academic literature, as well as empirical evidence, indicates that outsourcing organisations are at 
different stages with regard to (a) enhancing their perception of risk but also (b) maturity of their 
governance processes, along a continuum. Based on these two criteria, this section maps organisations 
from different industries, and suggests the aspirational trajectory to excellence. Exemplar industry 
case studies are used to illustrate each element of the proposed taxonomy (see Figures-8, -9 and -10 
below). These industry case studies and other related data have been collated from a survey of 113 
senior executives of large listed global organisations (typically with revenues over US$1 billion) 
directly responsible for governance and risk management of outsourcing who were asked about past 
(post financial crisis), present state and future intentions (next 5 years) regarding risk management 
and outsourcing governance. As discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3 (research process and design, 
together with the detailed steps), this survey was carried out in collaboration with one of the global 
top-tier consulting firms to investigate the current and emerging risk management and governance 
practices in outsourcing amongst large listed global organisations. 
Analysis of the survey results revealed clusters emerging around the key industry segments, thus 
providing us with the confidence of discussing organisational positioning around risk perception and 
governance maturity by four key industry segments, representative of the diverse state of play – 
Financial Services (FS), Healthcare and Life Sciences (HLS), Public Sector (PS) and Business and 
Professional Services (BAPS), each being representative of a typical organisation in that industry.  
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Breadth of risk perception 
Financial Services: The survey reveals that the Financial Services industry is currently the most 
advanced across all the key industry segments in its breadth of risk perception and its ability to 
intertwine the pursuit of value in its strategic and tactical decision-making with the related risks. A 
key trigger for this appears to be the global regulatory focus in this area. Following the recent global 
financial crisis, financial regulators around the world, including the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 
the US Federal Reserve (Fed), the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA), and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK, have continually 
enforced as well as provided guidance on the need to link risk closely with strategic and tactical 
decision-making. According to these regulators, this linkage between risk and strategy should be 
established and implemented by the organisation clearly articulating its “risk appetite” which reflects 
the amount and type of risk that an organisation is willing and able to accept in its pursuit of strategic 
goals. In November 2013, the FSB set out the key elements for establishing and implementing an 
effective risk appetite framework and underscoring the roles and responsibilities of the Board of 
Directors and senior management. In keeping with these principles for an effective risk appetite 
framework, the breadth of risk perception managed through such frameworks has emerged as the 
primary lens through which FS organisations’ quality of risk management and governance are 
evaluated. To ensure stakeholder buy-in and engagement, some of the FS organisations covered by 
the survey initiated risk articulation workshops, which involved supplier staff and leadership in 
addition to those within their own organisations. These workshops revisited existing perceptions and 
definitions of risk to establish a shared understanding on risk, as a first step to being able to articulate 
these risks and participate in risk conversations. The next step was then to align governance and risk 
management initiatives to outsourcing strategy to ensure that conscious risk-taking was enabled 
through a greater focus on areas of higher risk, enabled through a greater sophistication of tools and 
technologies. For example, many of the FS organisations had introduced an organisation-wide 
mechanism for classifying outsourcing providers who were strategic or critical to their businesses, 
with related technology investments to enable continuous monitoring through bespoke tools. One of 
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the organisations surveyed had also initiated a pilot project to evaluate the power of cognitive risk 
management technology to enable them to transform and consolidate unstructured data related to 
suppliers of critical services into actionable information providing real-time alerts of notable supplier-
related events such as cyber incidents and customised reports for business managers responsible for 
managing relationships with relevant suppliers. The natural link of risk and reward inherent in 
financial offerings has also supported the philosophy of considering risk-taking as a source of 
opportunity. For instance, higher risk financial products, such as small portfolios of equity shares in 
public companies or specialist unit trusts or investment trusts have historically offered the opportunity 
for higher returns on investment than fixed interest-bearing deposits or government bonds. Survey 
respondents felt that this risk-reward thinking inherent in FS is helpful in supporting a similar “risk 
for reward” approach in the governance and risk management in the context of outsourcing. 
Accordingly, FS organisations appear to be far more advanced than other industries in taking 
calculated risks in order to innovate in outsourced higher value processes (e.g., combining new 
technology such as the cloud or social media, leveraging industry with functional knowledge to 
reinvent processes, etc.).  
The survey also demonstrates that organisations in other industry sectors are starting to follow the 
example of their counterparts in FS in broadening their outlook to risk, acknowledging risk as a 
source of potential opportunity. However, given the absence of compelling regulatory pressures in this 
regard, they are moving slower in this direction. 
Life Sciences and Healthcare: The HLS industry segment is a good example of an industry that is 
broadening its outlook to risk, not in response to regulation, but to address their challenge to manage 
high levels of uncertainty and disruptive change. The survey reveals that organisations in this industry 
have an imminent need to evaluate the exposure to risk that strategic decisions bring about in an 
environment of significant uncertainty, caused by changing demography (e.g., the ageing population 
in Western countries and related healthcare issues), financial factors (e.g., government reform and 
cost reduction) and increasing innovation (e.g., patient self-care), amidst increasing regulation and the 
need to be more patient-centric through greater use of technology. These changes give rise to new 
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risks, but also open the doors to new opportunities. As a result, HLS organisations are now starting to 
realize that, to seize these opportunities, it is not enough to be able to avoid risks but they must 
manage risks to become more effective and efficient and succeed in embracing new technology-
enabled ways of working and improving patient services, while increasing revenues and managing 
costs. In pursuing this view on risks, the explicit link between risk and strategy is increasingly being 
considered to be an integral part of the organisational strategy-setting process. Accordingly, HLS 
organisations now expect their risk management functions to not only address damage and regulatory 
fine prevention, but also introduce new ways to drive growth and manage costs. This, in turn, assists 
their Board and C-suite in making informed business and strategic decisions about growth and 
expansion, operational challenges and opportunities, and technology adoption and implementation. 
For instance, with the shift in thinking from fee-for-service to the concept of value-based care, survey 
informants explained how many healthcare companies are now using their enhanced perception of 
risk to evaluate the benefits of adopting new capabilities such as those related to emerging 
technologies including the “Internet of Things” that could radically transform healthcare delivery, or 
merging with or acquiring other entities in the supply chain such as contract research organisations 
that augment current capabilities in healthcare delivery.  
Leveraging data innovatively, supported by the advanced analytical tools and technologies, is 
increasingly enabling organisational leadership to translate risk to opportunity. One respondent 
organisation, for example, that operates multiple hospitals has initiated a significant transformational 
initiative to integrate clinical treatment data with cost data related to healthcare service delivery, 
which earlier resided in separate data pools and was utilised by a completely different set of 
stakeholders representing lower and middle management teams. The integration of these internal data 
pools, together with additional external data related to patient finances and behaviours (e.g., retail 
purchase history) now enables their risk management team to periodically segment patients and match 
the profiles and preferences of patients to care providers (physicians, nurses, etc.) and healthcare 
delivery choices in each segment. This has established an evidence-based mechanism to ensure that 
the right provider is providing care under an appropriate setting, to deliver the intended clinical 
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impact. As a result, the organisation has been able to enhance net revenues by delivering value-based 
care (equal or better quality of healthcare delivered at lower cost). Traditionally, IT-based 
transformation projects in the organisation had been delivered by in-house IT and business teams. 
However, in this case, the organisational leadership chose to take what they considered higher risks by 
outsourcing the project to an overseas provider to be able to bring in specialised knowledge and skills, 
innovation and process improvement. Regular project progress tracking, together with ongoing 
discussions in the boardroom, helped to manage additional risks and leverage opportunities.  
 Public Sector: The survey results indicate that PS organisations still have a relatively narrow 
perception of risk, focusing primarily on the traditional approach of perceiving risks as “bad things 
happening” rather than the more entrepreneurial perception of risk as a source of opportunity. Based 
on survey responses, it appears that high levels of public accountability in PS organisations seem to be 
driving organisational decision-makers to “play safe” and focus risk management efforts on managing 
any adverse consequences of risks, making limited efforts to integrate risk management more directly 
with strategy. In some cases, risk management in PS continues to serve the purpose of the proverbial 
“fig-leaf” for blame-avoidance, or as an excuse for sticking to procedural rules that may be ill adapted 
to particular problems (Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001). Further, the entrepreneurial spirit inherent 
in business risk-taking for financial gain, eventually translating into a higher return on investment for 
equity shareholders or an increase in share prices (shareholder value), is not natural to public sector 
enterprises, where senior decision-makers are distracted by considerations of “public value” or “value 
for money” considerations in making investment decisions. In the absence of risk-taking being seen as 
a driver of shareholder value, governance and risk management in many PS organisations still operate 
as an extension of financial audit and compliance mechanisms to support a post-mortem rather than 
real-time or forward-looking approaches, with very low levels of sophistication in the related tools. 
For instance, multiple survey respondents indicated the use of spreadsheets, often scattered across 
several departments that did not provide an integrated view on which to base holistic strategic 
decisions. At best, some respondent organisations used homegrown solutions with basic interfaces to 
capture data and create graphical reports.  
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As a result, this narrower perception of risk tends to have a negative impact on outsourcing decision-
making. The inability to perceive risks as a source of organisational value typically leads PS 
organisations to focus on less critical or lower value processes (e.g., basic accounting processes) 
rather than higher value or more sophisticated processes (e.g., managerial decision support through 
advanced analytics) that have the potential to stimulate innovation, process improvement or to 
maximize the strategic benefits to the organisation.  
Business and Professional Services: The survey reveals that this industry segment has the lowest 
focus on exploiting the upside or the opportunities that risks create for business. The primary focus of 
risk management in these industries continues to be on minimizing the downside of risk, which in turn 
has traditionally been the mitigation of risks resulting from professional liability to their clients or 
other third parties impacted by services rendered by them as a result of errors, omissions or 
negligence in discharging their professional responsibilities, misunderstandings over the scope of their 
work and other issues. Such professional liability can be significant and can threaten the very 
existence of these businesses. Although this fundamentally remains unchanged over the years, 
additional risks to professional liability continue to emerge. For instance, a firm of accountants or 
lawyers can now be held liable for risks such as breaches of computer security or data privacy related 
to their clients. A professional services business can be similarly held liable for bodily injury or 
property damage as a result of its acts or omissions or even economic damages including delays, lost 
productivity and remedial costs. The overwhelming significance of these professional liabilities is 
driving the focus of risk management in outsourcing to minimize the downside of such risks. As a 
result, BAPS organisations are mainly experiencing a need to integrate and align their governance and 
risk management efforts on the operational (rather than a strategic) level, essentially focusing on 
practice-protection and management of the related liabilities, supported by professional liability 
insurance to cover residual risks.  
Based on the literature review and empirical experience supported by the above survey, four key 
operational implications of organisations that demonstrate a higher breadth of risk perception can be 
summarised: 
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 A stronger focus on aligning strategic decision-making around outsourcing to related risks by 
considering opportunities for value-creation that accompany these risks, while taking steps to 
mitigate the negative impact of these risks. This is in contrast to organisations with a lower 
breadth of risk perception that primarily focus on just avoiding “bad things happening” such 
as breach of data privacy or business interruption caused by the provider of outsourcing 
services. 
 To be able to do so, these organisations establish a holistic view of risks and compare that 
with the overall risk-taking capacity of the business to articulate clearly the leadership 
appetite for taking risks by outsourcing processes that bring in higher value through 
specialised technical knowledge or “best of breed” processes. This, in turn, also enables them 
to ensure that the returns are commensurate with the risks taken.  
 Having established this position, these organisations then establish actionable data points to 
monitor performance, using analytical and predictive tools and technology. 
 All these strategic activities are possible only with a top-level independent risk management 
function that works with the Board through all the stages of the outsourcing process, rather 
than an extension of existing compliance functions.  
Progress in implementing this concept of leveraging risk for strategic benefit has generally been slow 
as risk management leaders have struggled to overcome the complexities of embedding the 
mechanisms mentioned above in their business, except where triggered by drivers such as regulatory 
action (e.g., in the FS industry) or extremely high levels of uncertainty and disruptive change (e.g., in 
HLS businesses). This, in turn, has established a continuum along which different businesses can be 
positioned from a narrower to a broader perception of risk (see Figure-8).  
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Figure-8: Operational Implications of Outsourcing Organisations Based on Breadth of Risk 
Perception  
   
Note: Icons used in Figure-5 illustrate industries (from left to right): Business and Professional 
Services; Public Sector; Healthcare and Life Sciences, and Financial Services. 
Maturity of governance practices 
As organisational thinking on risk continues to evolve, it is interesting to study how organisations 
across these four industry segments are developing and maturing their governance and risk 
management mechanisms through the implementation of various organisational Governance, Risk and 
Compliance (GRC) initiatives. Our literature review and empirical evidence from the survey indicate 
that organisations with a higher level of maturity are better able to align organisational behaviours, 
structures, processes and infrastructures to the changing spectrum of business risk to reliably and 
sustainably achieve a higher standard of risk management. Specifically, the following key attributes of 
organisations that have been able to acquire a higher level of maturity or proficiency in enhancing 
their governance and risk management mechanisms over outsourcing, can be identified: 
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 Governance and risk management is a Board-led initiative, which is enabled by 
institutionalised policies, processes and supporting infrastructure (including tools and 
technologies) throughout the organisation. 
 Roles/responsibilities for outsourcing risk management are defined throughout the entire 
depth and breadth of the organisation, with a clear focus on risk training and competency 
development, supported by knowledge sharing on risks across various outsourcing projects. 
These attributes (see Figure-9) enable the organisation to establish a consistently disciplined process 
of decision-making and communication regarding outsourcing risks. 
Figure9: Key Organisational Attributes Related to Extent of Outsourcing Governance Maturity 
   
Board and top management leadership of governance initiatives 
The typical first step in enhancing the governance and risk management function in an organisation is 
elevating the overall responsibility and strategic decision-making in this regard to the Board level. 
This is key to establishing the explicit link between strategic decisions around outsourcing initiatives 
and the related risks in the context of the organisational risk appetite. In turn, Board-level 
responsibility facilitates multiple stakeholder buy-in, which is a critical success factor for establishing 
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the top-level linkage between strategy and risk. Our survey reveals that organisational attitude 
towards managing outsourcing risk has traditionally been reactive and determined by who is driving 
the activity. In some organisations it has been the responsibility of a procurement team that focused 
on compliance with payment terms for suppliers. In other organisations it is the brand and intellectual 
property (IP) protection function that is managing outsourcing risks, focusing on suppliers of services 
in distribution channels. Such a decentralised approach to risk has led to a micro-focus on risk areas 
that interest certain parts of a business or certain functions (e.g., operational performance from a 
supply chain perspective or information security from a corporate security angle). Board-level 
responsibility enables a holistic proactive approach to risk, covering all categories of third parties and 
all areas of risk. This Board-led evolving approach is a departure from the myopic method of 
considering risks in isolation and allows the organisation to consider operational risk factors (e.g., 
performance, quality standards, delivery times, KPI/SLA measurement) with reputational and 
financial risk factors (e.g., labour practices, an understanding of financial health, appropriate charging 
mechanisms and adherence to these), as well as legal/regulatory risks (e.g., compliance with bribery 
regulations, awareness of global industry standards as they apply to all outsourcing arrangements 
across the organisation). 
Comparing across the four industry segments, the survey results indicate that the FS industry segment 
appears to be most advanced in this regard, with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or a member of 
the Board being ultimately responsible for outsourcing risk management in a majority of 
organisations. This can once again be attributed to regulatory pressures as described in the preceding 
section. Following the financial crisis, key financial regulators now agree that the Board’s central role 
in approving and monitoring strategy cannot be appropriately fulfilled unless the Board understands 
the risks that strategic changes bring about and ensures appropriate risk management to strike a better 
balance between risk oversight, growth, performance and strategy. This is further evidenced in the 
survey results that outsourcing risk discussions feature consistently on the Board agenda in a majority 
of FS organisations. The survey reveals that this is also true for HLS organisations that are facing 
significant uncertainty, as described earlier, and are therefore anxious to feature outsourcing 
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decisions, together with the related risks, regularly on the Board agenda with a high level of urgency. 
Public Sector organisations that are making significant investments in transforming themselves to 
develop the capability and capacity comparable to their private sector counterparts are being driven by 
the need to enhance leadership accountability and direct involvement in organisational governance. 
This, in turn, is enhancing the move from silo-ed decision-making to a more integrated approach that 
considers organisation-wide risks and interdependencies.  
While the thinking that outsourcing governance should be a Board-level matter is expanding to HLS 
and PS organisations, in practice, the survey reveals that governance and risk management decisions 
continue largely to remain vested in operational responsibilities, i.e., the related changes in 
operational processes or personnel responsibilities, together with multiple stakeholder buy-in, 
required to implement this transformation are yet to be fully achieved. For instance, one of the HLS 
organisations included in the survey acknowledged the ultimate responsibility of the Board in 
outsourcing governance, yet relatively junior staff within the procurement or finance teams were 
taking key decisions in an isolated manner, based on individual contract considerations rather than 
holistic policy-driven approaches. Board involvement in these decisions was largely reactive and 
typically driven by the need to respond to critical incidents resulting from outsourcing. To be able to 
elevate the position of the governance and risk management function, the organisation assigned 
oversight responsibility to the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) and the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) 
as go-betweens for the junior staff and the Board. It is interesting to note in this connection that the 
assignment of responsibility for outsourcing risk management to the CFO or the CPO is increasingly 
the case with many organisations, where these CFOs and CPOs are themselves trying to reposition 
their own roles from mere operators of financial or procurement functions to being stronger strategic 
partners to the business leadership and the Board. The status of both CFOs and CPOs, however, varies 
across organisations in terms of their ability to influence Board members and organisational 
leadership. For example, in most Fortune 100 companies, CFOs attend most of the leadership and 
Board meetings and are considered to be strategic advisors to the Board and business leadership. 
However, this is not the case with relatively small or family-owned businesses where CFO is 
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considered to be more of an accountant with the responsibility of effective operation and stewardship 
of finance functions. In such cases, assignment of risk management responsibilities to CFOs may not 
significantly drive the maturity of governance and risk management mechanisms. In the BAPS sector, 
however, outsourcing risk is still considered as an individual responsibility of client-facing staff and 
relationship managers. The survey indicates that BAPS organisations have typically not elevated the 
risk management function to the top level and accordingly do not generally have outsourcing risk 
management discussions regularly featuring in their Board agenda around an articulated risk-appetite. 
Policies, procedures and supporting infrastructure 
To support the elevation of the responsibility and decision-making regarding governance and risk 
management of outsourcing to Board/C-suite levels, FS organisations have made significant progress 
post-financial crisis in establishing institutionalised policies that need to be supported by processes, 
technology and infrastructure. Such policies encompass the entire life-cycle of the outsourcing 
relationship and include, for instance, policies related to establishing a business case for outsourcing, 
pre-contracting and due diligence, knowledge transfer and on-boarding through to ongoing 
monitoring/assurance and contract termination. For instance, a large global bank may have a policy of 
continuous monitoring of outsourced providers, who are classified as critical to the business, against 
mandated standards. This then needs to be supported by specific procedures to be followed for such 
monitoring/assurance activity, for instance, determining the frequency of visits to the third-party 
location based on risk and related verification to be performed, control self-assessment by the 
provider, procedures related to use of contractors for performing such risk management activities as 
against independent assurance provided by in-house internal audit teams, remote assessments with 
direct access to the provider systems and data, etc. These procedures, in turn, require appropriate tools 
and technology (e.g., risk management software packages such as RSA Archer or Open Pages; Third 
Party Management software such as Hiperos, etc.), in addition to the technology infrastructure to 
ensure secure connectivity with the provider organisation. The survey reveals that the elevation of the 
risk agenda to Board level has brought in a unified and consistent approach to managing outsourcing 
arrangements across multiple contracts, functions and departments of large global FS organisations. 
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When supported by consistent policies, processes, technology and infrastructure, this brings in a 
significantly higher level of maturity, enabling a consistent and disciplined decision-making process 
and communication around outsourcing.  
Whilst HLS and PS organisations are trying to move in the same direction as their FS counterparts, 
the survey indicates three primary differences, resulting in the related maturity levels being lower than 
FS. Firstly, outsourcing governance mechanisms still continues to be focused at the functional level as 
discussed in the preceding section rather than at the organisational level, despite the emerging 
leadership vision for change. As a result, the assessment of risk is driven by the priorities of the 
functional group leading the assessment. Thus, procurement teams might have a greater focus on the 
related operational risks; financial teams might emphasize compliance with financial terms, and this 
may undermine the broader organisational focus required on regulatory risks or reputational risks. 
Secondly, the focus is on the individual contractual arrangements rather than a holistic and consistent 
approach, e.g., grouping multiple contracts by supplier and having a single suppler relationship 
manager across all departments for each critical supplier, recognizing the interdependencies and 
commonalities across multiple contracts. Thirdly, the survey reveals significant gaps between 
leadership intention and the ability of the supporting processes, tools and technologies to achieve the 
intended results. For instance, an integrated set of organisational processes, supported by common 
technology underpinning outsourcing risk management across the entire organisation, were in the 
process of being developed by most HLS and PS organisations, with PS organisations somewhat more 
mature than their HLS counterparts, given their emphasis on processes and adversity to risk, in 
general. At the same time, the threat of global regulation such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) or the UK Bribery Act, which holds the principal/user organisation responsible for acts of its 
agents/providers, is compelling HLS organisations to invest in enhancing their maturity of governance 
processes. Organisations in the BAPS industry segment once again appear to have made the least 
investment in organisationally consistent policies, processes and technologies, given the relative lack 
of Board or leadership involvement in this regard. As a result, risk management processes are ad hoc 
and are not focused on separately from the related operational process.  
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Clarity on accountabilities and competency development on risk management 
Tools, technologies and processes need to be further supported by clear roles and responsibilities that 
are known by those tasked with governance and risk management responsibilities throughout the 
organisation. Additionally, these individuals must have the skills, experience and seniority appropriate 
to discharge their roles effectively, with the organisation taking responsibility for their competency 
development to be able to apply their judgment, addressing the relevant business requirements and 
risk management needs.  
The introduction of the Senior Managers Regime (SMR) by the Financial Conduct Authority in the 
UK in April 2016 has significantly enhanced the focus on having full clarity on allocating prescribed 
responsibilities to Senior Management Functions (SMF), supported by Management Responsibilities 
Maps to document key governance arrangements and Statements of Responsibilities for each SMF. 
Although this currently applies to the UK, the interviewees considered that it is likely to be emulated 
by regulators in the US and Hong Kong, thus having a global impact and already starting to drive 
global action. As a result, FS industries have once again progressed faster than their counterparts in 
other industries in this regard. At the same time, the survey indicates that clarity of accountability, 
supported by capability development initiatives in PS and HLS, are starting to feature strongly in 
governance programmes. This is, however, a relatively recent trend and it will take some time for 
these industry segments to reach the higher levels of maturity that compare with the levels attained by 
FS organisations. Survey respondents felt that cost and profitability pressures faced by HLS 
organisations, together with headcount reduction initiatives, may get in the way of investing in 
personnel with competencies and focus around risk, compared to the more recognised need for 
investment in capability building in PS. Finally, BAPS organisations are yet to make any significant 
progress in this regard, given the marked absence of Board and leadership-led governance initiatives 
and the limited recognition of the need to make further investments in this area, as discussed earlier.  
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3.4.2 Treading the aspirational path to excellence 
Based on the breadth of risk perception and maturity of governance processes, organisations can be 
mapped to a two-by-two grid set out in Figure 10. This grid can be used by organisations to understand 
their current positioning, as a first step towards developing plans for reinventing themselves as Astute 
Entrepreneurs (upper right-hand quadrant) who, as explained below, are able to maximize the 
opportunities while managing the risks with various outsourcing-related management initiatives. 
 
Figure-10: Framework to Assess Organisational Positioning on Strategic Governance and 
Managing Outsourcing Risks 
  
 
Astute Entrepreneurs: The “best in class” organisations are clearly those that have a broad perception 
of risk, considering risk as an enabler of value rather than just “bad things happening”. These 
organisations are mature in terms of implementation of top-down outsourcing governance, led by the 
Board. Such organisations are the best positioned to maximize the opportunities arising from 
outsourcing and innovate in outsourcing (Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Gerbasi, 2015). They are likely to 
outsource higher value processes (e.g., combining new technology such as the cloud or social media, 
leveraging industry with functional knowledge to reinvent processes), while managing a greater level 
of risks in a dynamic, agile and innovate way in their pursuit of business value. Based on the survey 
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results, it appears that at present the representative organisations in the FS industry fall into this 
category.  
Diametrically opposite to them are the organisations that continue to have a narrower perception of risk 
and have also not implemented, or matured in their implementation, of governance mechanisms and 
practices. Such organisations are likely to face the greatest potential challenges to erosion of 
organisational value and are lucky to be surviving into the future. Accordingly, they can be classed as 
the Lucky Survivors. For such organisations, it is likely that any outsourcing initiatives are focused on 
lower value generating and less risky activities (e.g., basic transaction processing or accounting) and 
they may still face several threats and hazards in these limited pursuits of organisational value. Based 
on the survey results, it appears that at present the representative organisations in the BAPS industry 
fall into this category. Public Sector organisations were in this category in the past, and over the years 
they have evolved towards more mature governance processes.  
Organisations that have a broader perception of risk are likely to aspire to greater organisational value 
without the requisite evolution in governance mechanisms to give them the required control and are 
likely to be unable to manage the various threats they face as they embark on outsourcing. They can be 
called the Great Gamblers. The broader perception of risks in such organisations leads to greater risk-
taking, typically by outsourcing critical and high value processes (e.g., supporting key managerial 
decisions such as advanced analytics or customer-facing processes) but without appropriate risk 
mitigation cover. Based on the survey results, it appears that at present the representative organisations 
in the HLS industry fall into this category. Financial Service organisations were in this category in the 
past but improved their governance processes and evolved into Astute Entrepreneurs.  
Finally, Perpetual Losers are the organisations that have limited perceptions of risk despite maturing in 
governance mechanisms, and practices are perpetually facing significant opportunity loss, leading 
eventually to threats of value erosion and survival challenges. In such organisations inability to perceive 
risks as a source of organisational value typically leads to significant opportunity loss in outsourcing 
by focusing on less critical or lower value processes (e.g., fundamental accounting processes) despite 
  
97 
significant investment in risk mitigation. Based on the survey results, it appears that at present the 
representative organisations in the PS industry segment fall into this category.  
A consistent path to excellence is evident as organisations in the four industry sectors aspire to evolve 
over time as Astute Entrepreneurs, who are the best positioned to leverage strategic governance 
around their outsourcing activities and beyond as shown in Figure-8. The figure illustrates how each 
of the four industry sectors evolved over time, from post-financial crisis to their current positioning, 
and their future aspirations. The past (post-financial crisis), present and future positioning of the four 
industries is supported by the findings from the survey and interviews we conducted with key 
informants across industries. Arrows between same industry icons show the movement from the 
positioning in the past, to present positioning, and then aspiration towards future positioning.  
Figure 11: Treading the Aspirational Path to Excellence: Past, Present and Future 
 
At the time of the last financial crisis, the majority of large global organisations (across all key industry 
segments) that were outsourcing business processes or technology did not invest enough in strategically 
governing their outsourcing, which resulted in relatively lower levels of maturity. This created two 
categories of organisations:  
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 The Great Gamblers who had an enhanced breadth of risk perception and acted recklessly by 
taking more business risks than their strategic governance mechanisms permitted (e.g., FS and 
HLS), resulting in a significant exposure to unmanaged risks in the face of performance and 
profitability pressures; and  
 The Lucky Survivors who neither invested sufficiently in strategic governance, nor took 
acceptable levels of risk, resulting in below optimal performance/profitability (e.g., PS and BPS).  
In other words, the absence of a Board-driven, structured, holistic, institutionalised and strategic 
approach to the governance of outsourcing impaired organisations’ ability to ensure a proportionate 
approach to outsourcing governance, based on the intensity of the risks involved vis-à-vis the related 
governance mechanisms.  
Throughout the financial crisis, various organisations across different industry segments continued to 
respond to the dynamic changes in the economic and business environment. For instance, the FS 
industry was compelled to make the highest investments in strategic governance as a result of emerging 
regulation in this regard, which resulted in enhancing the maturity of their governance mechanisms. A 
similar trend was seen across other industry segments, but not to the extent seen in FS. For instance, PS 
industries invested in governance mechanisms in an effort to develop the capability and competency of 
their private sector counterparts without significantly broadening their breadth of risk perception and 
appetite to risk, while HLS industries made limited investments in governance to manage the disruptive 
uncertainties that came their way while taking newer risks to survive. BPS industries appear to have 
been relatively unaffected by the financial crisis. 
Although each organisation is unique, based on this empirical research related to future aspirations 
captured in the survey, the researcher believes that going forward organisations will have a longer-term 
balanced view and a more deliberate strategic approach to implementing outsourcing governance 
proportionate to the risks, rather than just responding reactively in an isolated, short-term way to the 
compelling forces described above. Specifically, we expect to see the following trends in the four 
industry sectors investigated: 
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 FS organisations are likely to move diagonally towards the upper-right corner (Figure 10) as they 
continue to refine themselves as Astute Entrepreneurs. 
 HLS organisations are likely to move more horizontally towards the right-hand side of the grid 
(Figure 10) rather than moving vertically upwards, evolving from Great Gamblers to become 
Astute Entrepreneurs, as they continue to face significant changes in their operating environment. 
 PS organisations are likely to move more vertically upwards in the grid (Figure 10) than 
horizontally to the right, from being Perpetual Losers towards Astute Entrepreneurs, as they 
continue to invest in governance while still “playing safe” and taking limited risks. 
 BPS organisations are likely to move diagonally to the right in the lower left-hand quadrangle 
(Figure 10) away from being Lucky Survivors, as they embrace changes far more slowly than 
others. 
Specifically, the framework motivates organisations to answer two key questions. First, “Where are 
you today?” to assess where they are currently positioned in terms of maturity of strategic governance 
over outsourcing vis-à-vis their breadth of risk perception which drives their appetite to take higher 
risks. Second, “Which way should you be going next?” to determine a possible trajectory going 
forward to be able not just to manage risks but also fully exploit the opportunities that outsourcing can 
create. As illustrated by the exemplar case studies of four industries, there are different paths that 
organisations can pursue (e.g., horizontal, vertical or diagonal) in their attempt to develop into Astute 
Entrepreneurs, depending on their current positioning. For example, Perpetual Losers need to invest in 
broadening their risk perception, while Great Gamblers need to ensure that strategic governance is 
driven by the Board and seen as an institutional rather than project-level activity. Lucky Survivors, on 
the other hand, need to develop both aspects, and this is more likely to be successful if made gradually 
– from engaging the Board, towards broadening risk perception. 
3.4.3 Developing dynamic capabilities for outsourcing governance and risk management 
The literature review in section 3.3 identified how the DC theory emphasizes the flexibility and 
adaptability of organisations and their efforts to act strategically, embrace newer opportunities, and 
even shape the business environment (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Teece, 2014). As part of this 
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literature review, selected insights from the DC theory were also discussed that could be related to the 
two specific capabilities around risk management that form the two axes of the 2x2 framework: (a) a 
broader perception of risk in outsourcing that continually recognizes the opportunities that these risks 
present in addition to the threats and hazards; and (b) mature risk-management mechanisms that 
enable organisations to mitigate the risks while maximizing the business opportunity from 
outsourcing.  
Both these new capabilities require the organisation to act strategically and with flexibility and 
adaptability in order to innovatively embrace the new opportunities by graduating from an ordinary 
capabilities mind-set to a DC mind-set.  
Following these relevant insights from the DC theory, the key criteria for DCs proposed by Teece can 
now be linked to the two axes of the framework (see Table-6 below). In turn, the possible utilisation 
of existing DC literature to develop specific risk-management capabilities forming the core focus of 
this thesis can thus be proposed. 
Table-6: Linking DC Criteria to Evolving Requirements for Broader Risk Perception and 
Maturity of Risk Management Processes 
Criteria proposed by 
Teece (2016) 
Enhancing the breadth of risk 
perception (Horizontal Axis) 
Maturity of governance and 
risk management processes  
(Vertical Axis) 
Purpose: Ongoing 
congruence with 
technological and business 
opportunities to exploit 
opportunities for creating 
organisational value through 
a more differentiated and 
distinctive approach to 
addressing customer and 
other business needs. 
 
Develop an ongoing capability to 
be more strategic/innovative in 
organisational behaviour around 
outsourcing through continuous 
alignment of risks to opportunities 
for value-creation accompanying 
these risks, mitigating any negative 
impact (DC mind-set).  
 
 
 
 
 
Establish a Board and leadership-
led dynamic organisational 
framework focused on extending 
the frontline (boundaries) of 
ongoing organisational risk 
management activity within the 
organisation to also cover risks 
(and opportunities) related to 
third parties including outsourced 
service providers forming the 
“extended enterprise.” 
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 Organisations with a lower breadth 
of risk perception primarily focus 
on just being technically efficient in 
avoiding “bad things happening” in 
the current context, such as breach 
of data privacy or business 
interruption caused by the provider 
of outsourcing services (ordinary 
capabilities mind-set). 
 
In a dynamic framework, third 
party/outsourcing risk should be 
a regular item in the Board 
agenda discussing: 
 changes in inherent risks of 
engaging third parties;  
 the organisational choice to 
become more critically 
dependent on third parties;  
 review of disruptive events 
caused by third parties  
 ongoing sensing of third-
party risks and continued 
alignment to organisational 
value drivers.  
 
Tripartite schema and key 
routines: Sense, seize and 
transform opportunities to 
increase profitability, 
develop new capability and 
orchestrate resources to 
innovate and respond 
to/drive changes in a 
dynamic environment. Go 
beyond “best practices” to 
evolve unique “signature 
processes”. 
 
Establish a continuous mechanism 
for identifying opportunities and 
threats, enabled by the Board and 
supported by accountable members 
of top/middle management 
leadership team to:  
 
 develop a holistic view of risks 
and ongoing comparisons with 
the overall risk-taking capacity 
of the business;  
 articulate clearly the leadership 
appetite for taking risks by 
outsourcing processes that 
bring in higher value through 
specialised technical 
knowledge or “signature” 
processes.  
 
This enables organisations to sense, 
seize and transform opportunities 
where returns are commensurate 
with risks taken.  
 
Within the above framework, 
continually evolve policies and 
tactical action plans, processes 
relevant to the organisational 
business context and supporting 
IT infrastructure that can be 
embedded throughout the depth 
and breadth of the organisation. 
There should be related 
accountability across top and 
middle management, not just for 
immediately achieving the 
intended results but also for 
revisiting these continually in the 
light of changing business 
circumstances. 
 
Managerial 
emphasis/priority and 
intended result: Doing the 
“right things” (not just doing 
“things right”) through 
entrepreneurial/strategic 
leadership, asset 
orchestration and learning 
resulting in evolutionary 
fitness (ongoing learning, 
capability enhancement and 
alignment). 
Organisations with the above 
capability can then establish 
actionable data points on a forward-
looking basis, to monitor progress, 
using analytical and predictive tools 
and technology (in addition to 
looking for opportunities for 
independent innovation). 
 
Further, these strategic activities 
need to be supported and guided by 
a top-level independent risk-
management function, rather than 
an extension of existing compliance 
functions traditionally focused on 
consistent processes.  
Develop a clear organisational 
focus on risk training and 
competency development, 
supported by knowledge sharing 
on risks across various 
outsourcing projects. 
 
 
  
102 
4 IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES:  
SURVEY FINDINGS 
 
Section Summary: This section focuses on addressing RQ3 by gaining an understanding of the 
implementation experience in strategically repositioning the governance and risk management of the 
outsourcing ecosystem, using the findings from a survey carried out in collaboration with the 
sponsoring global top-tier consulting firm. The next section will drill-down on decentralisation as the 
root cause of this execution gap and identify emerging good practices to address the challenge.  
Explaining and addressing the knowledge gaps:  
Prior research discussed in section 3.1 related to governance and risk management around outsourcing 
has hitherto not covered the implications of emergent value-focused outsourcing ecosystem in large 
global organisations with increasing criticality of dependence on the provider (although contemporary 
management researchers have covered an understanding of business ecosystems in more general terms 
– see section 4,1). The current research (in sections 4.1 to 4.3 below) demonstrates how this significantly 
increases the severity of consequences of getting things wrong, amidst a changing perception that risk 
management and governance should focus on value creation in addition to value preservation. 
Following this discussion, section 4.4 addresses another gap in prior research around the lack of 
understanding on the maturity of large global organisations’ governance and risk management 
processes. It does so by using survey data that demonstrates how large global organisations are being 
compelled to “catch up” in increasing the maturity of their governance and risk management processes 
related to these third parties. It further analyses these results to assess organisational confidence in the 
various domains of risk management, revealing an execution gap between strategic intent and ability. 
Such execution gaps between strategic intent and ability have once again been researched in the past, 
albeit in general terms, without specific reference to the governance and risk management of the third 
party ecosystem (see section 4.5). Section 4.4 of this thesis addresses this gap by analysing this in the 
outsourcing governance/risk management context to identify the potential for emerging practices and 
mechanisms to address the gap going forward, thus enabling organisations maximize the opportunities 
that outsourcing can create for them. The related methodology has been set out earlier in Table 3 (page 
36 of this thesis).   
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4.1 Emergence of a value-focused ecosystem: towards a changing perception of risk and governance 
The results of the survey indicate that a renewed set of contemporary drivers, which are directly 
aligned to long-term value-creation, such as business agility, access to specialised skills and 
knowledge, innovation, process-improvement and other sources of sustainable competitive advantage, 
are now motivating organisations to outsource IT and business processes (see Table-7). 
Organisational agility characterised by the need for flexibility and scalability is emerging as the most 
powerful value-driver for future outsourcing projects (44.9% of respondents, up from 34.6% a year or 
more earlier). Similarly, the opportunity to bring in product or service innovation by leveraging 
specialised knowledge or skills from third parties is also rapidly enhancing its dominance as a key 
future driver (26.9% of respondents, up from 10.3% a year or more earlier). As many as 20.5% of 
respondents are expecting to improve their performance from the implementation of best practices, 
representing a significant increase from 9.0% a year or more earlier while 21.8% of respondents 
(10.3% a year or more earlier) expect outsourcing arrangements to provide other sources of 
competitive advantage that are derived from on-going innovation. The desire to achieve short-term 
cost-savings remains an important consideration, but significantly diminished in relative importance, 
with only 42.3% of respondents considering it a key future driver, down from 57.1% a year or more 
earlier.  
Table-7: Changing Drivers of Outsourcing 
Traditional drivers 
Past 
(a year or 
more 
earlier) 
Present 
 
 
Future (a 
year or 
more 
ahead) 
Cost savings/cost reduction 
 
57.1% 48.1% 42.3% 
Manage operational risks 
 
12.2% 11.5% 12.8% 
Improve on overall quality parameters 
 
6.4% 7.7% 3.8% 
Emerging drivers  
 
Flexibility and scalability 
 
34.6% 41.0% 44.9% 
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Implement best practices related to 
specific processes operated by third 
parties 
 
9.0% 12.8% 20.5% 
Product or service innovation by 
leveraging specialised third party 
knowledge 
 
14.1% 23.7% 26.9% 
Enhance competitive advantage   10.3% 16.0% 21.8% 
 
This shift, from a focus on cost to a focus on value, reconfirms the organisational recognition of the 
strategic opportunity that outsourcing can create for them. As a result, organisations are increasingly 
finding themselves as operating within an eco-system of third party relationships, which embodies the 
cumulative impact of these individual outsourcing relationships. Such an ecosystem directly resonates 
with the centralised network perspective of Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller (1995), subsequently described 
by Koenig (2012) as the Supply Ecosystem where the strategic centre of an organisation brings 
together as a nucleus a small number of strategic partners around it. The ecosystem thus acts as a 
system of diverse resources (e.g. scarce skills and talent, specialised knowledge and capabilities, 
“best-in-class” processes, technology etc.) that this central enterprise can mobilize, design, control 
and animate in order to propose a competitive offer to its clients. As Koenig (2012; p. 215) explained: 
“the term system is employed to highlight the fact that a part of the mobilised resources does not 
belong to the central enterprise but to the partners that have been enlisted”. These resources are being 
managed as the firm’s strategy is changing and evolving over time, as highlighted by Iansiti and 
Levien (2004b; 1): “the strategy increasingly becomes the art of managing assets that one does not 
possess”. In a similar vein, Moore (2006; 34) recognizes the need to “achieve inter-firm coordination 
sufficient to justify players’ aligning their dreams, plans, and product road maps”. Recent research by 
Lappi, Haapasalo & Aaltonon (2015) continues to acknowledge the concept of the business ecosystem 
as a trending model of business collaboration that emphasizes organisational diversity, relationship 
dependency and joint evolution.  
Contractor et al. (2010) demonstrate how the competitive strength of a 21st century global 
organisation will be driven not just by technological competencies, but equally by its strategic 
management competencies, along multiple dimensions, in a world of outsourcing and offshoring. 
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Global organisations will continue to be exploiters, knowledge seekers, and cost reducers (Nicholls-
Nixon & Woo, 2003), while being at the same time arbitrageurs, exploiting cost differentials across 
markets and seeking competitive advantage (Ghemawat, 2007). It will develop alliance negotiation 
and management skills, so as to increase the value of its quasi-externalised relationships globally 
(Contractor & Lorange, 2002) and innovation network managers (Ernst & Kim, 2002). The results of 
all these studies align with the future drivers of outsourcing in the survey, thus indicating that the 
desire for competitive advantage will further enhance the importance of these drivers in the years 
ahead.  
4.2 Increasing criticality of outsourced processes and growing dependence on providers 
Table-8 demonstrates how organisations continue to enhance the criticality of outsourced processes, 
which, together with the change in the drivers described earlier, is significantly increasing their 
dependence on the outsourcing providers. In particular, 73.9% of respondents believe that the level of 
dependence on outsourced processes will be high (44.8%) or critical (29.1%) in the year or more 
ahead, up from 60.3% a year or more earlier. Survey respondents believe that the pursuit of lower 
costs and agile access to scarce resources and talent will continue to drive businesses to “continue to 
identify and work with high quality but lower cost vendors and other third-party providers in 
emerging markets” (as pointed out by one respondent). In the words of another respondent, “third-
party providers are increasingly carrying out activities traditionally carried out by direct employees, in 
particular interacting with customers”. This is making the outsourced task far more critical than ever 
before, thus increasing the severity of consequences on disruption or failure. Several respondents also 
indicated that the increasing use of new technology (such as the cloud and cloud-based applications) 
which facilitates collaboration and enables businesses to enhance their virtual boundaries is expected 
to further accelerate this trend of service provider dependence and the severity of repercussions in 
case of any failure. Finally, the dependence on specific third-party providers will further increase as 
organisations choose to work with fewer global strategic partners in an environment where 
consolidation activity is continuously taking place within the third-party marketplace. 
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Table-8: Increasing Dependence on Outsourced Processes 
 
Level of dependence 
 
Past  
(a year or more 
earlier) 
Present 
 
Future  
(a year or more 
ahead) 
Minor Dependence 3.6% 1.8% 1.2% 
Low Dependence 10.2% 7.2% 6.7% 
Moderate Dependence 25.9% 27.3% 18.2% 
High Dependence 38.0% 36.4% 44.8% 
Critical Dependence 22.3% 27.3% 29.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
4.3 Increasing likelihood and severity of risks related to the outsourcing ecosystem 
Table-9 illustrates that as businesses take the concept of outsourcing to new levels, they are facing 
new risks such as the threat of high profile customer service disruption and other major business 
failures. This has compromised organisational reputation, broken down business continuity and even 
attracted substantial penalties and regulatory enforcement action. Respondents consider disruption in 
client service as the most critical risk of outsourcing, closely followed by breach of regulations or 
laws by third parties being attributed to their organisation. Reputational damage and financial 
fraud/exposure also feature high on the list of critical risks. In addition, respondents are anxious about 
any failure in financial viability of a provider that can impact their ability to deliver. These threats 
arising from the actions of outsourced service providers are real. 87% of respondents have faced a 
disruptive incident associated with outsourced providers in the last 2-3 years, out of which 28% faced 
major disruption and 11% outsourced provider failure, reducing their confidence in the related 
governance and risk management processes. 
Just above a quarter (26.2%) of respondents have suffered reputational damage arising from the 
actions of their external providers in the last 2-3 years while 23.0% have ended up being non-
compliant with regulatory requirements with 8.7% of these respondents facing a fine or financial 
penalty as a result of this non-compliance. Another 23.0% of respondents have experienced financial 
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or transaction-reporting errors, 20.6% have dealt with a situation where sensitive customer data has 
been breached by third-party providers and 10.3% have been challenged on maintaining business 
continuity with the risk of lost revenue.  
Table-9: Outsourcing Risks and Incidents  
Top outsourcing risks, ranked by criticality  
 
Risk Areas  Rank 
Disruption in customer service  First 
Breach of regulation or law  Second 
Reputational damage  Third 
Financial fraud or exposure  Fourth 
 
Impact of incidents actually faced by respondents 
Nature of incident % of respondents 
Reputational damage 26.2% 
Financial or transaction reporting errors 23.0%  
Non-compliance with regulatory requirements 23.0% 
Breach of sensitive customer data 20.6% 
Business continuity failure and lost revenue 10.3%  
 
 
Prior research and global surveys on outsourcing have also confirmed that increasing costs, enhanced 
regulation and concerns around cyber fraud, data security and privacy are expected to challenge 
organisations on outsourcing as a business model (Thorson, 2014; Mathaisel & Yoost, 2015; Deloitte, 
2014; Chapman, 2015). Challenges are expected to increase in staffing the retained organisation after 
outsourcing on the one hand as well as in managing vendors and delivery centres on the other to be 
able to enhance innovation and generate greater value to the business (Nakatsu & Iacovou, 2009; 
Abdullah & Verner, 2012; Deloitte, 2014) 
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4.4 Execution gap in strategic governance and risk management of outsourcing  
Given the changing drivers and increasing dependence on outsourcing, survey respondents were asked 
to self-assess their level of maturity in risk management over outsourcing in line with the new 
thinking, based on a five-point rating system, considering the overall impact of the various domains of 
risk management: 
 structure of third-party management organisation 
 clarity of related roles and responsibilities 
 stakeholder awareness and commitment to third-party risk management 
 skills, bandwidth and competence in management of third parties 
 process and supporting technology for third-party risk management. 
The risk management maturity ratings were defined as follows: 
 Initial: Risk management primarily focused on value preservation with none or very few of 
the above domains addressed. 
 Managed: Risk management primarily focused on value preservation with some of the above 
domains addressed through limited effort.  
 Defined: Risk management starting to focus on value creation in addition to value 
preservation. Consideration given to addressing all the above domains with room for 
improvement. 
 Integrated: Risk management focused on value creation and value preservation with most of 
the above domains addressed and evolved. 
 Optimised: “Best in class” organisation – Risk management focused on value creation and 
value preservation with all of the above domains addressed and evolved. 
Towards a holistic and integrated approach to outsourcing risk 
The survey revealed that only 9.5% of respondents had integrated or optimised their risk management 
systems related to their outsourcing ecosystem a year ago or earlier. However, these organisations 
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were now being compelled to rapidly “catch-up” in taking a holistic and proactive approach to 
outsourcing risk, with 71.6% respondents expecting to be able to integrate and optimize their risk 
management system in the near future (a year or more ahead), including around 16.5% of respondents 
aspiring to be “best-in-class” (see Table-10). 
The trend in terms of the proportion of respondents at each maturity level appears to indicate that 
most of the respondents have moved up or are aspiring to move up by one level of maturity between 
the recent past, present and near future, thus reconfirming a progressive journey to excellence. 
Table-10: Increasing Maturity of Outsourcing Risk Management Systems 
 
Level of maturity 
 
Past  
(a year or more 
earlier) 
Present 
 
Future  
(a year or more 
ahead) 
Initial 21.3% 0.8% 0.0% 
Managed  45.7% 26.8% 2.4% 
Defined 23.5% 47.2% 26.0% 
Integrated 8.7% 22.8% 55.1% 
Optimised 0.8% 2.4% 16.5% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
The survey results resonate with the review of literature on the changing perception of risks and risk 
management activities. Organisational focus on outsourcing risk management has traditionally been 
reactive and driven by mid-level to lower level management, including contract managers, focused on 
achieving contractual Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to “prevent bad things happening” (e.g. 
report by Deloitte, 2015). Such an approach to risk has led to micro-focus on risk areas that interest 
lower and middle levels of management (e.g. McCourt, 2012; Jaeger, 2014; Chapman, 2015). The 
survey results in Table 8 confirm that organisations are only now starting to depart from this myopia 
and take a leadership-led holistic and proactive approach to outsourcing risk as a source of 
organisational value.  
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However, there is a possibility that respondent aspirations may be overly optimistic in their estimation 
of the time and effort required to achieve this organisational transformation. Given the diverse range 
of stakeholders, processes and technology impacted by this transformation, respondent organisations 
that believe that they would be able to substantially complete their transformational journey in the 
next year may actually take much longer to do so. 
Organisational commitment inadequately supported by processes and enabling technology 
Survey respondents have indicated varying levels of organisational confidence in the different 
domains of risk management over outsourcing. Organisational confidence appears to be the highest in 
the level of awareness of various stakeholders in outsourcing risk management processes and their 
commitment to managing the related risks. 78.1% of respondents have expressed moderately high to 
higher levels of confidence in this domain.  
Closely related to stakeholder awareness is the clarity with which the ownership of these risk 
management activities is known to those tasked with the performance and oversight of the framework. 
77.9% of respondents have expressed a moderately high to higher levels of confidence in this area. 
This relatively higher level of confidence also extends to the organisation of risk management teams 
as well as the skills, competence and training of the relevant individuals (see Table-11). 
However, such higher levels of confidence are not mirrored in the related tools, technology and 
processes. For instance, organisational confidence is lowest in the tools and technology, monitoring 
mechanisms and other risk management processes with as many as 94.3%, 93.4% and 88.6% 
respondents respectively expressing moderately low to lower levels of confidence in these domains. 
  
  
111 
Table-11: Levels of Confidence in Various Domains of Outsourcing Risk Management 
 
Domains of outsourcing risk management where confidence is moderately high or 
higher 
Risk management domain 
 
% of respondents 
 
Awareness and commitment to managing third-party 
risk 
78.10% 
  
Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
 
77.90%   
Skills competence and training 
  
73.90%   
Organisation of third-party risk management   73.20%   
 
Domains of outsourcing risk management where confidence is moderately low or 
lower 
Risk management domain 
 
% of respondents   
Tools and technology used for risk management 94.30%   
Management and monitoring mechanisms 
 
93.50%   
Quality of risk management processes 88.60%   
Disciplined escalation framework     78.90%   
 
 
In spite of the overall strategy and governance framework having been put in place in a larger number 
of respondent organisations, there is therefore more to do in strengthening their risk management tools 
and technologies, together with the underlying processes and monitoring mechanisms.  
This also identifies a disparity between strategic intent and ability, or in other words, an emerging 
“execution gap” in risk management of the outsourcing ecosystem. The gap is the result of 
organisational commitment not being supported by the ability of the related operational enablers 
including technology and processes to achieve intended results. Addressing this execution gap would 
help to reduce the potential for failure while augmenting organisational capability to maximise the 
opportunities from outsourcing. 
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4.5 Relating survey results to prior research on execution gap  
Researchers in Strategic Management have studied the concept of the execution gap in large global 
organisations extensively over the last decade (e.g. Becher, 2005; Lepsinger, 2006; Sull, 2007; 
Martin, 2010; Minter, 2011; Murray & Mohamed, 2015). Lepsinger (2006) discovered through a 
survey that contrary to conventional wisdom the real strategic challenge in large global organisations 
is not the absence of a vision or stakeholder buy-in. Most organisations have clear and inspiring 
visions and commitment across stakeholders and employees. However, a gap exists between 
“organisations’ ability to develop and communicate sound strategies and their ability to implement 
those strategies” (Lepsinger, 2006; p. 56.). He advocates that organisations should close this gap 
before it widens by addressing three key factors, which he refers to as the “Tipping Point Trio”: 
 Clarifying the strategy in greater level of detail by articulating what would be operationally 
required to implement that strategy and the priorities for action. 
 Ensuring that the appropriate management systems are in place that would enable and 
support the achievement of the strategy. 
 Confirming, through periodic senior management review and monitoring, that the actions 
required for achieving the strategy mutually support each other across various organisational 
levels and functions rather than conflict with each other. 
In a similar vein, Becher (2005) highlights the need for operational alignment to ensure that strategy 
and execution are in sync while continuing to underscore the importance of continually monitoring 
and measuring progress with a dual focus on identifying challenges as well as areas for growth. 
Minter (2011) revalidated Lepsinger’s views five years later while Murray & Mohamed (2015) 
emphasize the importance of predictive rather than lagging indicators in the monitoring process, given 
the growing ability of contemporary businesses to manipulate organisational data more effectively 
and meaningfully than in the past.   
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 4.6 Decentralisation as a key underlying cause of the execution gap 
Simply stated, decentralisation is the dispersion or distribution of functions and powers. A 
decentralised organisation is one where the decision-making authority is not vested in a central group 
or individual, but is dispersed across business units and divisions to achieve divisional flexibility with 
which to react to local environmental and operational contingencies (Alexander & Fennell, 1985).  
The survey confirms that global organisations are increasingly being managed through increasing 
degrees of decentralisation across their various operating units and entities. Three-quarters (75.5%) of 
respondent organisations today have a partial to high degree of decentralisation, reflecting a potential 
challenge to a holistic and unified approach to third-party risk management that more centralised 
structures would have enabled, particularly when organisations are seeking to bring in consistency in 
the manner in which they establish uniform processes and technology for collectively managing their 
third-party relationships.  
Third-party governance and risk management is clearly evolving as a crucial organisation-wide 
matter (Palm, 2015) that cannot be left to the discretion of a divergent group of operational-level 
personnel in the multiple divisions of an institution that operates with a moderate to a higher level 
of decentralisation. However, at the same time, the world is getting disruptively complex as a 
result of multiple drivers such as globalisation, technology advancement and a more demanding 
stakeholder community, within the overall context of an uncertain and volatile macro-economic 
environment. In this increasingly complex and uncertain environment, the structure and internal 
functioning of organisations must be consistent with changing demands, with firms operating in 
volatile environments typically characterised by loosely integrated operations and decentralised 
decision making. (Rantakari, 2013; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969). By its very nature, a global 
organisation invariably faces a number of external challenges that it has to address proactively or 
reactively within short timeframes and accordingly organisational flexibility becomes a very 
important strategy for survival and remaining competitive (Alexander & Fennell, 1985; Alexander, 
1991).  
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Decentralised structures were generally criticised for their inefficiency, duplication and lack of 
consistent strategic direction in the past (e.g. Bolton & Farrell, 1990). Research conducted by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit in collaboration with Ricoh, a Fortune 500 company however recognizes 
that by 2020 effective business processes will empower workers to better meet the needs of the 
market place and enable organisations to be more agile (report by Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). 
Furthermore, 86% of business leaders agree that by 2020 customers will be the main source of new 
product or service ideas and therefore an integral part of decision-making, leaving companies no 
choice but to move further away from centralised structures. 
The challenges that arise from increasing decentralisation impacting risk management of outsourcing 
and governance mechanisms include the following: 
 implementing robust governance structures to manage outsourcing ecosystem risk pervasively 
through the entire decentralised organisation, down to the lowest unit of decentralisation; 
 ensuring clarity in accountability on ownership of activities for outsourcing ecosystem risk 
management across the decentralised business units; 
 enhancing visibility and awareness of outsourcing ecosystem risk management processes 
(including back-end monitoring to determine compliance) consistently through the 
decentralised organisation; 
 developing uniform levels of capability across the decentralised organisation in individuals, to 
whom activity ownership is allocated; 
 integrating consistent processes and technology across the various business units and divisions, 
with specific deviations only to accommodate local requirements; 
 establishing a common culture been across the decentralised units, together with 
communication and training to have a shared understanding of risk. 
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One can expect that the existence of a global management philosophy and an integrated management 
team at the top (global) level of decentralised organisations could address any concerns that a 
decentralised structure may adversely affect the quality of risk management in the operating units. 
However, it is important to recognise the conflicting motivations that may drive the behaviours of the 
operating unit leadership, i.e. the leadership of regional entities, product groups or functions. The 
challenges with regard to governance and risk management however typically arise from some of the 
following factors: 
 Many of the operating units or entities are run as independent profit centres, with clearly 
articulated performance expectations, goals and metrics. As the executives in charge of these 
units are made accountable for the achievement of specified profit (or sales) objectives, they 
must be given the authority and operational freedom to do whatever is required to achieve them. 
This can potentially challenge the importance and focus of governance and risk management 
considerations. 
 Secondly, the external and internal environments, as well as the markets in which these 
organisations operate, are diverse. Whilst decentralisation provides the flexibility to determine 
the appropriate competitive strategy to address its specific market considerations and react to 
local environmental and operational considerations, this can come at the cost of a more 
disciplined and uniform approach to risk management that a more centralised approach can 
ensure. 
 Thirdly, the lack of knowledge in centralised risk and governance teams in corporate 
headquarters relating to local market considerations, competitive forces and the changing local 
business environment further reduces the effectiveness of any form of long-distance approach to 
ensuring governance, despite the availability of management information and analytical data. 
 Fourthly, the desire for business unit management to operate with a greater degree of 
decentralisation than planned can amplify the lower level of technology integration and process 
standardisation.  
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 Finally, the combination of several softer attributes such as the challenges of implementing a 
common organisational and risk culture and consistency of training often weakens the focus on 
risk management in decentralised environments.  
4.7 Emerging practices to bridge the execution gap 
The survey reveals a number of corporate practices that businesses are adopting to bridge the 
execution gap. 
4.7.1 Escalating the level of responsibility: the role of the Board. The survey results echo the growing 
organisational acceptance of the need for enhanced accountability for outsourcing ecosystem risk 
management at the Board and the C-suite level (see Table-12). Being viewed for decades as an 
operational-level issue rather than a Board or top leadership issue, this rethinking now presents a 
transformational opportunity for the more progressive organisations leveraging outsourcing as a 
source of value. Repositioning the accountability for outsourcing risk management at the Board and 
C-suite level would significantly enhance the status and priority of this organisational imperative and 
enable the execution gap to be addressed with greater authority and commitment of resources for 
establishing the relevant management systems including processes, tools and technologies and 
monitoring mechanisms.  
Table-12: Board Involvement in Managing of Outsourcing Risks 
Outsourcing risk on the Board agenda 
  % of respondents 
Not on the Board agenda 0.9% 
Intermittently on Board agenda with low importance 18.6% 
Reactively in the agenda in response to incidents 25.4% 
Periodically on the agenda with varying urgency 39.0% 
Features consistently as a critical item on the Board agenda 16.1% 
Total 100.0% 
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Level of ultimate accountability for risk management 
 
% of respondents 
Member(s) of the Board 
 
19.5% 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
 
27.1% 
Chief Finance Officer (CFO) 
 
5.1% 
Head of Risk or Chief Risk Officer 
 
9.3% 
Chief Procurement Officer or CPO 
 
16.9% 
Head of Vendor/Alliance Management 
 
4.2% 
Individual Vendor or Alliance Manager 
 
2.5% 
Head of Internal Audit 
 
0.8% 
Head of Compliance 
 
4.2% 
Not clear/dependent on type of third party 
 
10.2% 
Total   100.0% 
 
 
Board and C-suite responsibility for outsourcing ecosystem governance and risk management would 
also ensure a dual focus on value creation and value preservation, based on a holistic understanding of 
the strategic importance of outsourcing as well as the severity of consequences of not managing the 
risk of failure. Responsibility vested in organisational levels that are higher than individual functional 
levels would also facilitate functional stakeholder buy-in and ensure consistency and mutually-
supportive actions, one of the potential challenges created through increasing decentralisation of 
business units and underlying causes of the execution gap discussed earlier in this paper.  
Following the financial crisis, key regulators/governance bodies now agree on the Board’s central role 
in approving and monitoring strategy, in keeping with their fiduciary duties to shareholders. The 
Board therefore needs to understand the risks and ensure appropriate risk management, which would 
further enable them to strike a better balance between risk oversight, growth, performance and 
strategy.  
4.7.2 Mandating common governance standards: With increasing volume and complexity of outsourcing 
arrangements in a business environment characterised by increasing decentralisation, the vast majority 
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of respondent organisations (86.0%) are establishing common risk management standards to be 
compulsorily followed by all their providers to ensure a consistent approach across business units. 
Given the increasing spectrum of risks in outsourcing, the survey also reveals that the general trend in 
this regard is to have a combined approach to formulating these standards, representing a mix of 
existing industry-specific (e.g. HIPAA standards for safeguarding of personal identifiable or private 
information for patient data handled or managed by third-party service providers) or generally 
accepted functional standards (ISO 22301 standard for business continuity in relation to business 
processes operated by third parties), supplemented by organisation-specific standards particularly in 
those areas where no such generally accepted standards exist.  
Respondents have also indicated that the domains covered by these standards are continually 
expanding and extending to areas such as code of conduct and ethics, regulatory compliance, 
minimum wage requirements, information security and privacy etc. 
4.7.3 Investing in centralised Centres of Excellence for outsourcing risk management: Establishing a 
centralised in-house function for outsourcing ecosystem risk management seems to be the approach 
that the majority of survey respondents are adopting, with 58.4% of respondents in this category 
despite the emergence of a number of external service-providers offering “managed services” based 
models (see Table-13). These “managed services” refer to the outsourced delivery of risk 
management and IT security-related processes to external providers. With the increasing complexity 
in risk management and use of new technologies, organisations are increasingly considering 
outsourcing these functions under the ever-expanding banner of business services to specialist teams 
who can provide the required expertise cost-effectively (Gupta & Zhdanov, 2012; Zhao, Xue & 
Whinston, 2013). Responses indicate that organisations that are moving to such a centralised in-house 
function are primarily driven by the need to retain organisational control over this critical activity, 
enhanced by a better organisational understanding as well as the ability to manage a diverse group of 
stakeholders that an external provider may be unable to match. There is also a perception amongst 
some respondents that that in-house models can adapt better to the needs of larger global 
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organisations, particularly where diverse operating groups are involved, with varying degrees of 
decentralisation.  
Table-13: Approaches to Risk Management 
 
Organisations considering in-house vs. external service provider-based risk 
management models for outsourcing  
 
Increasingly moving to a centralised in-house function to support  
third-party management 58.4% 
Increasingly moving to an external service provider model for  
third-party management 8.0% 
Neither of these/Not sure 33.6% 
Total 100.0% 
 
Expected functions of centralised in-house risk management team 
 
Ongoing regular risk assessments 80.3% 
Third-party provider monitoring activities 80.3% 
Risk management coordination activities 56.1% 
Tracking remediation activities 57.6% 
Tracking ongoing monitoring requirements 50.0% 
Archiving evidence related to risk management 33.3% 
Filing of contracts and amendments 48.5% 
Assisting in implementing termination plans 25.8% 
 
 
It is expected that this centralised function would cover most of the key risk management activities 
including on-going risk assessments (80.3%); monitoring activities (80.3%) and co-ordination 
(56.1%); tracking remediation activities (57.6%) and on-going monitoring requirements (50.0%). It 
would also be responsible for various administrative activities such as filing of contracts and 
amendments (48.5%), archiving evidence related to risk management as required by regulators and 
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other stakeholders (33.3%) and would assist in the implementation of any contract termination plans 
where required (25.8%). 
It should also be noted that as many as many as 33.6% of respondents are not yet clear on the future 
organisational choice of an in-house vs. an external service provider model. The choice between a 
centralised in-house model for outsourcing risk management vis-à-vis an external service provider 
based model is a vital decision that can have far-reaching strategic consequences therefore it needs to 
be carefully considered and not taken recklessly.  The lack of understanding of their outsourcing 
ecosystem together with inadequate knowledge of the marketplace of external providers may be 
resulting in a significant proportion of organisations remaining undecided in this matter, although 
many of them are already working with contract staff to assist them in the related tasks.  
4.7.4 Concurrence of multiple methods of gaining assurance: The growing complexity of risks requires a 
holistic and deep understanding across a diverse group of organisational stakeholders as well as 
disparate group of third-party providers. This is resulting in a combination of multiple methods of 
gaining holistic assurance that the entire spectrum of key risks related to the outsourcing ecosystem 
are being appropriately managed, balancing between efficiency and effectiveness. Assurance activity 
can be undertaken by line managers, who are directly responsible for managing the third-party 
provider (e.g. in the form of ongoing third-party activity monitoring), as well as by organisational 
teams such as internal audit who operate independently of line management, often reporting directly 
to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors or other Board Members.  The survey reveals that 
on-site reviews of third-party providers by line managers dominate the methods of obtaining 
assurance and is also considered the most effective method, further recognizing the relational impact 
that this creates (see Table-14). 
In-house internal audit reviews represent the second most dominant and effective method of gaining 
assurance, practised by 62.7% of respondent organisations. In addition, control self-assessments by 
third-party providers, remote assessments with direct access to third-party systems/data and desktop 
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audits represent the other key assurance methods, although these are not considered as effective as on-
site reviews or in-house internal audit procedures. 
Use of contractors or outsourced internal audits are also rapidly gaining popularity as effective 
methods of obtaining assurance over third-party management. 
Some respondents have expressed their dependence on external audits and service provider audits 
under SSAE16/ISAE3402 standards. However, most of these audits cover the risk of material 
financial statement misstatements only and may not address the wider set of strategic, operational, 
reputational, legal and regulatory risks that a best-in-class framework should holistically and 
proactively address.  
However, it is interesting to note that internal controls testing drives the approach to on-site reviews in 
more than 80% of cases, with detailed transaction testing for all risks driving the approach only in less 
than 20% of cases. There is clearly room for improvement here by adopting an approach based on a 
higher extent of detailed transaction testing supported by available data that would significantly 
improve the quality of assurance obtained. For instance, reversing the mix with 20% of controls 
testing and 80% of transaction testing should be the benchmark that organisations should strive to 
attain in this area. This would not only portray a more holistic assessment but would also reduce the 
risk of reviewers simply ticking the boxes without appropriate substantiation with underlying data. 
Table-14: Assurance in Working with Third Parties 
Dominant methods of gaining assurance over outsourcing  
 
Method of gaining assurance % of respondents 
Visiting third-party provider locations periodically based on risk 
assessment 
69.5% 
In-house internal audit 62.7% 
Control self-assessments by third-party providers 39.8% 
Remote assessments with direct access to provider systems and data 22.9% 
Desktop audits 22.0% 
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Most effective methods of gaining assurance over third-party management 
 
Methods of gaining assurance over third-party management Rank 
Visiting third-party provider locations periodically based on risk 
assessment First 
In-house internal audit Second 
Using contractors for outsourcing assurance Third 
Outsourced internal audit Third 
Control self-assessments by third-party providers Fifth 
 
 
What drives the approach to on-site third-party reviews 
Internal control testing 80.5% 
Detailed transaction testing for all risks 19.5% 
Total 100.0% 
 
 
4.7.5 Enhancing the level of monitoring and other assurance activities: Organisations are prioritizing certain 
key risk management initiatives as their top business imperatives to address the risks that the 
heightened levels of outsourcing create for them. It is interesting to note that these monitoring and 
assurance activities take place at various stages of third-party engagement. For instance, business case 
articulation and due diligence typically take place at the pre-contracting stage followed by finalisation 
of the contract. On the other hand, visibility and transparency of the activities of various third parties 
in the outsourcing ecosystem, supported by monitoring and other assurance activities are ongoing 
processes throughout the life cycle of the third-party engagement. The survey demonstrates that 
ongoing monitoring and other assurance activities dominate the list of organisational priorities. 
Specifically, enhanced monitoring of the related external providers appears to be the top initiative in 
this regard, being taken up by 59.7% of respondents. 57.1% of respondents are stepping up their 
assurance activities over their service providers as their key initiative to reduce third-party risk (see 
Table-14). 
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Table- 15: Key Initiatives to Reduce Risks Associated with Outsourcing 
Key initiative   % of respondents 
Enhanced monitoring  59.7% 
Enhancing assurance activities  57.1% 
More disciplined contracting  44.5% 
Enhanced business case and due diligence  38.7% 
Enhancing visibility and transparency 36.1% 
 
 
Respondents recognize that various stakeholders across various levels and functional areas (for 
instance, business owners, supply chain teams and compliance groups) have a role to play in these 
monitoring and assurance activities. Respondents have highlighted the fact that each of these players 
brings a unique set of perspectives and skills to risk management, which can be an invaluable asset to 
the business, but which need to be orchestrated to ensure that there is complete clarity on respective 
roles and responsibilities and to ensure that limited risk management resources are deployed 
effectively across the organisation to address the most significant areas of concern. 
The effectiveness of using limited risk management resources can also be enhanced by intensifying 
the rigor of disciplined contracting and pre-contracting activities such as business case articulation 
and due diligence, as indicated by 44.5% and 38.7% of respondents, respectively. Additionally, the 
activities of third parties within the outsourcing ecosystem should be visible and transparent to all 
relevant stakeholders across the organisation.  
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5 ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION  
Section Summary: This section addresses RQ4 by focusing on decentralisation as the root cause of 
this execution gap in implementation of strategic governance and risk management of the outsourcing 
ecosystem in large global organisations and sets out emerging good practices to address this 
challenge. This section concludes the three-phased presentation on research findings. Accordingly, 
the next section aims to provide a holistic summary and thorough reflection on the research covered 
by this thesis.  
5.1     Experience from prior research and related knowledge gaps 
Historically large and geographically dispersed organisations have long been trying to balance between 
centralisation and decentralisation of the IT function and, more recently, IT-enabled business services 
(Sia, Soh and Weill, 2010). The choice of organisational structures was typically driven by the need to 
optimize meeting local and global organisational needs, while making sure that organisations can 
control and govern centralised or decentralised functions, and therefore suppliers providing IT and 
business services for these functions. Whilst prior research has informed this debate, our literature 
review in section 3.1 together with the discussion below demonstrates that this has hitherto not been 
researched in the context of implications on governance and risk management of the outsourcing 
ecosystem in large global organisations. The current research in section 5.2 provides empirical evidence 
from the survey supported by interview data of these challenges in the specific context of the 
outsourcing governance/risk management as the root cause of the execution gap discussed in the 
preceding section and sets out the way forward in terms of addressing these challenges. The related 
methodology has been set out earlier in Table 3 (page 36 of this thesis).   
This theme of centralisation vs. decentralisation has been researched and debated for over sixty years 
and many organisational researchers (e.g., Sobotkiewicz, 2014) who believe this to be one of the most 
complex both in organisation and management theory and in business practice. As large organisations 
continue to grow their global presence and evolve as multinationals, management thinkers have 
increasingly focused on issues concerning their structure, which needs to be aligned to organisational 
goals and tasks in the context of diverse geographical environments in which they operate.  
The dictionary meaning of the word decentralisation is the dispersion or distribution of functions and 
powers. A decentralised organisation is therefore one where the decision-making authority is not vested 
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in a central group or individual, but is dispersed across business units and divisions to achieve divisional 
flexibility with which to react to local environmental and operational contingencies (Alexander & 
Fennell, 1985). On the contrary, centralisation is defined as the process by which the activities of an 
organisation (particularly those regarding planning and decision-making) become concentrated within 
a particular location or group, typically the head office or the centre of the organisation. According to 
the Bloomsbury Business Library Business and Management Dictionary (2007), centralisation can be 
defined as the gathering together, at a corporate headquarters, of specialist functions such as finance, 
personnel, centralised purchasing, and information technology. Centralisation is usually undertaken in 
order to effect economies of scale and to standardize operating procedures throughout the organisation. 
Many businesses start to decentralize their organisational authority and decision making as they grow 
larger or start operating from several places or any new units and markets.  
According to Rodrigues (2001), Fayol’s original principle of management suggests that too much 
centralisation leads to ineffectiveness, as does too much decentralisation. As a result, organisations must 
attain a balance between the two ends of the decision-making scale. An example of an approach that 
could be used to achieve such a balance is to have senior management establish broad strategic plans 
and policies while the interpretive decisions of these plans and policies can be made by middle or lower 
management in the form of tactical plans and procedures (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Weick (1987), however, 
observes that over the next few decades, the stronger emerging trend amongst larger global 
organisations has been to move away from this “trickle-down” decision making and evolve “ad-hoc” 
centres that possess the relevant skills and knowledge with relevance to specific organisation problems 
to be addressed. As a result, centres of command, authority, decision-making and control in 
organisations are progressively moving to locations near the expertise for specific tasks. Some 
researchers (e.g. Magjuka & Baldwin, 1991; Furst, Reeves, Rosen, & Blackburn, 2004) have referred 
to this phenomenon as the establishment of “Problem Solving Groups” or “Virtual Teams” (Rodrigues, 
2010). 
Decentralised organisations adapt themselves to the tasks at hand and external environmental 
considerations (Perlmutter, 1969; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1969; Schollhammer, 1971; 
  
126 
Lorsch & Allen, 1973). The key features of these structural attributes, based on these studies, are 
summarised below to provide the relevant context to understand how decentralisation impacts strategic 
governance of the outsourcing ecosystem: 
 The extent of integration of the top management team and commonality of the enterprise-wide 
philosophy at the top level that thinks in terms of the global commitments of the organisation and 
establishes a common organisational culture, supported by leadership at functional, product 
and/or regional levels.  
 Multiple reporting relationships between executives at the operating entities and those at the 
corporate headquarters, which may be a combination of direct (“solid” line), indirect (nominal or 
“grey” line) and coordinating (“dotted” line) relationships, often with varying levels of clarity to 
enable flexibility in responding to task requirements and the external environment, also known 
as matrix structures (Shreiber & Rosenberg, 2015).  
 The degree to which both authority and accountability have been delegated to executives within 
the operating units. This is typically evident through the number of levels between the leaders in 
the global organisation and the executives of the operating unit (a taller structure being an 
indicator of a higher degree of decentralisation), and the level of relative importance given to the 
concept of the profit centre(s) in the operating unit, i.e. the rigour with which executives in the 
operating unit are held accountable for profitability.  
 The degree of organisational flexibility and perceived degree of autonomy of executives in the 
operating unit level. In some cases, the absence of formal task descriptions with authority 
specifications in a comprehensive manner ensures that the concept of decentralisation can be 
followed in “spirit” rather than the “letter of the law” and can be invoked or revoked based on 
the circumstances or the individuals involved in running the unit which is a critical strategy for 
survival and maintenance of organisational effectiveness in the face of diversity and speed of 
change in the internal and external local environment. 
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Decentralised structures were generally criticised for their inefficiency, duplication and lack of 
consistent strategic direction in the past (e.g. Bolton & Farrell, 1990). Research conducted by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit in collaboration with Ricoh, a Fortune 500 company, however recognizes 
that by 2020, effective business processes will empower workers to better meet the needs of the 
marketplace and enable organisations to be more agile (report by Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). 
Furthermore, 86% of business leaders agree that by 2020 customers will be the main source of new 
service or product ideas and therefore an integral part of decision-making, leaving companies no choice 
but to move further away from centralised structures.  
It is interesting to recognise that the increasing degree of decentralisation in global organisations is also 
being accompanied by the development of hybrid structures of various forms, discussed subsequently 
in this thesis. For example, large global organisations that outsource a major proportion of support 
functions relying on IT and IT-enabled services (e.g., finance, procurement, human resources and IT) 
are searching for ways to improve operational efficiencies and some are considering centralisation of 
support functions under “shared services”. Shared services imply the consolidation of support functions 
from several departments into a stand-alone organisational entity the objective of which is to provide 
services as efficiently and effectively as possible. When managed well, shared services can reduce costs, 
improve services and even generate revenue (Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 2015).  
A higher degree of centralisation in governance-related activities is almost always inevitable. Let us 
consider, for instance, the major players in the enterprise software industry such as SAP, IBM and 
Oracle offering platform-based solutions, where partnering software firms have traditionally co-created 
value by combining add-on solutions to their platforms for a number of years. (Huber, Kude, & Dibbern, 
2017; Sarker et al., 2012). These platform-owners have adopted high degrees of decentralisation with 
regard to addressing the needs of their customers, yet the same organisations adopt a centralised and 
integrated way to govern large ecosystems of add-on solution-providers to their platform, bringing in 
the advantages of standardisation to objectively orchestrate the members of these large third-party 
ecosystem at arm’s length (Wareham et al., 2014). Thus, governance is seen as a problem of designing 
effective ecosystem-wide standardised mechanisms (Gulati et al., 2012). 
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5.2 Empirical evidence of the challenges of decentralisation in strategic governance of outsourcing 
eco-systems  
In theory, the existence of a global management philosophy and an integrated management team at the 
top (global) level of decentralised organisations should be expected to address any concerns that a 
decentralised structure may adversely affect the quality of governance and risk management in the 
operating units. However, it is important to recognise the conflicting motivation that may drive the 
behaviours of the decentralised operating unit leadership, i.e. the leadership of regional entities, product 
groups or functions. The challenges with regard to governance and risk management typically arise, 
based on the above literature review and additional empirical evidence from publicly-available sources, 
from some of the following factors: 
Pressure to meet financial performance targets: Many of the operating units or entities are run as 
independent profit centres, with clearly articulated performance expectations, goals and metrics. As the 
executives in charge of these units are made accountable for the achievement of these specified profit 
(or sales) objectives or other financial targets, they naturally assume the authority and operational 
freedom to do “whatever it takes” to achieve them. This certainly makes the organisation more agile 
but can potentially overshadow the consistency in focus on governance and risk management 
considerations. For instance, a global telecommunications company was recently fined US$ 795 million 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) for paying more than US$ 114 million in bribes to a 
government official in Uzbekistan in an attempt to win new projects that would enable them to meet 
performance targets. The proposed service-provider was the Uzbek subsidiary of this company that had 
structured and concealed the bribes through various payments recorded as disbursements to third-party 
contractors under sham consulting agreements, such payments to suppliers relating to reseller 
transactions. Despite the presence of red flags, local or group management did not appropriately vet 
these transactions (Makinwa, 2016).  
Diversity of business and market environments: The external and internal environments, as well as the 
markets in which these organisations operate are diverse. Whilst decentralisation provides the flexibility 
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to determine the appropriate competitive strategy to address its specific market considerations and react 
to local environmental and operational considerations, this can come at the cost of a more disciplined 
and uniform approach to governance and risk management that a more centralised approach can 
provide. The search of major incidents related to the lack of understanding of local markets and 
environments did not identify any publicly-available situations involving third parties related to 
outsourced IT and business process services; however, there are several reported incidents in other 
business ecosystems, based on the same principle. For instance, in one of the largest healthcare fraud 
settlements in history, the US Department of Justice announced that a global healthcare giant and its 
subsidiaries will pay more than US$2.2 billion to resolve criminal and civil liability arising from 
allegations relating to manufactured drugs, including promotion for uses not approved as safe and 
effective by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and payment of kickbacks intended to promote 
the use of these drugs in nursing homes in a specific geographic jurisdiction. Although the consultant 
pharmacists who were involved purported to provide “independent” recommendations based on their 
clinical judgment, this civil settlement concluded that the organisation viewed the pharmacists as an 
“extension of their sales force”, thus holding the organisation responsible for these actions (Verschoor, 
2014).  
Lack of local knowledge of global governance teams: The lack of knowledge of centralised risk and 
governance teams in local market considerations, competitive forces and the changing local business 
environment further reduces the effectiveness of any form of long-distance approach to ensuring 
governance, even where appropriate management information and analytical data is available. For 
example, a global organisation operating in the energy and resources sector was fined US$ 772 million 
for engaging in conduct in violation of the FCPA arising from the conduct of third parties and ineffective 
corporate controls over third parties. Certain consultants/service-providers were located in a country 
different to the project country. The organisation did not perform any due diligence on the service-
providers even though some of them had no knowledge about, or experience in, the relevant industry. 
At other times, the service-provider asked to be paid in a currency or in a bank account located in a 
country different to where the consultant and the project were located. In multiple instances, more than 
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one consultant was retained on the same project, ostensibly to perform the very same services. Despite, 
these “red flags,” the consultants were nevertheless retained without meaningful scrutiny (Leibold, 
2015). 
Process inconsistencies and non-integrated technology: A lower level of process standardisation and 
technology integration can result in unintended consequences with business units operating with a 
greater degree of decentralisation than planned or risk-managed. For example, the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA) in the UK recently fined a bank £1.8 million in connection with an 
arrangement with another company in its parent company group (Company C) for managing finances 
related to the ATM operations of the bank without appropriate controls around this business process 
management arrangement. Company C employees improperly transferred a part of these funds over 
seven years to deal with their own cash flow problems and took steps to conceal their actions, thus 
putting the financial safety and soundness of the bank at risk (Berry, 2014). 
In addition to the regulatory enforcement action described above, a detailed review of the above cases 
through to final notices of enforcement and organisational response to the same indicates that 
organisations operating with process inconsistencies and lack of technology integration across the entire 
organisation have failed to enhance organisational value in the following ways: 
- Inability to recover under-reported revenue streams by third parties in the sales and distribution 
network due to the absence of a consistent (centralised) monitoring of third parties. 
- Increased costs arising from poor due diligence and absence of common organisational standards 
around selection of third parties. These third parties did not operate cost-effectively or were 
responsible for loss of reputation. 
- Inability to gain efficiencies (for instance through technology integration) and opportunity loss 
arising from the inability to respond to fluctuations in the market forces of demand and supply. 
Training and competency development: Finally, the challenges of implementing a common competency 
development programme in governance and risk management supported by the consistency of training 
in this area throughout the entire depth and breadth of the decentralised organisation often weakens the 
  
131 
focus on risk management in decentralised environments. As part of the UK Serious Fraud Office 
(SFOs) co-ordinated global settlement under the UK Bribery Act, a global organisation agreed to a  
US$ 25m fine for failing to prevent bribery in a Tanzanian subsidiary. The organisation was the lead 
manager in a large private placement to raise funds from the Tanzanian government. However, the deal 
was subsequently changed to on-board a local partner to whom compliance processes related to “Know 
Your Customer” (KYC) were assigned. Unfortunately, the organisation did not have the competency 
and training on making rigorous enquiries under the KYC rules and accordingly the bribes remained 
undetected (Jaeger, 2016).  
The above empirical evidence thus clearly indicates that third-party governance and risk 
management is progressively evolving as a crucial organisation-wide matter (Palm, 2015) which 
cannot be left to the discretion of a divergent group of operational-level personnel in the multiple 
divisions of an institution that operates with a moderate to a higher level of decentralisation. 
However, at the same time, the world is getting disruptively complex as a result of multiple drivers 
such as globalisation, technology advancement and a more demanding stakeholder community, 
within the overall context of an uncertain and volatile macro-economic environment. In this 
increasingly complex and uncertain environment, the structure and internal functioning of 
organisations must be consistent with changing demands, with firms operating in volatile 
environments typically characterised by loosely integrated operations and decentralised decision 
making (Rantakari, 2013; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969). By its very nature, a global organisation 
invariably faces a number of external challenges that it has to address proactively or reactively within 
short timeframes and accordingly organisational flexibility becomes a very important strategy for 
survival and remaining competitive (Alexander & Fennell, 1985; Alexander, 1991).  
The challenges (and related questions) that arise from increasing decentralisation impacting the 
governance and risk management of the outsourcing ecosystem can thus be summarised from the above 
literature review and additional empirical evidence as follows: 
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 How can a decentralised organisation implement robust governance structures that addresses 
diverse market and business unit considerations to manage outsourcing ecosystem risk 
pervasively through the entire organisation, down to the lowest unit of decentralisation? 
 How can the clarity in accountability or ownership of activities for outsourcing ecosystem risk 
management be enhanced across the decentralised profit centres, each of which is driven by their 
own profit performance metrics? 
 How can the decentralised organisation develop uniform levels of capability in individuals, to 
whom activity ownership is allocated?  
 How can a common level of awareness on outsourcing ecosystem governance and risk be 
developed across the decentralised units, together with communication and training to have a 
shared understanding? 
 How can consistent processes and technology be integrated across the various business units and 
divisions, with specific deviations only to accommodate local requirements? 
5.3 Addressing the challenges  
The following section summarises survey data and feedback from the follow-up interviews to discuss 
how large global organisations that operate with a higher degree of decentralisation are addressing the 
above challenges related to the strategic governance of their outsourcing ecosystem. Broadly, these 
organisations are adopting a three-pronged approach: 
 Reviewing the role of the corporate centre, specifically its role in strategy and governance, to 
ensure that the need for agility to operate with all the attributes of a decentralised organisation 
discussed earlier in this paper are balanced with the need for consistency to address the threats 
and challenges that organisations have suffered from. 
 Establishing centres of excellence and shared service centres that are directly managed and 
controlled by the corporate centre, yet operated through innovative organisational models such 
as “hub and spoke” or “federated structures” that combine best-of-breed elements from the 
traditional centralised and decentralised structures. 
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 Enhancing co-ordination between various parties (“three lines of defense”) involved in 
governance and risk management across the entire depth and breadth of the decentralised 
organisation. 
5.3.1 Balancing consistency and agility: reviewing the role of the corporate centre 
The survey respondents indicate that one of the foundational actions that large global organisations with 
higher degrees of decentralisation must take to ensure better governance of the third-party ecosystem is 
to fine-tune the mechanisms by which the Group Board or other equivalent apex body administers the 
process of outsourcing ecosystem governance. This includes establishing clarity of accountability on 
governance and risk management matters between central and local teams at the Board level (in cases 
where decentralised units are managed by local or subsidiary Boards) or leadership team level that need 
to permeate down to middle and lower levels of management. In the words of one of the interviewees 
as a follow-up to the survey:  
“Our Group has a decentralised Contracts & Procurement function, in that there are teams in 
various locations globally. There clearly exists an element of confusion over who the relevant 
line managers are and in some cases only a dotted line back to central team, resulting in less 
knowledge sharing, too much independence of the team in one location etc., e.g. they take orders 
from local senior management who do not always comply with group purchasing strategy. Such 
a structure increases the exposure to third-party related incidents, potentially resulting in 
disruption to business, reputation damage and regulatory action. We have now initiated a project 
to have full clarity on who exactly has accountability for doing exactly what at the corporate 
centre and at the business unit level, which includes the subsequent ratification of anything that 
the local team has to do to respond to immediate market opportunities or threats.” 
Being able to address key stakeholder requirements not just in the corporate centre but across the various 
business units is a key requisite for success. As one of the other interviewees responded,   
“Group leadership does not really understand what the functional heads in the operating entities 
want and what their performance metrics require them to achieve. I do not think any of these 
functional heads, including key members of our procurement or IT team have good governance 
or risk management included in their performance criteria; what they have instead are 
parameters to indicate whether they are running their respective teams as efficiently as possible 
and at the lowest cost. If our Group Board took a little more interest in understanding what local 
functional leadership really want to achieve and what their strategy for doing so actually is, I 
think that would go a long way in ensuring better governance. Currently Group involvement in 
local governance and risk management issues is often a bit too little and a bit too late.”  
In the words of another respondent to the survey: 
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“We are sometimes told that what we are doing [in the local operating teams] does not adhere 
to the Group management philosophy, particularly when we have done something that saves a 
lot of costs for the organisation. If our Group management philosophy is going to be our best 
kept secret, why keep managing the procurement team by how much money we can save?” 
The findings above are corroborated by a recent McKinsey report (Hall, Huyett, & Koller, 2012) that 
explains how most corporate centres in global organisations have evolved by simply expanding the 
capacity of central functions required for single country operation to multiple jurisdictions, as they 
emerged as global players. However, they soon realised that this became unwieldy and got in the way 
of getting things done, but more importantly, the agility required to respond to the pace of change in 
the marketplace. To strike a balance between consistency and agility, many global organisations have 
now reviewed or are in the process of reviewing the role of the corporate centre with regard to strategy 
and governance and are reinventing themselves to ensure that the organisation: 
 operates with an integrated management philosophy aligned to a corporate strategy articulated 
by the Board and the C-suite, with related governance mechanisms to address diverse stakeholder 
expectations across multiple business units and ensure that all compliance requirements are met; 
while 
 continually engaging with the group Board on the one hand and the operating units on the other 
to refine its strategy (to retain operational agility and competitive advantage); and  
 managing performance, while upholding the values in the management philosophy.  
To thus summarise, the overall responsibility for establishing a strategy and framework for the 
governance and risk management of the outsourcing ecosystem of a large global decentralised 
organisation and aligning it to stakeholder expectations across the entire business should be vested in 
the corporate centre led by the group Board or central leadership teams (rather than by operating teams 
at the operating unit or divisional level) and feature consistently on the Board agenda (both at the Group 
Board level and at the divisional or subsidiary Board level) with high priority. Designated teams from 
the corporate centre (e.g. centralised risk management and compliance) should continually engage with 
the operating units to refine this strategy and framework, while reviewing processes at the global and 
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operational unit level for continuous improvement and to eliminate any duplication or gaps in co-
ordination. Further good practices in this area are set out in the sub-section below (5.3.2). 
5.3.2 Aligning outsourcing ecosystem governance to the nature and extent of decentralisation  
Global organisations have several choices in how they design themselves to achieve their intended 
balance of consistent centralised control and marketplace agility. In the past, management thinkers have 
incorrectly assumed that “decentralised” institutions are a rather homogeneous class of large global 
organisations that are managed through semiautonomous, self-contained divisions responsible for 
operating decisions; a separate corporate office focusing on strategic decisions; and a corporate staff 
which performs advisory and auditing functions (Schollhammer, 1971).  
However, subsequent research has revealed that three basic choices determine the nature of 
decentralisation, i.e., what kind of geographic or functional (divisional) independence should the 
company have (high, overlaid, or low), how extensively should it divisionalize, and how complex a set 
of coordinative devices (i.e., information systems, review mechanisms, performance evaluation 
systems, and coordinative groups/roles) should it develop (see Perlmutter, 1969; Pugh, Hickson, 
Hinings, & Turner, 1969; Schollhammer, 1971; Lorsch & Allen, 1973). This is summarised in  
Figure-12 below published by Deloitte (2016). One of the authors of this paper designed this 
summarised depiction of the varying organisational forms under the guidance of the other co-authors 
for inclusion in the above publication where he is also one of the authors. 
The data gathered from the survey, together with the related follow-on interviews, indicate that the 
mechanisms of governance and risk management that should be put in place for controlled operational 
agility should recognise and align with these drivers in every decentralised organisation. For instance, 
an organisation with a high extent of decentralisation and a high degree of divisional independence but 
rudimentary coordinative devices may require a higher investment in staff responsible for outsourcing 
ecosystem governance and risk management functions at the divisional level who report up to a central 
team with final accountability to the Group Board, while those organisations with more sophisticated 
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coordinative elements should leverage the organisational investment in these elements to operate 
primarily with a central team with limited representation in the business units (see Figure-12 below). 
At one end of this scale of choices are organisations which operate through a greater degree of command 
and control with direct (solid line) reporting relationships with their operating units, fewer levels 
between the leaders in the corporate centre and operating unit executives and formal task descriptions 
with authority specifications.  
At the other end of this scale, are those organisations that operate with decentralisation following the 
“spirit” rather than the “letter of the law” with greater operational flexibility, taller organisation 
structures between the corporate centre and operating units and a combination of direct (solid line), 
indirect (grey line) and coordinating (dotted line) relationships with varying levels of clarity.  
Federated structures, which have become increasingly popular over the last decade in larger 
organisations, represent a hybrid form that combines characteristics of centralised and decentralised 
organisations and operates somewhere in the middle of this scale (see Williams & Karahanna, 2013). 
Such structures can combine the benefits of centralised planning, standardisation and economies of 
scale with local leadership and flexibility. This, in turn, enables the organisation to remain agile and 
competitive in the marketplace.  
Further, even within the same organisation, different functions could be designed to operate with 
varying degrees of decentralisation. For instance, an organisation could choose to centralize the 
decision-making around its IT infrastructure services to maximise the benefits of standardisation and 
economies of scale, while IT solutions delivery, including relationship management and application 
development, could mirror the reporting structure of its decentralised businesses. The same organisation 
could choose to adopt a different approach for its HR or procurement services. 
The hub and spoke model is another example of a hybridised approach to a fundamentally more 
centralised structure that was pioneered by the transportation industry, but the lessons learnt have been 
applied by most other industries. Although this model could have a number of variants, the fundamental 
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principle is that the corporate centre redistributes its powers to operate through regional “hubs” that 
steer the relevant organisational units within its purview (Minculete & Olar, 2014).  
Figure-12: Varying Degrees of Decentralisation 
 
(Source: Deloitte, 2016) 
Centres of Excellence for Outsourcing Ecosystem Governance: The results of the survey indicate that 
progressive global organisations are increasingly looking to create Centres of Excellence (CoEs) that 
are based on the above “hub and spoke model”, nurture specialised skills and expertise for being 
leveraged by all their operating units, while encouraging collaboration to facilitate innovation and 
continuous improvement. 
The survey further revealed that CoEs to address outsourcing ecosystem governance and risk 
management activities that require specialised skill-sets for the benefit of the entire organisation could 
cover activities including: 
 on-going risk assessments  
 third-party monitoring activities and co-ordination  
 tracking remediation activities and on-going monitoring requirements  
 filing of contracts and amendments  
 archiving evidence related to third-party management  
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 implementation of third-party contract termination plans. 
Additionally, the concept of establishing shared services is being explored by several survey 
respondents for some of the more routine control activities including validation of transaction-level 
activities with third parties.  
5.3.3 Enhancing co-ordination between the “three lines of defense” in the organisation 
As outsourcing ecosystem governance evolves as an overarching strategic issue which aligned to 
business strategy and operations and drills down to the decentralised business units, it is natural that 
people at various levels, functional areas and stakeholders will have a role to play. 
The concept of the Three Lines of Defence (Seago, 2015) distinguishes between three groups of such 
players as indicated in Figure-13. 
 First line of defence: represents functions that own, manage and take corrective action for risks 
in their respective functional areas. They typically report to operating management, who in turn 
report up to executive leadership and are supervised by the Board.  
 Second line of defence: represents functions that oversee and guide common risk management 
processes as a common organisational function, such as risk management or compliance or even 
the office of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and financial controllers. Once again, they report 
to the executive leadership and the Board.  
 Third line of defence: provides independent assurance on risk management, typically 
represented by Internal Audit functions and teams, reporting typically to an independent Audit 
Committee.  
In a decentralised organisation, each of these players brings a unique set of perspectives and skill-sets 
to risk management and governance which can be an invaluable asset to every business, provided they 
are orchestrated to ensure that: 
 there is complete clarity on who does what in the area of risk management 
 there are neither overlaps nor underlaps in who does what, in the context of the bigger picture 
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 limited risk management resources are deployed effectively across the organisation to address 
the most significant areas of concern and opportunity across the business. 
Figure-13: The Three Lines of Defense 
 
Data gathered from the survey and subsequent follow-up interviews indicate that it is likely that in most 
global organisations it is only the first line of defence (related to the operating management in the more 
decentralised units) that would have their reporting lines distributed across separate lines to the 
leadership of these decentralised units.  
The second and third lines of defence would typically continue to operate with a high degree of 
centralisation, reporting to the strategy and governance-related functions at the corporate centre.  
The challenge from an outsourcing ecosystem governance perspective is therefore two-fold: 
 establishing a consistent rigour, supported by common standards and working practices related 
to risk and control assessments and any remediation activity across members of the first lines of 
defence who report to a diverse set of leaders in the decentralised operating units; and 
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 ensuring that the benefits of centralised functions related to the second and third lines of defence 
extend to the entire group organisation, covering all the decentralised units, rather than being the 
organisation’s “best kept secret”.  
Coordination and knowledge/information-sharing across the Lines of Defence, enabled through 
common technology and a “risk data warehouse”, appears to be a key element required to address these 
challenges: 
 Establishing consistent standards and working practices: Common organisational functions 
representing the second line of defence, such as centralised risk and compliance teams, in 
coordination with the central procurement, supply chain management, sales and marketing 
management etc., should collaborate with leaders of the decentralised operating units to establish 
the quality standards and working practices to be followed by the first line in carrying out their 
responsibilities and continually refine the governance and risk management framework based on 
this iterative experience.  
 Focused responsibility in risk management and controls in the first line: Persons charged with 
risk and control-related functions in the first line of defence should be given focused 
responsibility in this area, clearly identified and distinguished from transaction processing 
responsibilities, particularly in high risk areas. This, in turn, should be supported by relevant 
training, incorporating the quality standards and the working practices mentioned above, together 
with hand-holding them in discharging their functions. Members of the second line of defence 
should play a key role in supporting the first line, including the development of training materials, 
templates and tools and establishing a group-wide outsourcing governance system.  
 Embedding second line representatives in the first line: Specific representatives from the second 
line of defence should consider co-locating or embedding themselves in various first line 
functions to provide on-going guidance and to identify opportunities for continuous 
improvement, while continuing to enhance their own specialist expertise.  This would enable 
them to implement critical tasks that have group-wide implications consistently across the 
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decentralised units, for instance, risk-segmenting third parties, establishing third-party 
governance related policies and monitoring compliance. 
 Better audit planning for the third line: With increasing decentralisation and geographic 
diversification, it is increasingly being observed that the third line of defence continually feels 
under-resourced in their ability to carry out on-site reviews of risk and controls across all 
locations of the diverse decentralised organisation. They should therefore increasingly leverage 
the power of analysing data obtained upfront from the decentralised units to be able to assess 
risks more meaningfully and focus their resources on the more critical areas. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
Section Summary: This section sets out a holistic summary across all the research areas/questions on 
an integrated basis and presents a thorough reflection on the outcomes of the study. The findings are 
discussed in the context of both: 
 theoretical framework: e.g., how do these findings contribute to the existing body of 
knowledge e.g. extending DC theory or how do they contrast/confirm/extend what was 
expected from theory and prior research/literature review?  
 managerial context: e.g., how do these findings alter organisational leadership’s perceptions 
and actions with regard to developing dynamic risk management capabilities for innovative 
outsourcing; understanding what the peer group is doing with regard to addressing execution 
gaps in strategic governance and risk management of outsourcing etc. In other words, how do 
the findings contribute to current professional practice? 
 
The motivation for this research arose from the engagement of the researcher with senior executives 
from FTSE 500 organisations in the UK during 2013-14 who had expressed their concerns around the 
growth and complexity of their outsourcing ecosystem, given that many of these organisations were 
managing anything between 20,000 – 50,000 outsourcing contracts at that time, ranging from 
providers of IT and business process outsourcing services that included operating their core and 
support functions, sales and distribution functions etc. to their core supply chain (for manufacturing 
and trading companies). Many of these FTSE 500 organisations had also established their own 
subsidiary companies in lower-lost locations such as India and the Philippines to offshore their IT and 
business processes, which were also considered to be an extension of “outsourcing” in the eyes of the 
industry regulator, given that these subsidiaries were managed by their own local management teams. 
These executives felt that experience was lacking in managing IT and BPO vendors with an 
ecosystem perspective, particularly when compared to traditional supply-chain management, where 
organisational expertise had been developed over the past several years. Having said that, these 
executives wanted to eventually extend their third-party governance and risk management framework 
to cover all third parties, including their supply chain, subsidiary companies and even joint venture 
partners and affiliate organisations to common standards as required by industry regulators. To 
establish a business case for investment in third-party governance and risk management, these 
organisations were keen to demonstrate a realisation of benefits from their investment by exploiting 
the upside of such risk management in addition to “preventing bad things happening”. At the same 
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time, they had realised that this would not be possible unless significant transformational changes 
were implemented within their organisations and relevant capability had been developed.  
Given the increasing proportion of work in a global organisation that was being handled by third 
parties with high to critical level of dependency on them (even up to 85-90% in some instances where, 
according to participants of the above roundtable, these organisations had chosen outsourcing as a 
core strategic choice to remain agile and responsive to market needs in a cost-effective way), it was 
evident to the researcher that this would hold significant implications for the way in which 
organisational leadership, procurement and vendor management teams, finance teams, risk 
management and internal audit groups and even industry regulators contributed to governing and risk-
managing these third-party relationships.  
 A review of prior research in strategic governance and risk management of the outsourcing (third-
party) ecosystem, also known as the “extended enterprise”, revealed that such research is only just 
about starting to emerge in academic literature from an ecosystem perspective, mostly as an offshoot 
of studies related to supply-chain management. However, most of the larger global consulting and 
business advisory firms had already published their thought-ware on this emerging subject and it 
appeared that academia was lagging behind. Recent developments in overall governance and risk 
management literature, particularly around the changing perception of risk and governance and 
development of the related capabilities to increase governance and risk management maturity 
specifically related to the context of the emerging concept of the third-party or outsourcing ecosystem 
seem however to be relevant in providing a contemporary context to strategic governance of the 
outsourcing ecosystem. 
The literature review that followed sought to explore how risks, traditionally seen as “bad things 
happening” was increasingly being seen as a source of strategic opportunities for business, as a result 
of which the focus of governance and risk management was also shifting to “creating inimitable 
sources of value and competitive advantage” in addition to proactively preserving value and 
safeguarding business organisations from newer threats such as strategic risks (which impair 
achievement of strategic objectives), reputational damage and regulatory breach – once again a 
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significant shift in focus from the traditional myopic emphasis on managing financial risks reactively. 
The overall state of this literature was then related in detail (Appendix-A) to the research questions to 
derive the areas for empirical investigation. 
The problematisation approach encouraged the researcher to extract the research questions from gap-
analysis in the existing literature (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997; Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011). There 
is no prevalent academic literature surrounding strategic governance related to the outsourcing 
ecosystem, so this opens up an opportunity to contribute something novel to these related research 
fields in light of the emergent issues identified in the literature review.  
Such problematisation of reality (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997; Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) 
promoted flexibility of research in examining the related phenomena. This, in turn, positioned the 
researcher to discover problems or findings that may not have been initially considered. The 
epistemological stance adopted therefore promoted a combination of an inductive and deductive 
approach to answering research questions which this research pursues through a mixed methods 
approach in order to provide a full and rigorous exploration of the issues defined in the literature 
review, with the required depth (e.g. semi-structured interviews) and breadth (e.g. large-scale survey 
to inform and support the semi-structured interviews and the resulting in-depth findings and analysis). 
The nature of this work was explorative across multiple disciplines including strategy, operations, 
finance and risk management, legal and compliance etc. as indicated at the outset of this thesis. The 
researcher aimed to learn about these experiences as opposed to empirically testing them. The 
researcher was also motivated by a desire to reflect the complexity of the constructs outlined in the 
literature review and how these phenomena interacted with each other to form the reality of strategic 
governance together with understanding of the related processes and good practices it entailed. It was 
therefore clear that there were a number of influences on this work (presented in the literature review) 
which reflected ‘messy’ (Parkhe, 1993), complex and real life research. This enabled objective 
measures identified through the large-scale survey to be used in this research. However, these were 
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used to further the intention of exploration and to validate the fundamental goalposts envisaged in the 
interpretive analysis rather than testing or comparing populations.  
This set the stage for exploring the emerging change in mind-set and business practices around risk 
management and governance in large global organisations that were outsourcing IT and business 
processes to a progressively larger number of vendors (including some positioned as strategic 
business partners) forming their “outsourcing ecosystem” or “extended enterprise”. The vast majority 
of these organisations considered this change to be highly strategic in nature, i.e. where specific 
responsibilities and behaviours led to the successful implementation of the organisational strategy.  
The study was split into two parts. The first part of the study attempted to gain an understanding of 
how and why such large global organisations were broadening their perspective and maturity over 
governance and risk-management around their outsourcing ecosystem, and the organisational 
capabilities that needed to be developed to emerge as the astute decision-makers in this regard, using 
primary research-based industry case studies: 
RQ1: Why and how are large global organisations (that operate with a significant level of 
dependence on their outsourcing ecosystem) broadening their perspective and maturity of risk-
management and repositioning their governance and risk-management processes around their 
outsourcing ecosystem (comprising multiple vendors and providers) to more strategic levels (for 
competitive advantage and value-creation)? 
RQ2: How can a classical management theory like DC theory that started to evolve in the 1980s and 
1990s be extended to aid in understanding the development of the related capabilities for such 
repositioning of governance and risk management around outsourcing? 
These two questions were intended to define, clarify and explain the context of the overall research, 
drawing together pertinent themes from the literature relevant to risk management and governance 
around outsourcing. Findings related to these two RQs are based on the analysis of qualitative and 
quantitative primary data captured through a survey and followed-up through semi-structured 
interviews, concluding with the industry-specific case studies demonstrating this transformation. This, 
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in turn, is supported by a 2 x 2 framework to analyse current organisational positioning and a 
projected trajectory to move forward with the aspiration to emerge as the astute decision-makers. The 
second question, in particular, highlights the opportunity to extend an established theory such as DC 
to explore the complexities of third-party relationships, given the constant change at all levels of the 
internal and external environment of the organisation described in Section 2 of this thesis. 
The second part of the study focused primarily on the implementation experience of this strategic 
transformation initiative in large global organisations. It once again used primary data based on the 
survey and follow-up interviews, but this time to capture the overall progress made in achieving this 
transformation, together with the related implementation challenges, and evolving good-practice to 
address these challenges to be able to exploit the full spectrum of opportunity that the outsourcing 
ecosystem presents: 
RQ3: How are organisations making progress in repositioning their governance and risk 
management of their outsourcing ecosystem to more strategic levels, particularly the key challenge(s) 
experienced by organisations so far?  
RQ4: How are these organisations overcoming the implementation challenges? 
The findings in response to RQ3 indicated a widening “execution gap” caused by leadership intent 
failing to achieve intended consequences. This gap related to people, processes and technologies 
underpinning the transition to strategic governance. Aligned to these findings, addressing RQ4 
enabled the showcasing of how organisations were overcoming the implementation challenges, 
particularly the execution gap between strategy and execution identified above, together with 
capturing and summarizing the related good practices evolving. 
The how and why of adopting a strategic governance and risk management approach to 
outsourcing ecosystems 
Review of existing literature depicted the evolving multi-disciplinary perspective on strategic 
governance in the context of the outsourcing ecosystem across four key themes. First, it demonstrated 
the changing perceptions of risk over time towards recognizing the strategic nature of risk as an enabler 
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for value-creation, not just “bad things happening” (Funston & Wagner, 2010; Slywotzky & Drzik, 
2005), and dealing with uncertainty (Samson, Reneke, & Wiecek, 2009; Carbonara & Caiazza, 2010; 
Marczyk, 2009; Elahi, 2013). This also included the recognition of the more strategic types of risk, in 
addition to traditional financial or compliance-related risks (McConnell, 2013; Weitzner & Peridis, 
2011). Second, prior research reconfirmed that a strategic repositioning of governance was taking 
place, which was being driven by a closer alignment to (strategic and other) risks and integrated as a 
top-down Board-driven activity. Third, emerging enablers for strategic governance involve 
recognizing the increasing role of the Board in governance (McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas, 2013) and 
regulation as strategic enablers in this evolution. Lastly, strategic governance and risk management 
mechanisms were increasingly being applied from an outsourcing ecosystem perspective, rather than in 
the context of individual outsourcing contracts. Pursuit of organisational value and sustainable 
competitive advantage through a longer-term strategic focus on areas such as innovation, growth and 
scarce skills is continually driving organisations to evolve outsourcing strategies across their multiple 
third-party relationships. These strategies went far beyond merely fulfilling short-term objectives, such 
as immediate cost-savings, which cannot offer sustained competitive advantage or value, given their 
imitability (Porter, 1985; Porter, 1990). As a result, organisations were increasingly finding themselves 
as operating within an ecosystem of third parties as a fundamental means to transform them in the way 
they organize themselves to compete globally (Lewin & Peeters, 2006). 
The literature review and empirical experience from the survey, enabled the summarisation of four 
key operational implications of organisations that demonstrate a higher breadth of risk perception: 
 A stronger focus on aligning strategic decision-making around outsourcing to related risks by 
considering opportunities for value-creation that accompany these risks, while taking steps to 
mitigate the negative impact. This is in contrast to organisations with a lower breadth of risk 
perception that primarily focus on just avoiding “bad things happening” such as breach of data 
privacy or business interruption caused by the provider of outsourcing services. 
 To be able to do so, these organisations established a holistic view of risks and compared that with 
the overall risk-taking capacity of the business to articulate clearly the leadership appetite for 
taking risks by outsourcing processes that created higher value for the organisation through 
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specialised technical knowledge or “best of breed” processes. This, in turn, also enabled them to 
ensure that the returns were commensurate with the risks taken.  
 Having established this position, these organisations then established actionable data points to 
monitor performance, using analytical and predictive tools and technology. 
 All these strategic activities were possible only with a top-level independent risk management 
function that works with the Board through all the stages of the outsourcing process, rather than 
an extension of existing compliance functions.  
The research however indicated that progress in implementing this concept of leveraging risk for 
strategic benefit has generally been slow as risk management leaders have struggled to overcome the 
complexities of embedding the mechanisms mentioned above in their business, except where triggered 
by drivers such as regulatory action (e.g., in the FS industry) or extremely high levels of uncertainty 
and disruptive change (e.g., in HLS businesses). This, in turn, has established a continuum along which 
different businesses can be positioned from a narrower to a broader perception of risk. 
Similarly, the literature review and empirical evidence from the survey indicated that organisations with 
a higher level of maturity were better able to align organisational behaviours, structures, processes and 
infrastructures to the changing spectrum of business risk to reliably and sustainably achieve a higher 
standard of risk management. Specifically, the following key attributes of organisations were identified 
that have been able to acquire a higher level of maturity or proficiency in enhancing their governance 
and risk management mechanisms over outsourcing: 
 Governance and risk management was a Board-led initiative, which was enabled by 
institutionalised policies, processes and supporting infrastructure (including tools and 
technologies) throughout the organisation. 
 Roles/responsibilities for outsourcing risk management were defined throughout the entire 
depth and breadth of the organisation, with a clear focus on risk training and competency 
development, supported by knowledge sharing on risks across various outsourcing projects. 
These attributes enabled the organisation to establish a consistently disciplined process of decision-
making and communication regarding outsourcing risks. Based on the breadth of risk perception and 
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maturity of governance processes, the researcher mapped the research organisations by industry 
segment to a two-by-two grid. This grid or framework can be used by organisations to understand their 
current positioning, as a first step towards developing plans for reinventing themselves as Astute 
Entrepreneurs who are able to maximize the opportunities while managing the risks with various 
outsourcing-related management initiatives.  
Astute Entrepreneurs: The “best in class” organisations are clearly those that have a broad perception 
of risk, considering risk as an enabler of value rather than just “bad things happening”. These 
organisations are mature in terms of implementation of top-down outsourcing governance, led by the 
Board. Such organisations are the best positioned to maximize the opportunities arising from 
outsourcing and innovate in outsourcing (Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Gerbasi, 2015). They are likely to 
outsource higher value processes (e.g., combining new technology such as the cloud or social media, 
leveraging industry with functional knowledge to reinvent processes), while managing a greater level 
of risks in a dynamic, agile and innovate way in their pursuit of business value. Based on the survey 
results, it appears that at present the representative organisations in the FS industry fall into this 
category.  
Diametrically opposite to them are the organisations that continue to have a narrower perception of risk 
and have also not implemented, or matured in their implementation of governance mechanisms and 
practices. Such organisations are likely to face the greatest potential challenges to erosion of 
organisational value and are lucky to be surviving into the future. Accordingly, they can be classed as 
the Lucky Survivors. For such organisations, it is likely that any outsourcing initiatives are focused on 
lower value generating and less risky activities (e.g., basic transaction processing or accounting) and 
they may still face several threats and hazards in these limited pursuits of organisational value. Based 
on the survey results, it appears that at present the representative organisations in the BAPS industry 
fall into this category. Public Sector organisations were in this category in the past, and over the years 
they have evolved towards more mature governance processes.  
Organisations that have a broader perception of risk are likely to aspire to greater organisational value 
without the requisite evolution in governance mechanisms to give them the required control and are 
likely to be unable to manage the various threats they face as they embark on outsourcing. They can be 
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called the Great Gamblers. The broader perception of risks in such organisations leads to greater risk-
taking, typically by outsourcing critical and high value processes (e.g., supporting key managerial 
decisions such as advanced analytics or customer-facing processes) but without appropriate risk 
mitigation cover. Based on the survey results, it appears that at present the representative organisations 
in the HLS industry fall into this category. Financial Service organisations were in this category in the 
past but improved their governance processes and evolved into Astute Entrepreneurs.  
Finally, Perpetual Losers are organisations that have limited perceptions of risk despite maturing in 
governance mechanisms, and practices are perpetually facing significant opportunity loss, leading 
eventually to threats of value erosion and survival challenges. In such organisations inability to perceive 
risks as a source of organisational value typically leads to significant opportunity loss in outsourcing 
by focusing on less critical or lower value processes (e.g., fundamental accounting processes) despite 
significant investment in risk mitigation. Based on the survey results, it appears that at present the 
representative organisations in the PS industry segment fall into this category.  
A consistent path to excellence is evident as organisations in the four industry sectors aspire to evolve 
over time as Astute Entrepreneurs, who are the best positioned to leverage strategic governance around 
their outsourcing activities and beyond. The figure illustrates how each of the four industry sectors 
evolved over time, from post-financial crisis to their current positioning, and their future aspirations. 
Specifically, the framework motivates organisations to answer two key questions. First, “Where are you 
today?” to assess where they are currently positioned in terms of maturity of strategic governance over 
outsourcing vis-à-vis their breadth of risk perception which drives their appetite to take higher 
risks. Second, “Which way should you be going next?” to determine a possible trajectory going forward 
to be able not just to manage risks but also fully exploit the opportunities that outsourcing can create. 
As illustrated by the exemplar case studies of four industries, there are different paths that organisations 
can pursue (e.g., horizontal, vertical or diagonal) in their attempt to develop into Astute Entrepreneurs, 
depending on their current positioning. For example, Perpetual Losers need to invest in broadening their 
risk perception, while Great Gamblers need to ensure that strategic governance is driven by the Board 
and seen as an institutional rather than project-level activity. Lucky Survivors, on the other hand, need 
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to develop both aspects, and this is more likely to be successful if made gradually – from engaging the 
Board, towards broadening risk perception.  
Alignment to the dynamic capabilities theory 
Review of literature related to the DC theory revealed how this theory emphasizes the flexibility and 
adaptability of organisations and their efforts to act strategically, embrace newer opportunities, and 
even shape the business environment (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Teece, 2014). In Section 4 of this 
thesis, key principles from the DC theory were discussed and related to developing the two specific 
capabilities around risk management to transition to more strategic forms of governance and risk 
management of the outsourcing ecosystem and subsequently define the two axes of the 2x2 
framework: (a) a broader perception of risk in outsourcing that continually recognizes the 
opportunities that these risks present in addition to the threats and hazards; and (b) mature risk-
management mechanisms that enable organisations to mitigate the risks while maximizing the 
business opportunity from outsourcing.  
The research revealed how both these new capabilities required the organisation to act strategically 
and with flexibility and adaptability in order to innovatively embrace the new opportunities by 
graduating from an ordinary capabilities mind-set to a DC mind-set. Similar to the difference between 
traditional forms of governance and risk management of outsourcing contracts to the more recent 
strategic approach to the governance and risk management of the outsourcing ecosystem, ordinary 
capabilities are about being efficient while dynamic capabilities are about learning and improving and 
about being innovative. The research revealed how strong DCs were therefore vital for firms facing 
dynamic competition and, possibly, significant disruption from competitive behaviour (Sidak & 
Teece, 2009). The other area of alignment of the proposed strategic governance and risk management 
framework to DC theory was observed to be the dual focus on recognizing threats along with the 
opportunities presented by its dynamic and competitive business environment (Teece, 2016). Thirdly, 
prior researchers in DC, such as Teece (2016), have defined innovation in general terms as creative 
ideas related to the generation and delivery of products or services that are new to the world or just 
new in a given context. These creative ideas can either: 
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 extend existing activities in some way (improved risk management processes, proactively 
“sensing” risks in the business environment, using emerging technologies to process real time 
data such as cloud, predictive analytics, visualisation of risks etc.) i.e. “routinised innovation”; 
and  
 be completely new and create a new market and revenue streams, satisfy a previously 
unrecognised customer need or develop and commercialize a new approach to technology, i.e. 
“independent innovation”) (Baumol, 2002).  
 
The research reconfirms that how well a firm fosters both types of innovation (in this thesis, through 
outsourcing) to simultaneously seek competitive advance, based on the strength of its dynamic 
capabilities (Beske, Land, & Seuring, 2014; Chen, Paulraj & Lado, 2004; Teece & Pisano, 1994; 
Teece, 2007). The earlier examples of innovative outsourcing, as well as the multi-industry 
perspectives in section 7, demonstrated this concurrence in practice. Finally, both the literature review 
and empirical research reflected similar views on ownership and accountability for implementing DCs 
in an organisation compared to establishing risk-management mechanisms for outsourcing, which 
once again establishes a common foundation in relating the two. Although led by Boards and 
organisational leadership, the ownership and accountability for developing and leveraging dynamic 
capabilities in an organisation resides, in part, with individual managers and the top management team 
(Adner & Helfat, 2003). The ability of board members and the top management team to have 
continued macro- and micro-level insight is important to reallocating resources to lead the firm 
forward. Teece (2016) is of the view that this is likely to be the most visible feature of the firm’s DCs. 
To summarise, the table in section 6.2 aligned DC criteria proposed by Teece (2016) to the two axes 
of the framework and proposed extending the DC literature to develop specific risk-management 
capabilities forming the core focus of this thesis.  
Going forward in an environment of environmental uncertainty and volatility, unconventional 
thinking capabilities of large global organisations that operate with a large ecosystem of third parties 
will continue to be of paramount importance. This is because the gains from running efficiently with 
rigid operating procedures can easily be negated if an unexpected scenario suddenly emerges. Strong 
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dynamic capabilities have an entrepreneurial and an “asset orchestration” dimension. They enable 
companies to do a better job of responding to (and shaping) unknown futures (e.g. the impact of new 
regulation such as GDPR in Europe or disruptive impact of new technologies including advanced 
cyber-threats in the more connected organisations) impacting interactions with their third-party 
ecosystem. For instance, if a firm has a good early warning system (i.e., can “sense” developments in 
the business environment quickly), it can have more time to respond to positive and negative shocks. 
Sensing capabilities more generally exercise the cognitive skills associated with sensing and sense-
making that can benefit any organisation. Similarly, an organisation with strong seizing and 
transformation capabilities will be more resilient when shocks require rapid alignment or expansion. 
A culture of continuous renewal keeps organisations supple and responsive. The alternative is 
pursuing efficiency in the face of surprising and consequential events when it is a distraction from 
what the organisation should be doing (Teece, Peteraf, & Leih, 2016). 
Implementation issues in transitioning to the new strategic governance and risk management 
framework 
 
This part of the thesis showcased how future growth in outsourcing of IT and business processes will 
increasingly be driven through a longer-term strategic focus on value drivers such as innovation, 
growth and scarce skills for sustainable competitive advantage. In exploiting the opportunity this 
creates across multiple outsourcing engagements, organisations are increasingly finding themselves 
operating within an outsourcing ecosystem, comprised of multiple third parties, as a fundamental 
means to transform themselves in the way in which they organize themselves to compete globally. 
This transformation supports the call for strategically repositioning governance and risk management 
over the outsourcing ecosystem holistically at the Board and C-suite level to manage the new sets of 
risks that accompany the opportunities. In this context, current and emerging risk management and 
governance practices related to the outsourcing ecosystem were investigated through a survey 
conducted in collaboration with one of the global top tier consulting firms.  
The survey reconfirmed the emergence of outsourcing value-drivers such as organisational agility, 
flexibility, scalability, innovation and process-improvement through the implementation of best 
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practices, reflecting organisational recognition of the strategic opportunity that the outsourcing 
ecosystem can create for them. Survey results demonstrate how this pursuit of value increases the 
criticality of the processes being outsourced across the outsourcing ecosystem, together with the 
growing dependence on the related providers, thus enhancing the severity of consequences on 
disruption or failure including reputational damage, erosion in shareholder wealth through a fall in 
share prices and regulatory enforcement including substantial penalties. The reality of this threat is 
established by a substantial majority of survey respondents facing a disruptive incident in the last 2-3 
years with around a quarter of them facing major disruption. These changes are taking place at a time 
when risk management is increasingly being perceived to have a dual focus of value preservation 
(preventing “bad things happening”) as well as value-creation (exploiting the opportunities that risks 
accompany). 
However, against this backdrop, less than one in ten respondents had integrated or optimised their risk 
management systems related to the outsourcing ecosystem a year ago or earlier. However, these 
organisations were now being compelled to rapidly “catch-up” in taking a holistic and proactive 
approach to outsourcing risk, with more than seven in ten respondents expecting to be able to 
integrate and optimize their risk management system in the near future (a year or more ahead), with 
some aspiring to be “best-in-class”. The survey reveals that the key challenge that organisations are 
facing in this journey is a disparity between strategic intent and ability, or in other words, an emerging 
“execution gap”. This gap is the result of organisational commitment to risk management and 
governance over the outsourcing ecosystem not being supported by the ability of the related 
operational enablers including technology and processes to achieve intended results. The gap is 
potentially widened through increasing degrees of organisational decentralisation with over three-
quarters of respondent organisations having a partial through to a high degree of decentralisation, 
presenting a potential challenge to a holistic and unified approach to outsourcing/third-party risk 
management that more centralised structures would have enabled, particularly when organisations are 
seeking to bring in consistency in the manner in which they establish uniform processes and 
technology for collectively managing their outsourcing relationships.  
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The concept of the strategy execution gap is not new to Strategic Management and has been 
researched in the past. The results of the survey reconfirms that organisational experience is very 
similar in the context of strategic governance of the outsourcing ecosystem in that the real strategic 
challenge is not the absence of a strategic vision or stakeholder buy-in but in the implementation of 
the strategy (Lepsinger, 2006; Minter, 2011). More recently, following the completion of the 
fieldwork for this thesis, Leinwand & Mainardi, (2016) found that found that high-performance 
organisations that were able to manage their execution gap spent nearly 20% more time (compared to 
low-performing teams) defining strategy (i.e., translating a high-level vision into clear actionable 
goals). These organisations also spent 12% more time aligning the organisation around that strategy 
through frequent internal communications and driving a consistent message downward into the 
organisation. Having done that, high-performing teams spend over 25% more time focusing the 
enterprise than their lower-performing peers. That time is spent establishing financial and operational 
metrics, aligning goals with overarching strategy, allocating resources, and reviewing key metrics. 
These high-performing teams also spend 14% more time checking their progress against strategic 
goals by reviewing key metrics and shifting resources accordingly. Senior leadership of these more 
successful senior teams create a permeable membrane between the organisation’s mission and its day-
to-day activities. They are also agile in course-correcting when the needs of the business change, and 
are more easily prepared to shift organisational resources to ensure that the strategy is executed (Wiita 
& Leonard, 2017). Apart from the factors identified in section 6.3.1 as contributing to the execution 
gap, many of the research informants indicated that due to changes in the business and macro-
economic environment (including regulatory pressure), each organisation will need to establish what 
it considers to be its desired optimum state for governance and risk management of its third-party 
ecosystem, making it a moving target, with many organisations continuing to “catch-up” with the 
emerging set of strategic opportunities and related risks that third-parties continue to present. This 
includes, for instance, a broader set of support services delivered innovatively in a rapidly-changing 
external environment; a growing number of alliance and joint venture partners and an increasing 
proportion of third-parties in newer areas beyond the traditional focus on the direct supply chain 
(suppliers and vendors); and the increasing use of new technology (such as the cloud and cloud-based 
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applications) that facilitate collaboration and enable businesses to enhance their virtual boundaries 
will further accelerate this trend. It should also be noted that as good practice continues to evolve, the 
related goalposts are shifting too; hence in reality those that stand still are actually sliding backwards 
on the maturity curve. 
The first step in achieving these actions is to escalate the accountability for outsourcing ecosystem 
governance to Board and C-suite levels. This would prioritize and enable the execution gap to be 
addressed with greater authority and commitment of resources for establishing the relevant 
management systems including processes, tools and technologies and monitoring mechanisms. It is 
encouraging to see this starting to happen with the Board or CEO responsible for outsourcing 
ecosystem governance in nearly half of the respondent organisations.  Responsibility vested at 
organisational levels that are higher than individual functional levels also facilitates functional 
stakeholder buy-in and ensures consistency and mutually-supportive actions, one of the potential 
challenges created through increasing decentralisation of business units and underlying causes of the 
execution gap.  
With a view to clarifying the strategic expectations in greater level of detail to the third-party 
providers in the ecosystem, the vast majority of respondent organisations were mandating common 
risk management standards to be followed by all their providers to ensure a consistent approach across 
business units. These respondents believed that this would go a long way in establishing a baseline for 
the enabling management systems, consistently across organisational levels and functions. With 
organisational confidence being low in the supporting technology and processes around governance of 
the outsourcing ecosystem, consistent risk management standards would also enable multiple methods 
of obtaining assurance to co-exist and followed by organisational risk management teams, based on a 
judicious mix of efficiency and effectiveness, aligned to organisational circumstances and budgets. 
The survey reveals that most of the assurance activity is based on internal controls reviews rather than 
analysis of the underlying data related to the activities of third-party providers in the outsourcing 
ecosystem. One of the reasons for this is clearly the lower confidence in organisational technology 
that would produce this data. In line with the research recommendations of Murray & Mohamed 
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(2015) with regard to the strategy-execution gap in general, governance of the outsourcing ecosystem 
must also increasingly involve the use of predictive rather than lagging indicators in the assurance 
process, given the growing ability of contemporary businesses to manipulate organisational data more 
effectively and meaningfully than in the past.   
Whilst the survey establishes a clear need to increase monitoring and assurance activities over third 
parties in the outsourcing ecosystem, pre-contract activities such as clarity of business case, due 
diligence and disciplined contracting would also go a long way in addressing the execution gap with 
regard to the outsourcing ecosystem. To ensure appropriate focus and rigor related to outsourcing risk 
management and governance, almost six in ten respondents are establishing in-house centres of 
excellence while around three in ten respondents are still undecided on their future course of action in 
this regard. The concept of the centre of excellence reinforces organisational commitment to this 
important issue and enables consistent support at the execution level. 
Addressing the Execution Gap in Governance and Risk Management of the Outsourcing 
Ecosystem 
As indicated above, the survey results revealed that the key challenge that organisations were facing 
in their transformational journey to strategic governance of the outsourcing ecosystem was a disparity 
between strategic intent and ability, or in other words, an emerging “execution gap”. This gap was the 
result of organisational commitment to risk management and governance over the outsourcing 
ecosystem not being supported by the ability of the related operational enablers including technology 
and processes to achieve intended results. Strategy researchers such as Lepsinger, 2006: p. 56 
advocate that organisations should close this gap before the same broadens and becomes a “chasm” by 
addressing three key factors, which he refers to as the “Tripping Point Trio”: 
 Clarifying the strategy in greater level of detail by articulating what would be operationally 
required to implement that strategy and the priorities for action. 
 Ensuring that the appropriate management systems are in place that would enable and 
support the achievement of the strategy. 
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 Confirming, through periodic senior management review and monitoring that the actions 
required for achieving the strategy mutually support each other across various organisational 
levels and functions rather than conflict each other. 
The empirical research revealed that increasing decentralisation in large global organisations was the 
biggest cause of this widening execution gap, typically characterised by what prior research had 
referred to as “loosely integrated operations and decentralised decision making” (Rantakari, 2013; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969). To address these challenges, broadly these organisations were adopting a 
three-pronged approach: 
 Reviewing the role of the corporate centre, specifically its role in strategy and governance, to 
ensure that the need for agility to operate with all the attributes of a decentralised organisation 
discussed earlier in this thesis are balanced with the need for consistency to address the threats 
and challenges that organisations have suffered from. This is quite critical as the corporate centre 
cannot easily retract from the organisational journey to increasingly operate in a decentralised 
manner, having seen the benefits of organisational agility that it brings. The results of this 
research reveals that many corporate centre teams are therefore now trying to centralize specific 
elements of outsourcing governance to achieve this. For instance, elements of central oversight 
and management (through involvement in local management committee meetings in the 
decentralised business units) could help accelerate risk awareness and efficiency consistently 
throughout the global organisation. Accordingly, centralised elements in roles/structures and 
enabling technologies/processes are becoming more common-place.  
 Establishing centres of excellence (CoEs) and shared service centres that are directly managed 
and controlled by the corporate centre, yet operated through innovative organisational models 
such as “hub and spoke” or “federated structures” that combine best-of-breed elements from the 
traditional centralised and decentralised structures. The current research reconfirmed that these 
organisations that are moving to internal CoEs and shared service centres are primarily driven by 
the need to regain organisational control and consistency over this critical activity. The researcher 
is of the view that this theme of balancing consistency with agility will continue to evolve in 
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future years with managed services solutions being offered by external vendors to help 
organisations address this “consistency with agility” agenda. Such a “managed services” option 
can enable an organisation to achieve the desired level of customisation it requires, while keeping 
the cost lower than that of an internal team. This research demonstrates that CoEs (together with 
the more futuristic option of end-to-end managed services models that emulate CoEs except that 
it is run by an external agency) enable setting consistent standards, defining uniform process, 
implementing common technology across business units with a longer term strategic focus, 
providing training, executing risk assessments and providing guidance. However, business 
leadership retains the responsibility for managing risks and governance. Further, another new 
breed of market utility models are heralding in a uniquely innovative approach where the 
members of the community (typically large global organisations with significant third-party 
ecosystems) work together to reduce duplication of effort in third-party pre-qualification and 
retention. The participating organisations agree common standards for third parties as well as 
performance data and collaborate to collect it. Such collaboration is often facilitated by external 
infomediaries (knowledge brokers) who are making these community information hubs available 
as market utilities via a subscription-based service.  Using cloud-based or other agile 
technologies, the infomediary then provides access to an independent hub for validated data and 
analytics, which helps organisations assess and manage risk. In this way, the controlled sharing 
of non-confidential information can increase efficiency, raise compliance standards and reduce 
costs for the community as a whole. In addition to compliance with minimum standards for pre-
qualification based on criticality of the third-party, potential areas where information related to 
ongoing governance and risk management of third parties can be shared include, for instance, 
data privacy and protection, cybersecurity, regulatory compliance, corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), ethics and sustainability, supply disruption and continuity, anti-bribery and corruption, 
safety and quality, EU procurement compliance and financial distress. Some of the available 
market utilities also offer independent audit capability and Significant Event Notification and 
Tracking (SENT), which allow member organisations to manage community-wide disruptive 
events proactively. However, community models are unlikely to take away the need for 
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organisations to continue investing in their own strategic governance and risk management 
frameworks and undertaking assessments specific to their standards and third-party 
arrangements. 
 Last but not least, enhancing co-ordination between various parties (“three lines of defense”) 
involved in governance and risk management across the entire depth and breadth of the 
decentralised organisation. This specifically includes the risk domain owners, business unit 
leaders, functional heads, legal and internal audit teams etc., and given the increasing 
complexities of the external environment as well as the internal organisation is likely to become 
the top organisational imperative related to the strategic governance of the outsourcing 
ecosystem, if it is not already. A Deloitte (2018) report published after the completion of the 
research interviews for this survey subsequently reconfirmed that “as extended enterprise risks 
grow, along with shareholder, political, legal, and regulatory activism, there is likely to be a 
greater demand placed on management and boards to be accountable for major risk events, 
whether the events occur within the organisation or across its extended enterprise. In this 
scenario, Boards in their governing (supervision and oversight) capacity should have deeper 
levels of engagement and more frequent reviews to ensure management has also roped in all the 
relevant stakeholders and internal experts to fully engage in this process supported by robust risk 
management mechanisms”.  
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7. CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Section Summary: This section concludes the thesis, revisiting the contributions once again, 
acknowledging the weaknesses and limitations of the study and providing input for making 
recommendations for further research.  
 
To summarise and recapitulate, the thesis explored the emerging change in mind-set and business 
practices around risk management and governance in large global organisations that were outsourcing 
IT and business processes to a progressively larger number of vendors (including some positioned as 
strategic business partners) forming their “outsourcing ecosystem” or “extended enterprise”, amid a 
broadening of the scope of outsourcing to cover business services (Lacity et al., 2016) and a blurring 
of the boundaries with supply chain management, as in the case of organisations such as DHL who 
have traditionally been involved in the physical management of goods rather than the more virtual 
delivery of outsourced business services. This change in mind-set and action was considered to be 
highly strategic in nature, i.e. where specific responsibilities and behaviours led to the successful 
implementation of the organisational strategy.  
The first part of the thesis (RQ1 and RQ2) attempted to gain an understanding of how and why such 
large global organisations are broadening their perspective and maturity over governance and risk-
management around their outsourcing ecosystem, and the organisational capabilities that they need to 
develop to emerge as astute decision-makers in this regard, using primary research-based industry-
specific case studies.  
The second part of the thesis (RQ3 and RQ4) once again used primary data, but this time to capture 
the overall progress made in achieving this transformation, together with the related implementation 
challenges, and evolving good-practice to address these challenges and exploit the full spectrum of 
opportunity that the outsourcing ecosystem presents.  
Over the last few years, the potential for enhancing organisational value through the outsourcing 
ecosystem, enabled by such strategic governance and risk management, had made it a Board and top 
leadership (C-suite) led imperative and led researchers to study this phenomenon with a value-
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creation and competitive advantage lens. At the same time, the related organisations had also 
gradually increased their levels of dependence on outsourcing to unprecedented levels (Forrester 
Research, 2013; Gartner, 2014; Deloitte, 2015), exposing themselves to newer risks and hazards amid 
shifting business environments (Starbuck, 2014; Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 2015; Deloitte, 
2016). Despite this development, over the last decade or so, there had been limited research on the 
ability of organisations to manage risks around outsourcing with a strategic and dynamic mindset to 
create value for organisations. Instead, most researchers had largely examined risk management 
around outsourcing with the goal of preventing “bad things happening”. Further, their research had 
focused primarily at the level of contract managers and other members of middle/lower management 
rather than at strategic management or top leadership levels (e.g., Zhang, Liu, Tan, Jiang, & Zhu, 
2018; Gupta, 2018; Lintukangas, Kahkonen, & Ritala, 2016; Tsan-Ming, Yulan, & Wallace, 2016; 
Christ, Mintchik, Chen, & Bierstaker, 2015; Słoniec, Kaczorowska, & Motyka, 2016; Alexander, & 
Stefan, 2016; Yu-Chih Liu, & Asri Rizki, 2016; Liu, Wang, & Huang, 2017). This missing evidence 
had obscured the full spectrum of potential opportunity that outsourcing could create for 
organisations, particularly those that were more radical or transformational in nature. This thesis 
addressed that gap and broadened the emerging perspective by gaining a better understanding of this 
strategic transformation (RQ1), relating it to the development of newer organisational capabilities 
(RQ2) as well as identifying/addressing the challenges with implementing this new approach (RQ3 
and RQ4). 
The researcher believes that this thesis has made several theoretical and practical contributions. On 
the theoretical side:  
 It has contributed to the growing body of outsourcing literature by focusing on strategic 
governance and risk management from a novel and emerging “outsourcing ecosystem” 
perspective. To that end, it has integrated and extended the multi-disciplinary perspective on risk 
and governance across diverse disciplines such as strategy, operations, finance, risk, insurance, 
legal and compliance, macro-economics etc. supported by empirical evidence and case exemplars 
to propose a forward-looking framework. This framework depicts a unique trajectory to enable 
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companies to foreground capacities for strategic advantage through outsourcing that challenges 
traditional thinking in this area.  
 In addition to providing this multi-disciplinary perspective, this thesis related and extended DC 
theory to the need for a more dynamic approach to the outsourcing ecosystem. To do so, this 
thesis built upon earlier studies that have long recognised overall vendor relationship management 
ability of organisations as a DC. It now focuses specifically on two new capabilities (identified by 
the empirical research) forming an integral part of such overarching vendor relationship 
management activities: (a) the capability to have a broader perception of risk in outsourcing that 
recognizes opportunities that these risks present in addition to the threats and hazards; and (b) the 
“asset orchestration” capability to develop more mature risk management mechanisms that enable 
organisations to maximize the opportunity while addressing the risk. 
This research also made a number of practical contributions by helping identify and address 
implementation challenges relevant to this transformational thinking, together with the 2x2 model or 
framework.  
1. The framework that is proposed in this thesis is intended to assist organisations to align risk 
management with strategic governance and develop governance mechanisms that allow them to benefit 
from outsourcing opportunities. Specifically, the framework motivates organisations to answer two key 
questions. First, “Where are you today?” to assess where they are currently positioned in terms of 
maturity of strategic governance over outsourcing vis-à-vis their breadth of risk perception which drives 
their appetite to take higher risks. Second, “Which way should you be going next?” to determine a 
possible trajectory going forward to be able not just to manage risks but also fully exploit the 
opportunities that outsourcing can create. As illustrated by the exemplar case studies of four industries, 
there are different paths that organisations can pursue (e.g., horizontal, vertical or diagonal) in their 
attempt to develop into Astute Entrepreneurs, depending on their current positioning. For example, 
Perpetual Losers need to invest in broadening their risk perception, while Great Gamblers need to ensure 
that strategic governance is driven by the Board and seen as an institutional rather than project-level 
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activity. Lucky Survivors, on the other hand, need to develop both aspects, and this is more likely to be 
successful if made gradually – from engaging the Board, towards broadening risk perception.  
2. The thesis extends past experience on managing the strategy execution gap and relates the same to 
the context of the outsourcing ecosystem with a Strategic Management focus as well as Information 
Management focus. From a practitioner perspective, members of the Board and C-suite as well as 
senior management in large global outsourcing (client) organisations can use this thesis to help them 
address the potential for emerging practices and mechanism to avoid or address the execution gap to 
maximize the opportunities that the outsourcing ecosystem can create for them going forward.  
3. The current trend of increasing decentralisation in large global organisations presents a new set of 
challenges to achieving the transformational repositioning in the strategic governance and risk 
management of large global organisations. In response to this trend, this thesis highlights a three-
pronged approach being used by large decentralised global organisations to address this challenge by 
revisiting the role of the corporate centre with regard to its strategy and governance functions; 
aligning outsourcing governance practices to the nature and extent of decentralisation and ensuring 
better coordination between those who perform governance and control functions across the business. 
Practical contributions hold relevance for both organisations and individuals. The researcher considers 
that these practical contributions would be relevant for four categories of the latter category of users 
of the research presented in this thesis: 
 Board/C-suite level leadership of large global organisations that operate with a significant 
outsourcing ecosystem (as well as key vendor or “provider” organisations in that ecosystem) 
in aligning their increasing governance-related responsibilities to the changing strategic 
paradigm.  
 Senior and mid-management-led teams (risk, procurement, vendor management, internal 
audit, legal, technology etc.), who form the “three lines of defence” in large global 
organisations in aligning multiple risk management functions in an integrated manner and 
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accordingly being more coordinated in their approach, thus potentially helping to address one 
of the key challenges in this new approach to governance and risk management.  
 Individuals responsible for contract management, including performance management teams 
to establish consistent and best-in-class processes for working with their providers with due 
focus on governance/risk management and a consistent approach for multi-provider scenarios. 
 Regulators, lawmakers, future researchers etc. can also benefit from this thesis, by bringing in 
a practical perspective that is empirically tested and reflective of contemporary developments, 
both in the external as well as in the internal environments of large global businesses.  
Finally, methodologically speaking the work shows the value of a flexible problematisation approach 
(Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997; Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) in investigating “messy” contemporary 
issues, characterised by multiple layers of change and related uncertainties in the external and internal 
environment of large global organisations. This perspective allowed the researcher a degree of 
freedom and subsequently led to the unexpected discovery of the aspirational path to excellence in the 
2x2 framework presented in this thesis through a multi-stage approach involving exploratory 
interviews, qualitative and quantitative data collection in a range of organisational and industry 
contexts, and finally through follow-up work with executive level key informants to clarify meaning 
and prevent any misinterpretation of constructs. The combination of qualitative and quantitative data 
within this exploratory investigation provided both breadth (by studying responses to a diverse range 
of questions in a large-scale global survey spanning three continents) and a depth of focus (a small 
number of in-depth qualitative semi-structured interviews) to fully capture a range of issues and 
themes in a relatively under-studied field.  Case study research was used in this thesis to fulfil a dual 
purpose: (a) use case study as a narrative for the industry perspectives to address RQ1 and (b) use the 
semi-structured interviews forming the case study as a device to provide empirical evidence to past 
research/literature review to construct the current reality to address RQ3 and RQ4 [Yin (2009): case 
study as a narrative vs. case study as a device for empirical evidence]. 
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There is opportunity to develop this research in a number of different directions based on the findings 
of this study (for example each of the emerging solutions to address the execution gap can be further 
investigated in their own right, together with other emerging practices such as market utilities and 
managed services as an enabler going forward as these practices emerge more clearly in the next 2-3 
years).  
 
A potential limitation of this work is that it primarily reflects the outsourcing (client) organisation 
perspective for large global organisations that operate with significant outsourcing ecosystems, rather 
than also considering the related vendor or provider perspective. This high level client perspective, 
which formed the most salient feature of the scope of the study was, in turn, aligned to the objectives 
of the global consulting firm who sponsored the research and enabled the research access. The end-
objective of the global consulting firm, as we defined this scope, once again in its turn, mirrored the 
expressed needs of its top tier global clients, most of whom were embarking on repositioning their 
governance and risk management mechanisms related to their outsourcing ecosystem. Therefore, 
rather than perceiving this solely as a limitation of this research, the researcher also perceives this 
research scoping as reaffirmation that the thesis addresses one of the most contemporary and relevant 
issues that represents a burning platform in the modern business world. 
The fact that this does not address the vendor or provider perspective is clearly an area for future 
researchers to investigate. Finally, with most global organisations expected to address their transition 
challenges to migrate to strategic, holistic and integrated governance and risk management 
mechanisms related to their outsourcing ecosystems in the next 2-3 years, the focus of future research 
to build up on the current thesis is likely to extend to specific emerging technology and processes, 
including specialised technology-based solutions for outsourcing ecosystem governance and risk 
management (such as Aravo), market utilities that represent collaborative working (such as KY3P-
Markit, Eco Vadis, Shared Assessments etc.) and the overall theme of exploring, once again, the 
implications of outsourcing key aspects of governance and risk management of the outsourcing 
ecosystem to another third-party through evolving managed services solutions.  
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Although researcher bias can sometimes be a potential limitation to exploratory research, this has 
specifically been addressed through rigorous processes of data collection and analysis described in 
section 2 of this thesis. However, the only key area that the researcher felt could not possibly be 
practically addressed was complete randomness in the selection of interviewees for the follow-on 
interviews following the large-scale global survey. As indicated earlier, these interviewees were 
selected on the basis of their availability for the interview and this is further subject to the risk that the 
organisations themselves may have had a role to play in influencing the final selection of participants 
for this study, as a result of their desire to represent their business through the more driven and 
aspiring employees, who were not necessarily representative of all the team-members in the 
organisation. Overall, this research is intended to be the foundation for many other lines of enquiry 
and ultimately illustrates how traditional assumptions and practices around governance and risk 
management of the outsourcing ecosystem are being challenged, with global organisations embarking 
on large transformation projects to achieve this change by new ways of working across contemporary 
organisational forms. 
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State of the literature Areas for empirical research 
Changing Risk Perceptions: 
Risk drives governance and accordingly, 
at the very outset, it is important to gain 
an understanding of the changing 
perceptions of risk, particularly in the 
increasing focus on strategic risk to set 
the stage for understanding the 
emergence of strategic governance, and 
then relate this change to 
outsourcing/offshoring organisations as 
well as their vendors/delivery 
organisations (captives).  
 
  
Risk has been traditionally been associated with 
“bad things happening” and risk management has 
focused on the downside of risk to minimize 
financial, operational and compliance-related 
matters that lead to losses, rather than an enabler 
for value creation. 
 
There is a positive and significant link between 
risk, uncertainty and complexity, which makes it 
difficult to pre-configure and fully structure risk 
management solutions in a predictive manner. 
This uncertainty and complexity is only likely to 
increase in future. 
 
Strategic risk is emerging not just as a new 
category of risk, but driving a change in the way 
in which risks are managed to focus on the upside 
by maximizing value rather than just managing 
the downside.  
 
Academic literature on strategic risk and the need 
to recognize this as a key business imperative is 
emerging; however this literature is extremely 
limited where it relates to ongoing strategic risk 
management in the context of outsourcing or 
offshoring. 
 Examine the changing perceptions of risk 
relating to ITO and BPO, with a specific focus 
on confirming whether risk perceptions are 
broadening to include emerging strategic, 
operational, financial and compliance 
dimensions.  Assess the above change from 
the perspective of outsourcing/offshoring 
organisations as well as vendors and delivery 
organisations (captives).  
 
 Identify and confirm the key elements driving 
any such change in focus. 
 
 Expect and validate a positive linkage 
between outsourcing/offshoring risk and 
uncertainty and examine how increasing 
uncertainty is driving any changes in 
approach to identification or management of 
risks in this area. 
 
 Evaluate whether outsourcing/offshoring 
organisations are focused solely on managing 
the downside of risk or whether they are 
actively exploring the upside of risk for 
enhancing organisational value and untapped 
opportunities.  
 
 On a related note, examine how these risk 
management mechanisms are being re-
engineered or whether they continue to 
operate merely as extensions of audit and 
compliance management processes.  
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State of the literature Areas for empirical research 
 
Repositioning governance: 
 
Having gained an understanding of the 
changing perceptions of risk, the next 
step is to evaluate how this changing 
perception of risk is leading to the need 
for a strategic repositioning of 
governance and compliance management 
mechanisms in outsourcing/offshoring 
organisations, driven as a risk-based 
top-down Board-driven activity. There is 
also a need to follow through to see how 
this is getting devolved to the relevant 
vendors and delivery organisations 
(captives). 
 
 
Risk-based approaches to governance are widely 
promoted as universally applicable foundations 
for improving the quality, efficiency, and 
rationality of governance across various domains. 
 
For governance to be focused and meaningful, the 
complete alignment of governance mechanisms to 
the risk-perceptions provides an objective method 
for establishing governance priorities, areas of 
focus and allocating scarce resources.  
 
In view of the compelling justification for risk 
driving governance, it is natural that the 
increasing strategic nature of risks will drive risk 
management activity and governance to more 
strategic levels, starting at the Board of Directors 
and the CEO.   
 
This would also enhance, on an ongoing basis, the 
collective relationship between corporate 
governance and strategic management in a new 
perspective, and ensure that decisions are taken 
and implemented ethically in pursuit of 
shareholder value, whilst protecting the downside. 
  
Academic literature is however meagre in relating 
this phenomenon to organisations that are 
outsourcing/offshoring as well as those engaged in 
delivering these outsourced/offshored services. 
 
 
 
 
 Assess the extent to which governance 
mechanisms over outsourcing and offshoring 
operations are risk-based and driven by risk 
considerations.  
 
 Explore any related management dilemmas 
and goal conflicts, e.g. profitability vs. risk 
aversion, agility vs. structure etc.  
 
 Identify and confirm the level of management 
at which decisions relating to governance are 
taken, together with the extent of Board and 
leadership (C-suite) involvement. 
 
 Identify and confirm the processes by which 
any such Board-level interventions on risk 
take place.  
 
 Examine the relationship between strategic 
management and corporate governance in 
outsourcing and offshoring organisations. 
 
 Specifically identify how the broader 
considerations of ethical management and 
corporate social responsibility that are 
increasingly getting ingrained into corporate 
governance mechanisms are impacting 
outsourcing and offshoring organisations.  
 
 
Appendix-A: Identifying areas for Empirical Research based on the State of the Literature  
186 
Research step 
 
State of the literature Areas for empirical research 
 
Enabling strategic governance: 
Enablers for strategic governance 
include global developments in the area 
of corporate governance, emerging 
regulation and a fundamental rethinking 
on the changing role of Boards. It is 
therefore important to evaluate how this 
is impacting outsourcing/offshoring 
companies and their vendors and 
delivery organisations (captives). 
 
Qualitative studies in corporate governance have 
grown in number since the 1990s, and these 
studies are mostly developed by UK and 
European scholars, published in European 
journals and tend to explore boards of directors 
more than other governance related actors and 
mechanisms. 
 
Key regulators and governance bodies now agree 
that the board plays a central role, in keeping with 
its fiduciary duty, to approve and monitor 
strategy.  
 
Existing models of corporate governance need to 
be modified to include formal extensions to the 
Board of Directors’ traditionally conceived role, 
which has often been limited to financial 
oversight and not strategic management/strategic 
control. 
 
Changes in the regulatory environment are 
significantly impacting the Board’s area of focus 
in several countries around the world and are 
likely to continue to do so. 
 
However, the literature is impoverished in relating 
these changes to organisations that are 
outsourcing/offshoring and how this is devolving 
on to their vendors and delivery units (captives). 
 
 
 
 
 Examine the extent to which global 
developments around enhancing the 
governance-related accountability of the 
Board are impacting outsourcing/offshoring 
organisations.  
 
 Identify and highlight any emerging 
organisational processes to address the 
increasing impact of regulatory changes for 
such organisations. 
 
 Assess the extent to which the impact of 
regulatory changes is impacting Board and 
leadership behaviour around organisational 
governance for outsourcing and offshoring 
companies. 
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Research step 
 
State of the literature Areas for empirical research 
 
People, technology and operational 
processes around strategic governance 
over outsourcing and offshoring: 
 
The final step is to relate all this to 
people, technology and operational 
processes around strategic governance 
over outsourcing and offshoring 
arrangements, both from the user (client) 
as well as the provider (vendor) or 
delivery organisation (captive) 
perspective; compare and contrast 
vendor approaches from captives and 
identify emerging best practices. 
 
 
Over the years, researchers have examined the 
constructs of risk and risk management around 
outsourcing and offshoring.  
 
Most of this risk research has however been 
carried out largely from the perspective of an 
operational risk and the findings and 
recommendations have primarily been addressed 
to contract managers, outsourcing and offshoring 
team leaders and other members of middle 
management.  
 
Strategic risks, where researched, for example 
around choice of locations, structuring of 
relationships etc. have primarily been around 
initial structuring and decision-making, rather 
than ongoing activities around setting, managing 
and reviewing strategic risk in the context of the 
enhanced accountability of the Board of Directors 
discussed in the literature review.  
 
Limited research exists around holistically and 
cost-effectively implementing strategic 
governance in outsourcing and offshoring, in 
keeping with regulatory and other global 
developments, to be able to manage not just the 
downside of risk in preventing “bad things 
happening”, but more importantly, to be able to 
exploit the upside of risk and leverage risk for 
strategic advantage on an agile and dynamic basis. 
 
 
Identify and examine good practices in outsourcing 
and offshoring organisations, emanating from the 
repositioning of risk management and governance, 
relating to people (b) processes and (c) technology at 
the operational level around outsourcing and 
offshoring. Compare and contrast any significant 
variations in approaches related to the above between 
captives and third-party (vendor) delivery 
organisations. 
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Global Third-Party Risk Survey Questionnaire  
1. Organisational context: Global third-party ecosystems including, for example, suppliers, 
distributors, franchises and joint venture partners (known as extended enterprises in some 
organisations) have in recent years become important sources of strategic advantage for 
businesses.  Please identify the major categories of third parties that your organisation uses: 
Suppliers  
Contract Manufacturers  
Sourcing Agents  
Hardware and Software Vendors  
Technology Service Providers  
Human Resources (HR) Recruiters  
Payroll and Benefits Service Providers  
Office Facilities Providers  
Customer Support Service Providers  
Advertising Agents   
Sales Agents  
Distributors  
Franchisees and Loyalty Partners  
Research Facility Providers  
Licensees  
Joint Venture Partners  
Any others (please specify)  
 
On a scale of 1-5, please assess your organisational dependence on the third-party ecosystem.  
When making this assessment, you may want to consider some of the following factors:  
 Number of third parties involved 
 Proportion of business involving third parties 
 Criticality of business involving third parties 
 Impact of disruption in case of third-party-rated challenges or failure 
Rating 1: Minor Dependence 
Rating 2: Low Dependence 
Rating 3: Moderate Dependence 
Rating 4: High Dependence  
Rating 5: Critical Dependence 
 
Organisational dependence on the third-party ecosystem:  
             Past 
(More than a year ago) 
           Present  
(A year ago to a year 
ahead) 
              Future 
(More than a year ahead – as 
planned) 
Rating (1-5) 
 
Rating (1-5) Rating (1-5) 
Additional comments: 
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Key drivers for engaging third parties: Please select and rank the top 3 reasons for using third parties 
in your organisation: 
Reasons for using third parties  Past Present Future 
 Cost savings/cost reduction           
 Access to specialised skills           
 Flexibility and scalability           
 Manage operational risks           
 Enhance control over costs           
 Enhance control over financial risks         
 Difficult to develop capabilities in contracted area           
 Improve on overall quality parameters           
 Implement best practices related to specific processes 
operated by third parties 
          
 Product or service innovation by leveraging 
specialised third-party knowledge 
          
 Enhance competitive advantage           
 Enhance and protecting reputation           
 Access to new geographies           
Additional reasons or comments: 
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2. Key areas of concern with the use of third parties: Please list out and rank the top five areas of 
concern that you see with the use of third parties, based on the relative criticality or impact: 
 
 
RISK DESCRIPTION 
RANK 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Inadequate justification for involving third parties in a specific 
area. 
     
 Inappropriate overall mechanisms for identification and selection 
of third parties. 
     
 Incomplete or inadequate contract terms.      
 Reputational damage arising from third-party behaviour.      
 Failure of financial viability of third-party impacting delivery.      
 Financial fraud or exposure created by third-party behaviour.      
 Breach of regulation or law through third-party action.      
 Breach of information security through third-party action.      
 Inadequate resilience or business continuity arrangements 
covered by third parties. 
     
 Lack of competence or training of third parties.      
 Inadequate governance and management of third parties by 
retained organisation. 
     
 Concentration or other geo-political risks arising from the use of 
third parties. 
     
 Any other concern (please specify)      
 Any other concern (please specify)      
 Any other concern (please specify)      
Additional comments: 
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3. Third-party Risk Management: On a scale of 1-5, please assess the level of overall maturity in 
your organisation’s approach and processes for third-party risk management.  In making this 
assessment, you may want to consider the following factors: 
 
 Structure of third-party management organisation 
 Clarity of related roles and responsibilities 
 Awareness and commitment to third-party risk management 
 Skills, bandwidth and competence in management of third parties 
 Process and supporting technology for third-party risk management 
 
Rating 1: Ad hoc: None or very few of above elements addressed. 
Rating 2: Basic: Some of the above elements addressed. 
Rating 3: Developing: Consideration given to addressing all the above elements with 
significant room for improvement. 
Rating 4: Established: Most of the above elements addressed and evolved. 
Rating 5: Optimised: “Best in class” organisation – all of the above elements addressed and 
evolved. 
 
Level of overall maturity in approach and processes for third-party risk management: 
             Past 
(More than a year ago) 
           Present  
(A year ago to a year ahead) 
              Future 
(More than a year 
ahead – as planned) 
Rating (1-5) 
 
 
 
Rating (1-5) Rating (1-5) 
Additional comments: 
 
 
 
On a scale of 1-5, please rate the extent of decentralisation in third-party governance and risk 
management in your organisation, where 1 = Highly Centralised and 5 = Highly Decentralised. 
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4. Accountability for Third-party Risk Management: 
 
 
On scale of 1-5 as described below, how do you see Third-party Risk featuring on the Board 
agenda? 
 
1- Not on the Board agenda. 
2- Features intermittently on Board agenda with low importance. 
3- Features reactively in the agenda in response to incidents. 
4- Features periodically on the agenda with varying urgency. 
5- Features consistently as a critical item on the agenda. 
 
Rating (1-5):  
 
 
 
Who is the most senior person accountable for Third-party Risk Management in your 
organisation? Please select one of the following options and add any other optional comments: 
 
 Member(s) of the Board 
 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
 Chief Finance Officer (CFO) 
 Head of Risk or Chief Risk Officer 
 Chief Procurement Officer or CPO 
 Head of Vendor or Alliance Management 
 Individual Vendor or Alliance Manager 
 Head of Internal Audit 
 Head of Compliance 
 Other (specify) 
 
Optional comments: 
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5. Level of confidence in Third-party Risk Management mechanisms: 
 
Please rate your present level of confidence in the following areas impacting the effectiveness 
of third-party risk management in your organisation.  
 
Organisation of third-party risk management 
 
 
High/Medium/Low: 
 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
  
 
High/Medium/Low: 
 
 
Awareness and commitment to managing third-party risk 
 
 
High/Medium/Low: 
 
Skills, competence and training of risk management team 
 
 
High/Medium/Low: 
 
Quality of third-party risk management processes  
 
 
High/Medium/Low: 
 
Tools and Technology used for risk management 
 
 
High/Medium/Low: 
 
Management and monitoring mechanisms 
 
 
High/Medium/Low: 
 
Additional comments: 
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6. Key initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of third-party risk management:  Please rank up to 
five key initiatives that you are undertaking to reduce the risks associated with the use of third 
parties, based on relative urgency and importance. 
 
 
KEY INITIATIVE: 
RANK 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Supplier simplification      
 Enhanced business case and due diligence for 
involving third parties in a specific area 
     
 More disciplined contracting (e.g. centralised 
templates approach) 
     
 Proactive fraud management      
 Better coordination with legal teams      
 Enhanced monitoring of third parties      
 Enhanced training of third parties      
 Enhanced training and guidance for retained 
organisation 
     
 Addressing concentration risk      
 Enhancing visibility and transparency      
 Enhancing technology to manage third parties      
 Enhancing assurance activities over third parties      
 Any other initiative (please specify)      
 Any other initiative (please specify)      
 Any other initiative (please specify)      
 
Additional comments: 
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7. Risk Incidents: Which of the following, if any, risk incident(s), have you experienced in the last 
2-3 years with regard to the use of third parties in your organisation? 
  
 No risk incidents experienced in the last 2-3 years   
 Complete third-party failure   
 A service disruption that you consider as major, in the context of your business   
 A service disruption that you consider as minor, in the context of your business   
 Lost business   
 Fines   
 Reputational damage   
 Financial or transaction reporting errors   
 Breach of sensitive customer data   
 Non-compliance with regulatory requirements   
 Other (please specify)   
 Other (please specify)   
 Other (please specify)   
 
Optional details: 
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8. How do you get assurance over third-party risk management? (please select one or more of the 
following options) 
 
 Visiting third-party locations periodically based on risk assessment  
 Control self-assessments by third Parties  
 Remote assessments with direct access to third-party systems and data  
 In-house internal audit  
 Outsourced internal audit  
 Using contractors for third-party assurance 
 Desktop audits 
 
 Other (please specify)  
 Other (please specify)  
 Other (please specify)  
Optional details: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Organisational profile: Finally, some general questions to help us classify your organisation, so 
that you get more meaningful options. 
What is your job title or its nearest equivalent? 
o Chief Finance Officer (CFO)/Finance Director/Head of Finance 
o Chief Procurement Officer (CPO)/Head of Procurement/Head of Supply Chain 
o Chief Risk Officer (CRO)/Head of Risk 
o Chief Compliance Officer/Head of Compliance 
o Chief Internal Auditor (CIA)/Head of Internal Audit 
o Chief Operating Officer (COO) 
o Other C-Suite, please write in: _______________________ 
o Other, please write in: __________________________ 
Which of the following industry groupings does your organisation primarily operate in? 
o Aerospace and Defence 
o Agriculture 
o Automotive 
o Banking 
o Business & professional services 
o Charities & not-for-profit 
o Consumer products 
o Construction 
o Education 
o Food and beverages 
o Gaming and betting 
o Healthcare 
o Hospitality and Leisure 
o Infrastructure & capital projects 
o Insurance 
o Investment Management  
o Manufacturing 
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o Media 
o Metals & Mining 
o Oil and gas 
o Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology 
o Power & utilities 
o Private equity 
o Public sector – central or local government 
o Real Estate 
o Recruitment 
o Retail 
o Sports business 
o Technology 
o Telecommunications 
o Transportation & logistics 
o Travel & Aviation 
o Other (Please specify)  
What is the legal status of your organisation? 
Organisation here refers to the entity on whose behalf you are completing these questions, which 
may be a subsidiary of a larger group organisation.  Please ensure that you have answered all the 
questions consistently from this perspective. 
o Group organisation 
o Subsidiary/division of a group organisation 
o Single company 
o Government 
o Not-for-profit  
o Partnership 
o Other, please specify: _______________________________ 
What was the turnover of your organisation in the last financial year? 
Please write in the number alongside the relevant currency, consistently with the previous question 
– for example, if you are completing these questions on behalf of a subsidiary of a group, please 
enter the subsidiary’s turnover here. 
o GBP ________ 
o EUR_________ 
o USD_________ 
o Other, please specify ______________ 
What is the geographic reach of your organisation’s operations, i.e. which countries does these 
operations cover? 
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Changing Risk Perceptions: 
 Examine the changing perceptions of risk in the interviewee’s organisation relating to ITO and 
BPO (as well as more generally within its third party/outsourcing ecosystem), with a specific 
focus on confirming whether risk perceptions are broadening to include emerging strategic, 
operational, financial and compliance dimensions.    
 Identify and confirm the key elements driving any such change in focus. Specifically, bring up 
the impact of the macro-economic and business environment, increasing/decreasing dependence 
on third parties, organisational drivers (for instance, an organisation-wide awareness program on 
risks and the opportunities it opens up for businesses etc.) 
 How does the interviewer’s organisation assess their planned dependence on third parties.  Bring 
up the factors to be considered in making this assessment, such as the number of third parties 
involved; proportion of business involving third parties; criticality of business involving third 
parties; impact of disruption in case of third-party-related challenges or failure etc. 
 Evaluate whether the interviewee’s organisation is focused solely on managing the downside of 
risk or whether they are actively exploring the upside of risk for enhancing organizational value 
and untapped opportunities through the use of their outsourcing ecosystem (ask them to provide 
visible examples of such behaviour), together with any other related activities that they are 
undertaking (e.g. articulating their risk appetite). 
 Discuss how these outsourcing risk management mechanisms are being re-engineered to address 
this emerging “opportunity perspective” or whether they continue to operate merely as 
extensions of audit and compliance management processes.  
Repositioning governance: 
 Assess the extent to which governance mechanisms over outsourcing and use of third parties are 
risk-based (driven by risk considerations), capturing specific examples of how such alignment is 
ensured by the interviewee’s organisation. In this regard, bring up the issue of decentralisation in 
the interviewee’s organisations to understand its implications on governance of their third party 
ecosystem. 
 
 Explore any related management dilemmas and goal conflicts, e.g. profitability vs. risk aversion, 
agility vs. structure etc. Bring up the issue of decentralisation once again here to now drive 
discussion on actions being taken to address any challenges to consistent governance of third 
parties. 
 
 Identify and confirm the level of management at which decisions relating to the governance of 
third parties are taken (in particularly the alignment to organisational strategy, together with the 
extent of Board and leadership (C-suite) involvement and any structured processes by which any 
such Board-level interventions on risk take place.  
 
Enabling strategic governance: 
 
 Examine the extent to which global developments to enhance governance-related 
accountability of the Board is impacting the strategic governance of outsourcing/third parties.  
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 Identify and highlight any emerging organisational processes (including, for instance, greater 
involvement of the Board and executive leadership) to address the increasing impact of 
regulatory changes for such organizations, particularly where third parties are involved. 
People, technology and operational processes around strategic governance over outsourcing: 
 Identify and examine good practices in outsourcing organisations, emanating from the 
repositioning of risk management and governance, relating to (a) people (b) processes and (c) 
technology at the operational level around outsourcing and governance of third parties.   
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Board-level activity: The term “Board-level activity” in this thesis refers to an activity of a strategic 
nature that is directed and monitored by the Board, while being implemented by the executive 
leadership including the CEO and other members of top management (referred to as the C-suite), 
under direct Board oversight. This research recognizes the role of the Board of Directors in large 
publicly-listed global organisations to be in keeping with fiduciary duties to shareholders. This 
includes providing strategic direction and monitoring organisational goals, together with related 
strategies and policies. The role of executive leadership, led by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), is 
to run the organisation in line with the Board’s direction by making operational decisions, keeping the 
Board informed, and providing information and recommendations to support the Board in policy-
making, decision-making, and oversight. 
Extended enterprise: The research in this thesis indicates that large global organisations are 
outsourcing IT and business processes to a progressively larger number of vendors (including some 
positioned as strategic business partners) who collectively form their “outsourcing ecosystem” or 
“extended enterprise”. At the same time, adverse risk events originating outside of the legal 
boundaries of the organisation from the actions of these third parties can have a significant impact on 
shareholder value, brand and reputation, profit and loss, employee engagement, and operations. As 
organisations continue to evolve toward more complex ecosystems, these risks are likely to grow. Yet 
all too often traditional governance and risk management processes do not adequately consider these 
extended enterprise risks. Beyond financial and reputation losses, these risk events can demand a 
significant amount of time and focus on the part of organisational leadership to navigate and 
remediate the events, and sometimes even rebuild the organisation and its reputation. To protect and 
create value in the modern enterprise, management and boards need to reset the “front line of risk 
management” to include and focus on the extended enterprise. The outlines of this transformation of 
governance and risk management are already evident at many of the organisations covered by this 
research although few have completed the journey to create a coherent system with clear 
accountability for its execution. 
Governance is concerned with directing and managing activities to maximize performance that meets 
the expectations of internal and external stakeholders, while managing risks and complying with 
applicable laws, regulations and obligations (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 
2004). Researchers acknowledge risk-based approaches to governance as universally applicable 
foundations for improving quality, efficiency and rationality of governance (e.g., Rothstein, Borraz, & 
Huber, 2013). The alignment of governance mechanisms to risk perceptions provides an objective 
method for establishing governance priorities, allocating resources and rationalizing the practical 
limits of what governance interventions can and should achieve (Graham, 2010). Further, risk-based 
approaches create a potential convergence of the ways in which governance problems are framed and 
solutions sought across diverse domains and organisations (Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001). Power 
(2007) argues how risk-based governance practices offer bureaucracies defensive decision-making 
rationales that carry the “veneer of technocratic legitimacy” in the face of increasing scrutiny and 
legitimacy pressures. In line with this compelling justification that risk is driving governance, it is 
natural to expect that the increasing strategic nature of risk drives risk management activity and 
governance to more strategic levels, to be discussed and debated amongst the highest levels of 
management in the organisation, such as the Board of Directors and the CEO. Saltaji (2013) reiterates 
how this also enhances the ongoing relationship between corporate governance and strategic 
management in the pursuit of shareholder value, in keeping with the Anglo-American conception of a 
company as a device to further the wellbeing of shareholders. These emerging perspectives reconcile 
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the need to protect the downside risk to shareholders (managerial accountability), as well as to 
encourage managers to take risks to increase shareholders’ value (Keasey & Wright, 1993). 
Organisational transformation: The Business Dictionary defines organisational transformation as a 
significant shift in the ways of doing business in an organisation, resulting from a change in the 
underlying strategy and processes that the organisation has used in the past. Such a transformational 
change is designed to be organisation-wide and is typically enacted over a period of time. 
Specifically, this thesis explores the emerging change in mind-set (and related modifications in 
organisational behaviours, strategies and processes) around risk management and governance in large 
global organisations that are outsourcing IT and business processes to a progressively larger number 
of vendors (including some positioned as strategic business partners) forming their “outsourcing 
ecosystem” or “extended enterprise”. These organisations consider this change to be highly strategic 
in nature, i.e. where specific responsibilities and behaviours lead to the successful implementation of 
the organisational strategy. In addition to cost-reduction, organisations are increasingly striving to 
achieve strategic benefits such as more flexible IT, access to global markets and talent, etc. making it 
important to understand sourcing projects and their governance within a more strategic context 
(Lacity, Khan, & Yan, 2016). 
Organisational value: According to the Business Dictionary, organisations create value by performing 
actions that increase its worth to investors and other stakeholders.  For instance, many organisational 
leaders focus on value-creation both in the context of creating greater usefulness or worth for 
customers purchasing its products and services (referred to as customer value), as well as for 
shareholders in the business who are interested in increasing the worth of their investment in the 
organisation (referred to as shareholder value). The phrase “business value” is often used informally 
to denote the overall health and well-being of the organisation, resulting from resources or other 
sources that confer certain advantages on the focal organisation over its competitors in the 
marketplace.  For instance, this thesis discusses how strategic organisational pursuits focused on 
creating inimitable competitive advantage and organisational value has led to these organisations 
progressively increasing their dependence on outsourcing to unprecedented levels (Forrester 
Research, 2013; Gartner, 2014; Deloitte, 2015), exposing themselves to newer risks and hazards amid 
shifting business environments (Starbuck, 2014; Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 2015; Deloitte, 
2016).  As a result, the potential for enhancing organisational value through the outsourcing 
ecosystem, enabled by such strategic governance and risk management, has made it a Board- and top 
leadership (C-suite)-led imperative and has led researchers to study this phenomenon with a value-
creation and competitive advantage lens. 
Outsourcing: Outsourcing implies contracting with a third party (vendor) to accomplish some work 
for a specified length of time, cost, and level of service. Offshore outsourcing refers to scenarios 
where the third party is based at an offshore location, which usually means in a developing country 
and separated from the client by an ocean (Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 2015).  
Outsourcing ecosystem: Synonymous to “extended enterprise”.  Please refer to summarised 
description above. 
Risk is typically defined as a probability or threat of damage, injury, liability, loss, or any other 
negative occurrence, caused by external or internal vulnerabilities, which may be avoided through 
pre-emptive action (Law, 2006). Therefore, risk represents a potential for failure in terms of loss, 
harm or missed opportunity. In line with this view, risk management has typically been associated 
with mitigating adverse financial consequences of “bad things happening”, including the use of 
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market insurance mechanisms (Harrington & Niehaus, 2003). “Risk” is generally linked with 
uncertainty (Samson, Reneke, & Wiecek, 2009). Indeed, leadership often has to make decisions 
without complete information and with the inability to specifically describe future outcomes 
(Carbonara & Caiazza, 2010; Krickx, 2000). Several definitions of risk consider the extent of 
uncertainty and the magnitude of potential loss, as the two essential elements of risk (e.g., Kaplan & 
Garrick, 1981). Regda (2007) defines risk as uncertainty, concerning the occurrence of a loss, 
emanating from lack of complete information about the future. Luhmann (2005) argues that risk, 
unlike danger and uncertainty, implies a domain for decision-making about the future. Therefore, risk 
management creates an expectation of decidability and management of uncertainty and opportunity 
(Power, 2007). Research on exploiting the upside or opportunity in risk is emerging as the world 
continues to realize that risks must be taken to seize opportunities, managed and not simply avoided 
for an enterprise optimizing its value and success, particularly in uncertainty and turbulence (Funston 
& Wagner, 2010). 
Risk management is the discipline of improving one’s chances of survival and success, particularly in 
uncertainty and turbulence. It is driven by the philosophy that risks must be taken to seize 
opportunities, and they must be managed not simply avoided. Therefore, by considering and 
managing risk, an enterprise can succeed in optimizing its value and success (Dictionary of Business 
and Management; Law, 2006). Risk management can significantly enhance competitive advantage, as 
advocated by Porter (1985) through cost advantage as well as differentiation. This is showcased by 
Elahi (2013) who explains how this can be achieved by being stronger in dealing with disruption 
when it hits everyone, seeking riskier businesses with higher potential profits, creating a resilient 
image and dealing more effectively with day-to-day fluctuations. On similar lines, Kaplan & Mikes 
(2012) reiterate the need for managing strategic and external risks, but emphasize that this needs to be 
accomplished in addition to managing the downside and preventing “bad things happening”.  
Third party (and related ecosystem): Throughout this thesis, the phrase “third party” is used 
consistently to refer to providers/suppliers of IT and business processes and services, collectively also 
referred to as the third-party ecosystem (discussed in detail in section 3.2 of this thesis), embodying 
the cumulative impact of these individual outsourcing relationships. Accordingly, “outsourcing risk 
management” refers to the process of managing risks related to the third-party ecosystem. In support 
of the growing third-party ecosystem in organisations, recent data published by Deloitte (2018) in 
their publication entitled “Extended Enterprise Risk Management (EERM) – Focusing on the Climb 
Ahead” indicated that more than 56% of large global organisations had more than 1000 third parties 
comprising their ecosystem or extended enterprise. Within this group, 27% managed anything 
between 10,000 and 50,000 third parties as part of their ecosystem while another 19% had more than 
50,000 third parties forming their extended enterprise. This number is only expected to grow in the 
years ahead.  
 
 
